The Melby Mission was a special military mission that the United States sent to Southeast Asia on July 5, 1950, ten days after the outbreak of the Korean War. This mission was named after its Chairman, Mr. John F. Melby, the Special Assistant to the then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Dean Rusk. Also known as the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) Survey Mission, it was a sixteen-man team comprising representatives from the State and Defence Departments and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA).¹ For this high-level and top-secret mission, Melby, a representative from the State Department, was given the title of Ambassador. The Melby Mission’s aim was the containment of Communism in Southeast Asia, an aim that became more pressing after China’s fall to the Communists in December 1949.

China’s fall was a humiliating defeat for President T. Harry Truman whose Administration was forced to re-examine its policy towards Asia and to come up with better strategies to fight the Communist threat. To prevent Southeast Asia from succumbing to a similar fate as China and to prevent further criticism of the Democratic Party, the Truman Administration sent several missions to Southeast Asia after the Communist victory in China. The Melby Mission was one of these missions.

This paper begins with the reasons for the Melby Mission and then concentrates on its visit to Malaya, one of the six countries that the mission was instructed to visit, the others being Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines.² The paper examines the Melby Mission’s objectives in Malaya, then under British rule; its negotiations with the British authorities; its assessment of the situation in Malaya; and its recommendations for the country. This examination takes place against the backdrop of America’s preoccupation with the containment of Communism and its perceptions of Malaya as vulnerable to the Communist threat.

To understand why President Truman sent the Melby Mission to Southeast Asia, it is important to note America’s concern in 1950
about its position in Asia. Except in Japan, the Ryukyus, and in the Philippines, the United States was weak in Asia in terms of military power, political support, and influence. In China, despite massive American aid to the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-Shek, the Communists forces had defeated the Nationalist troops. Republicans in Congress, led by Senator William F. Knowland and Representative Walter H. Judd, criticized the Democrats for having “lost” China and for having devoted primary attention to resisting Communism in Europe while paying inadequate attention to the Communist threat in Asia. Senator Joseph McCarthy also made charges that the State Department harbored many Communists. The Truman Administration became very sensitive and defensive about these criticisms of ineptness and neglect. Fears about the threat of Communism in Asia were increased when the Chinese Communists concluded a military alliance with the Soviet Union in February 1950.3

Since most of the countries of Southeast Asia were, after the Second World War, agitating for self-rule, the Truman Administration realized that it needed to forge closer relations with the nationalist forces in the region to extend America’s influence. Not to do so would allow the Communists to seize control of the nationalist movements and cause “other Chinas”. In order to forge closer relations, America began to stress the economic development of backward areas as it believed that economically strong nations could better withstand the onslaught of Communism. President Truman emphasized the importance of economic aid to underdeveloped areas when he referred to his “Point Four” Program in his inaugural address of January 20, 1949.4

As a first step towards implementing America’s revised and updated policy towards Asia following the “loss” of China, the Truman Administration sent Ambassador Philip Jessup on a tour of the region, to review America’s Asian policies, to express America’s support for Asian governments, and to explain the new Administration’s intentions with respect to the “Point Four” Program.5 The Jessup Mission was followed by an economic mission to Southeast Asia — the Griffin Mission — in Spring 1950.6 Next, using a multi-pronged approach to the Communist threat, the United States despatched a military mission, the Melby Mission, to Southeast Asia.

The Melby Mission was planned before the outbreak of the Korean War. The groundwork for the mission was laid in January 1950 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff called attention to the “increased military liability which apparently is developing in the Far East”. They claimed that:
The attainment of minimum U.S. objectives in the area will require of the United States and all like-minded people the integration of those political, economic, psychological as well as purely military means which are essential to prevent the domination of the Far East by Soviet-led Communism.\(^7\)

They recommended that a program of “overt assistance and ... operations” be initiated as early as possible and “with emphasis in the order listed: Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaya”. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended that the US$75 million for assistance to “the general area of China”, made available under Section 303 of the Mutual Assistance Act of 1949, be allocated as follows: Indochina US$15 million, Indonesia US$5 million, Thailand US$10 million, Malaya US$5 million, Burma US$10 million, and China (including Taiwan and Tibet) US$30 million. The aid allocated for Indochina, Indonesia, and Thailand was listed as being for “direct and immediate usage” while that for Malaya, Burma, and China was listed as “a contingency reserve the exact use of which will be determined later”.\(^8\) In the Southeast Asian area, Indochina and Thailand were given relatively larger sums of aid because “The Cold War... was hot in both countries”.\(^9\)

The United States government was urged to allocate more funds for defense spending in NSC-68, a National Security Council report completed in April 1950. NSC-68 advocated increased defense expenditures to build up Western military and economic strength for a more effective American containment policy. Its recommendations were implemented after the outbreak of the Korean War which followed the fall of China by only six months and which increased American fears about the eventual fate of the region.\(^10\)

The war led Washington officials to emphasize a new military stance. The Melby Mission was the result of America’s decision to intensify U.S. military involvement in the Far East.

The Melby Mission was sent to Southeast Asia to determine how military preparedness could be strengthened, to recommend priorities for arms shipments, and to discuss the composition of American military advisory groups. It spent altogether three and a half months in Indochina, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines and was an important mission because its findings played a significant role in the expansion of American military assistance to Southeast Asia.\(^11\) Malaya was on the itinerary because the Emergency, the fight against Communist insurgency, had been declared in 1948. Like the earlier Jessup and Griffin Missions, the Melby Mission focused on the containment of Communism in the region and made its recommendations in an atmosphere of urgency. Unlike the earlier Missions, however, it concentrated on military
aid as the major containment weapon. Ironically, the military planners in the Department of Defence did not push for remilitarization; under the new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, the Pentagon followed a policy of fiscal orthodoxy. Instead, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and civilian planners in the Department of State advocated increased defense spending.\textsuperscript{12}

American concern about military aid for Southeast Asia was closely connected to the importance of the region. A memorandum of April 14, 1950 by the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, to the Secretary of State, spelled out the economic, strategic, and political importance of Malaya and the rest of Southeast Asia. It noted that the mainland states of Southeast Asia were of "vital, strategic importance to the United States because they were major sources of certain strategic materials required for the completion of United States stockpile projects" and "a crossroad of communications". It also emphasized the significance of the area in America's containment policy:

Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of containment of Communism stretching from Japan southward and around to the Indian Peninsula The security of the three major non-Communist base areas in this quarter of the world — Japan, India, and Australia — depends in a large measure on the denial of Southeast Asia to the Communists.\textsuperscript{13}

The memorandum warned that the fall of Southeast Asia would "result in the virtually complete denial to the United States of the Pacific littoral of Asia" and that a Soviet position of dominance over the Far East would also threaten America's position in Japan because Japan would be denied its Asian markets, sources of food, and other raw materials.\textsuperscript{14}

In the case of Malaya, the outbreak of the Korean War reinforced its importance as a producer of vital raw materials needed for the war effort and led America to put its stockpile program into top gear. The United States quickly bought up as much rubber and tin from Malaya as possible for its strategic reserves. As a State Department memorandum on "Procurement of Strategic Materials from Southeast Asia", revealed in August 1950, Washington did worry that it would not be able to obtain adequate supplies of these materials from that area.\textsuperscript{15} The Melby Mission was sent, in part, to ensure that the United States would continue to have access to Southeast Asia's abundant resources.

Before the Melby Mission departed for Southeast Asia, it was briefed on the situation in Malaya by William Lacy, the Acting Director of the State Department's Office of Philippines and
Southeast Asian Affairs. Lacy explained that there was not yet a strong nationalist movement and that the difficulty there was "caused by imported Chinese thugs," who, by their guerrilla activities, were sabotaging Malaya’s political economy. The warfare in the country was "extremely difficult" and of the type which resulted in "the pinning down of a great number of troops by a relatively small number of guerrillas". He claimed that "the British considered the problem to be of an essentially military nature."16

Precise instructions to the Melby Mission regarding its visit to Malaya stated:

Basic Mission in Malaya is to determine whether or not grant aid should be furnished to the British for use there and if so,

a) U.S. objectives and policies which should govern the furnishing of such aid,

b) The types of equipment and quantities that should be furnished

1. Within allowable monetary sums recommended by the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] ($5 million).

2. Beyond the above limit to meet United States objectives in Malaya.17

Implicit in these instructions was the belief that the United States should offer aid to the British in Malaya.

Attached to the above memorandum were State Department notes pointing out that the British had made "no request for grant military aid for use in Malaya", and that no MDAF funds had been "either allocated or even approved in principle for Malaya". The notes also stated that the "basic reason" for the visit to Malaya was "to decide whether we feel the situation in Malaysia [sic] ... is such that there is a manifest need for outside aid".18 If there was a need for outside aid, the Melby Mission was to decide whether that aid was to be on a reimbursable or grant basis. If the former, the British were to make cash purchases from the United States, as had been done previously. If the latter, the aid was to be given as a gift. If there was a need for grant aid, the Mission was to formulate American "politico-military objectives and policies" and make recommendations as to the nature and extent of the aid needed to achieve those objectives.19

These State Department notes revealed that differences existed between British officials in London and Malaya about their attitudes to American aid. Whereas officials in the Colonial Office were "cool" to the general idea of aid from the United States, the local British officials in Singapore "promoted the idea of U.S. grant aid." According to the notes:
The reason for this appears to be that Great Britain has been slow in making available several items (especially transportation and communications equipment) which British forces in Malaya need in their campaign against the Communist directed bands.

While no explanation, however, was given as to why Britain was slow in sending supplies perhaps this had to do with Britain placing more importance on the defense of Europe. Nevertheless, the notes warned that, in view of the circumstances, "the representations of local British officials should be taken with a grain of salt". 20

The Melby Mission arrived in Singapore via Saigon on August 7, 1950 to begin its two-week visit to Malaya. On arrival, Ambassador John F. Melby stated: "The United States Government attaches great importance to the present situation in Malaya, otherwise we would not be here." 21 The next day the Melby Mission had a private conference with top British officials at Bukit Serene. This meeting was chaired by Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia. Other British officials in attendance included Admiral Sir E.J. Patrick Brind, Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station; General Sir John Harding, Commander-in-Chief, Far East Land Forces; Air-Vice Marshall R.S. Blucke, Air Officer in Charge of Administration, Far East Air Force; and Group Captain B.A. Casey, Head of the Far East Defence Secretariat; The Americans consisted of the Melby Mission members, the U.S. Consul General in Singapore, Mr. W.R. Langdon, and the U.S. Consul in Kuala Lumpur, Mr. R. Poole. 22

Ambassador Melby began by explaining the reasons for his Mission:

...we have come out to Southeast Asia to look over and get some estimate of the political and military situation. American interest has increased and is increasing. We want to look the place over, see what it offers, see what the situation is, what capacities are, and later also to the question of means and ways.

Major General Erskine of the U.S. Marine Corps added that "the main objective is to stop the advance of Communism in Asia as well as elsewhere." 23

When Erskine went on to say that "We are here to find out what we can do to help," MacDonald commented frankly:

For a long time we here have felt that we were getting wonderful support from the USA in soothing expressions of sympathy, but little in the way of concrete support.

MacDonald’s comments verified what the State Department notes had divulged about British officials in Malaya — they were eager
for American aid. MacDonald later acknowledged that “American economic aid in the last few months has just come in the nick of time.”

Ambassador Melby then asked Mr. MacDonald for his views on the general situation in the area, particularly Malaya. In reply, MacDonald concentrated on two main aims of Southeast Asian nations — self-government and economic uplift. He said Southeast Asians believed that the democratic Western powers were their best friends for bringing them economic and political freedom. As long as they were convinced of this, they would not be susceptible to Communism. The discussion next focused on the use of blatant military aggression by the Communists to force their way into a country. The outbreak of the Korean War had increased fears that force, rather than persuasion, would be used by the Communists.

Attention then shifted to Indochina which MacDonald described as “the highway to the rest of Southeast Asia”. He viewed Indochina’s position as pivotal:

If Indochina holds, all holds. Indochina is top priority in world economic and political situations and we would give it first place in all our considerations.

He and Melby and their colleagues voiced their fears of the growing problems between the French and the Vietminh and of China’s increasing support for the Vietminh. All present agreed that there should be more cooperation between France, Britain, and the United States to effectively deal with the Communist threat in the region. All also agreed that their propaganda machinery should be improved. In addition, both sides acknowledged that the defense of Indochina was connected to the defense of Malaya. MacDonald referred to Malaya as “the great prize”, no doubt because of its abundant supplies of rubber and tin.

The last topic of discussion was Burma. Melby said that Burma had impressed the Mission as one of the two main channels for the spread of Communism from the North and that the Mission was very interested in British views about that country, especially in view of the primacy of British interests there. MacDonald noted that the Burma road was important as an entrance to Burma itself but it was a difficult route and therefore should be regarded as the “low” road to Southeast Asia. Indochina, on the other hand, was the “high” road, as it was the main highway to Siam and Malaya. He viewed the Burmese government as weak and needing assistance. While there were some moderate leaders, it was difficult for them to side openly with the Western democracies like Britain and
America. To MacDonald, Burma was vulnerable to Communism and unable to resist a Chinese attack.

At this point it was necessary to conclude the meeting as the Mission members had to meet the Governor of Singapore, Sir Franklin Gimson. It was agreed that another meeting would be held at 9 a.m. the following morning at Phoenix Park to discuss the problem of Malaya. 27

The Phoenix Park Conference, on Wednesday, August 9, 1950, was again chaired by MacDonald in his capacity as the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia. This meeting on Malaya revolved around two main issues — the military situation and the political situation. General Sir John Harding, the Commander-in-Chief of Britain's Far East Land Forces, began the discussion on the military situation in Malaya by stressing that it was impossible for Britain to conduct its anti-bandit campaign in a ruthless manner as in an enemy country because of the plans to eventually grant self-rule to Malaya. Britain could not afford to alienate the sympathies of the population. Harding also noted that there were about 3,000 to 4,000 bandits who were organized on a state basis. These bandits were assisted by a civilian group, the Min Yuen, who provided them with supplies and information. The Min Yuen had 8,000 to 10,000 members. 28 The objective of the Communists was to take over Malaya. When they failed to set up three bases in North, Central and South Malaya from which to expand their armed insurrection, the Communists had turned to internal insurrection on orthodox Communist lines. Fighting the Communists, however, was a difficult and arduous task for the British as the bandits operated in deep, thick jungle and were able to obtain supplies from easily intimidated smallholders. Fortunately, the British did have certain advantages, such as the use of wireless communications and air lifts for troops.

Harding then outlined the way in which operations were conducted under the Director of Operations, General Briggs, who planned, directed, and controlled the work of the police, army, and airforce, and the civilian departments, against the Communists. He detailed the forces — British, Gurkha, and Malay — then stationed in Malaya and described the strategy of the campaign to clear, from the South, the country of bandits. This involved the resettlement of squatters in areas under effective civil administration so as to prevent them from assisting the bandits.

Melby asked why the bandits had not increased in numbers and Harding replied that this was due to difficulty in both recruiting men and in procuring arms. Regarding arms, MacDonald said that
the bandits had received no new weapons of importance. The only arms they had were old weapons, captured from British and Japanese forces, and large amounts of ammunition. Melby then asked if attempts had been made to supply arms to the bandits from outside. In reply, Harding said that there was no evidence of recent importation. He added that the methods of the bandits were "very poor and unskilled", that they could not handle explosives, and that they knew "literally nothing about demolition".

Melby also asked if there was evidence of external political guidance, to which Harding answered that there was guidance from China but no direct guidance from Russia. When Melby inquired if Calcutta was involved, Harding said that the British had no proof of this. MacDonald agreed with Harding and added that most communications to the bandits came via Hong Kong or through Bangkok, where a new Soviet Embassy had been established. The U.S. Consul General in Singapore then asked if the bandits used radio transmitting sets to get in touch with Peking. Harding informed him they had no such equipment while MacDonald pointed out that the bandits used messengers for their contacts with Peking.29

Still on the subject of the Emergency, which dominated the discussion on the military situation, the Melby Mission learned that there were 12 British battalions, 8 Gurkha battalions, and 4 Malay battalions in active service to fight the bandits.30 The Mission also learned that the British needed to maintain a large police force to deal with the resettlement plan and to obtain information about the bandits. While the army had to deal with the bandits in the jungle, the police had to deal with the population in the settled areas. The "rate of killing bandits", which was not very high, depended directly on information obtained. Unfortunately, as Harding noted, "we need information and are not getting it". This was because the Chinese, Malays, and Indians feared that their lives and property would be in danger if they provided information. Harding then told the Melby Mission of the needs of the British authorities and indicated where the Mission might be of help:

The greatest need, in my opinion, is better communications. On equipment, I find we need road building machinery and earth moving equipment for roads and airfields, but also for helping the civilian authorities.

Our wireless equipment is not satisfactory. We've tried almost every type manufactured by every country and none are adequate: too much static and interference of various kinds. Don't think you have one that will serve, but if you have, we should like to have some.
We might not get guns (M-2’s) from Australia because Australia is giving them to Korea. We don’t want to use United States dollars on guns (which we believe UK has already ordered from the United States), especially if they can be gotten from a Commonwealth source.\(^{31}\)

Harding’s remarks constituted a British appeal for American aid with regard to road building machinery, earth moving equipment, radio transmission sets and guns. This aid was seen in military terms, for security purposes to fight Communism. Regarding the wireless sets, the British needed “light round-the clock wireless sets” that would “withstand local atmosphere conditions”. As for the guns, the British needed 1,000 M2 carbines from the United States. More would be needed if Australia could not supply 2,000 Owen guns to the British. The British also needed 100 armored vehicles for the army.\(^{32}\)

Admiral Brind then briefed the Melby Mission about the position of the Navy in the combined operations against the bandits. He said the British were short of patrol craft and that a very serious sea problem would emerge if the bandit situation was not improved. He suggested that the patrol craft used by the U.S. coastguard service would be very appropriate for use in Malaya.\(^{33}\) As for the Air Force capabilities of the British, Air Vice-Marshall Blucke outlined the air forces used in the anti-bandit operations for bombing and emphasized the importance of good intelligence. He suggested special talks with the Melby Mission’s Air Force representatives on the equipment required.

At this juncture, MacDonald urged the members of the Melby Mission to “Please ask any questions no matter how embarrassing”. He assured them: “We won’t keep anything from you”. This led General Erskine to say:

The Griffin Mission made certain statements about equipment, but it was not definite enough to answer this Mission’s purposes, so we had to come back. When the services reports are in, we shall get action.

To this, MacDonald replied:

On purpose it was left that way — not definite. When we tried to find out exactly what we did want we were uncertain as to what you had that was needed for our use, and we found that we would need the help of American technical experts to work out the details.

General Erskine then said that the members of this Melby Mission would get together with the British service chiefs to decide what military aid was required from America. One of the functions of the Melby Mission was to identify the types of equipment that had
been requested from the Griffin Mission. The Melby Mission consisted of experts for this task.  

When Erskine asked what additional equipment would be needed by the British in case of a foreign invasion, Harding replied that in such an event Britain would need a corps of two divisions with all necessary arms as well as help for the police. Requirements included “artillery, armour, engineers, and a small amphibious force”. Units would also be needed from the United Kingdom to enable a balanced field force to be formed. Since the British had sea and air superiority, it should be possible to hold out against 4-8 Chinese divisions. Harding reiterated that the defense of Malaya was connected to the defense of Indochina. “Whole thing in Malaya” he said “lies in the defense of the frontier of Indochina, and Malaya is very closely interlocked with this and cannot be separated”. These comments led MacDonald to stress that he and other British officials in Malaya would urge their counterparts in London to hold discussions with American departments concentrating on the defense of Southeast Asia. He said that joint discussions on Southeast Asia’s defense were very much on the minds of British officials.

At this point, MacDonald initiated the discussion on Malaya’s political situation and began by stating that Britain’s aim was self-government which it hoped to grant as soon as possible. He explained that Malaya was then made up of two territories — the Federation of Malaya and the small island of Singapore. While Singapore was a colony, the Federation was a state under the protection of the British Crown and had to be governed in agreement with the Malayan rulers. Both territories were moving toward self-government. Politically, the British placed greater importance on the situation in the Federation. MacDonald also explained why, despite Britain’s intentions, it had not yet granted self-rule to the Federation of Malaya. According to him, there were two reasons — the lack of unity among the states and the lack of unity among the races. He noted that “until the last three years Malaya had been nothing more than a political and geographic expression”. Besides being divided into eleven political units, the Federation, with its population of five million, was also divided into six different races, with 43 per cent Malay, 43 per cent Chinese, 10 per cent Indians, and smaller numbers of Ceylonese, Eurasians, and European inhabitants. MacDonald pointed out that while Malays agreed that they needed to create a Malayan nation, this would take a long time. As for the time needed, to him “it may be 10 years or 15, but it should be, ideally 25 years”. In reality, Malaya obtained
its independence from Britain in August 1957, 7 years after the Melby Mission.

During the briefing, MacDonald took the opportunity to commend British rule in Malaya. He said “There is general contentment with the over-all British handling of matters”. He also alluded to the benevolent nature of British rule when he pointed out that Indonesia and Indochina had been ruled under violence whereas “Malaya has never been [ruled] like that”. He added, “The fact is we’re getting the support of the majority of the people”.

MacDonald then noted that about 95 per cent of the terrorists were Chinese, mostly China-born. On the other hand, the Malays were “98 per cent with the government” as were the Indians, Ceylonese, and Eurasians. As for the Chinese, they presented a problem as “75 per cent of the Chinese would like to be with us and are holding out until they know the British are going to win”.37

As for Singapore, with its 75 or 80 per cent Chinese population, the British were also presented with some problems. Britain’s policy in that island was still towards self-government but the colony was “too small really to be self-governing and wants to be part of the Federation”. The Federation, however, was not keen on union:

The Federation doesn’t want it to be a part of itself because it fears that an equally large Chinese population might take advantage of full citizenship and take over the country politically. The Federation doesn’t want Singapore.

MacDonald’s observations were correct as future events proved — Singapore federated with Malaya in 1963, along with Sabah and Sarawak, to form Malaysia, but, despite Singapore’s large Chinese population being offset by the indigenous inhabitants of Sabah and Sarawak, widening frictions forced Singapore’s withdrawal from Malaysia in 1965.

The British and American officials at the Phoenix Park Conference then discussed the immediate program for the Melby Mission. Both sides agreed that talks should follow at staff levels between the appropriate services and civil departments, and that the Commissioner General should have further talks with Mr. Melby and General Erskine. Arrangements were also made for Melby and Erskine and six of their staff to arrive in Kuala Lumpur by 11 a.m. on Saturday, August 12 to meet the Chief Secretary, General Briggs and General Urquhart. It was further agreed that another meeting between the Mission and British representatives, should take place before the Mission’s departure from Singapore for Rangoon.38
Both meetings that the Melby Mission had in Singapore provided its members with thorough and frank accounts of the military and political situation both in Southeast Asia, in general, and, in Malaya, in particular. These talks confirmed that American military aid was, indeed, required in Malaya to fight Communism. The talks also emphasized that Anglo-American cooperation was vital to fight the menace of Communism. In addition, Malaya’s importance was also emphasized. In short, the talks provided justification for the sending of the Melby Mission.

During their tour of Singapore and the Federation, the members of the Melby Mission visited many key installations and troop areas in order to obtain a comprehensive over-all view of the military, economic, and political situation in both areas. The Mission also made subsidiary trips to Penang, Ipoh, and Malacca. While all these trips were most instructive and useful for an American assessment of Malaya’s military needs, one drawback was that discussions were mainly held with British officials and not with local inhabitants. Only a few meetings were held ‘in an informal manner with individual Malayan citizens and a few Malayan officers’.

Meanwhile, on August 16, 1950, the Melby Mission received a cable from Washington with news that an additional US$313,000,000 was available in military assistance for Southeast Asia in Fiscal Year 1951. This sum was in addition to the US$75,000,000 already allocated. This meant that Malaya could expect to receive US$8,000,000 in American assistance.

The Melby Mission met again in Phoenix Park, Singapore, on Saturday August 19, 1950 for its final meeting with British officials. As Chairman, MacDonald began by stating that the Federation and Singapore had given the Melby Mission the proposals for assistance. Melby then gave an overview of the security situation in the region, particularly in China, and noted that the Mission’s visit to Burma might be cancelled because of Burmese objections. On the British side, General Harding said that he was able to give the formal assurance requested by the Melby Mission regarding the military importance of assistance with the topographical survey of Malaya while Admiral Brind drew attention to his revised memorandum to the Mission giving the reduced immediate requirements for patrol boats. Admiral Brind had earlier asked for 32 patrol craft from America but the British Admiralty had limited his request to a maximum of 12 because of lack of manpower for the extra craft. On the American side, General Erskine requested that a consolidated list of all requirements should be forwarded to the United States Government through the British Government while Consul-General
Langdon proposed that the list should be submitted as amendments to the basic Griffin Mission list already forwarded by the British Government to Washington. The directive to link the Melby Mission with the earlier Griffin Mission came from the State Department because the Griffin Mission’s recommendations for American aid were more political and military than economic in nature. Melby then said that he would visit London if the Mission went to Europe. Although no plans had yet been fixed for a visit to London, MacDonald encouraged that visit, saying it would be very valuable. The meeting ended with the Commissioner-General thanking Mr. Melby, General Erskine and the members of the Mission. Mr. Melby and General Erskine also expressed their thanks for the reception accorded to them in Malaya and Singapore and said that their talks and visits had been of the highest value.

As requested by the Melby Mission, the British authorities in Singapore and the Federation submitted a consolidated list of all requirements to the Mission. This list was subsequently summarized by the Mission for transmittal to Washington as amendments to the Griffin Mission. As with the Griffin Mission, the requests submitted to the Melby Mission were all related to the Emergency, the most important problem then facing the British in Malaya. To the Melby Mission, the British again stressed the need for aid with Chinese primary education. The British wanted help with the “preparation and publication of a complete series of new primary school textbooks, in Chinese, based on sound educational principles, with Malayan background and content”. The British also wanted training of Chinese vernacular teachers under conditions which will ensure a degree of professional efficiency and, by removing them from the ‘China’ background of the present Chinese schools and bringing them into contact with other (particularly English) teacher training, promote a feeling of unity.

The aim was to lead Chinese students and school teachers away from a pro-Communist and pro-China bias and to integrate the Chinese into Malayan society. A suggestion was made that Chinese-speaking American missionaries who had lost their employment in China might be available. Another suggestion was that an immediate step would be for one or two selected educationists to go to Malaya to survey the field of work ahead and to plan the project.

While the first item in the summary of requirements submitted to the Melby Mission was “Chinese Primary Education”, the second was “Police Requirements”. This had ten subheadings — radio; armoured vehicles; marine craft and engines; interpreters — Chinese speakers; shotguns; armour plate; barbed wire; clothing;
tear-gas equipment; and arms. As with the first item, most of the police requirements had been included in the requests made to the Griffin Mission. The only new requests submitted to the Melby Mission under police requirements were clothing (kaki drill, twill, suits of jungle green, jungle hats and light webbing equipment) and arms (carbines, pump guns, and ammunition). The third item was "Road Construction Plant", a request that had also been made to the Griffin Mission. The fourth item "Road Construction Teams" was a new item submitted to the Melby Mission as a metalled road was urgently required along the Northern Frontier. The fifth item, also a new request, was a "Topographical Survey" of Malaya to help in the defense of the country.

As for priorities, the following items were regarded as of the highest priority; — Chinese speaking educationalists; police items such as shotguns, barbed wire, and interpreters that were "wanted immediately"; and road construction plant. Next in order of priority were: police wireless (maintenance staff and mobile transmission sets); police armoured vehicles; and police clothing. These items were followed by: marine engines and marine craft, arms, armour plate and tear gas equipment.

The memorandum with the summary of requirements also listed the Griffin Mission items that had already been ordered because of urgent need or availability. These items were: police radio equipment; 200 jeeps; hulls for launches; telecommunications equipment, and electric generating plant. The memorandum also indicated, through the use of symbols, that shotguns, armour plate, and barbed wire were items added after the Griffin Mission but before the arrival of the Melby Mission. The requests for these three items had been communicated by the British Government to the United States Government. 45

In the meantime, based on their discussions and observations in Singapore and the Federation, the U.S. Service (Army, Navy, Airforce and Coast Guard) representatives wrote very detailed reports on their perceptions of the situation in Malaya. The State Department and ECA representatives also prepared official reports. All their reports made recommendations for aid and indicated whether that aid was to be on a grant or reimbursable basis. These individual reports were submitted in early September 1950 to the U.S. Government as the Melby Mission’s Country Report on Malaya. 46

The individual reports — Service, State, and ECA — were in agreement about the good cooperation that the Melby Mission had received from the British authorities in Singapore and the Federa-
tion. The reports also agreed that compared with the rest of Southeast Asia, "Malaya appears to present the brightest and certainly the most optimistic prospect of any of the countries concerned". This was due to benevolent British rule in Malaya. The members of the Melby Mission were convinced that "What distinguishes Malaya from other countries in the area is the presence of an enlightened Colonial administration committed to the self-government of the Malayan people". They were also in agreement about the Communist threat: "In common with the countries in Southeast Asia, Malaya is confronted with the menace of Communist expansion on whose solution the future of the country and of the Malayan people depend". The 3,000 to 4,000 bandits in the country represented a sufficient threat to the internal security to require the services of around 40,000 British troops and 100,000 police. On the whole, the Melby Mission believed that the British were handling the security problem very well although the U.S. Army Report by Lt. Col. Henry Neilson and Major Hamilton Reger had reservations (later proved unfounded) about the Briggs Plan, implemented on June 1, 1950.

The reports also indicated that while the British were "determined" to hold Malaya "with or without American support", they would "be encouraged and strengthened in their determination by some expression of American approval and cooperation". Moreover, some "token of American support" was "also necessary for British morale". While in agreement about the necessity for aid, the members of the Melby Mission disagreed about whether it should be grant or reimbursable aid. While most of the service reports, particularly the Army, Navy, and Coast Guard argued against grant aid, Melby and Erskine advocated grant aid. Those against grant aid stressed Malaya's strong economic position. For example, the Army Report stated: "Malaya is the largest dollar earning area for the British Commonwealth, and for this reason it is in an excellent position to pay for U.S. military equipment requested". Those advocating grant aid stressed that reimbursable aid to the British would put a strain on Britain's economy and thus adversely affect Britain's rearmament program for the defense of Western Europe. For instance, the "Summary Report No. 2" by Erskine noted:

...most British officers feel that the purchase of equipment for use in Malaya will handicap to some degree British rearmament for the Western European situation. It has been stressed by many officials that the Federation Government is unable to purchase equipment without making a loan from the United Kingdom.
Melby also claimed that giving grant aid to Malaya would have psychological benefits — it would convince Asian fence-sitters to join the pro-West and democratic camp of America and England. Regardless of whether American aid was to be grant or reimbursable, however, the individual reports reinforced the view that America had a role in Malaya, alongside the British. The reports also pointed out that there was agreement that although Malaya was very important for economic and strategic reasons, Indochina held top priority in Southeast Asia. In their report, Melby and Erskine recommended “in the strongest possible terms that a modest program of military assistance to Malaya be approved and implemented at the earliest possible date”.

From Malaya, the Melby Mission proceeded to Thailand and from there to the Philippines where the Mission received instructions from the State Department to return to Washington via London. In London the Mission was to meet with members of the American Embassy as well as with British officials concerning the Mission’s recommendations for Malaya. MacDonald suggested the visit because he believed there was “a certain discrepancy in the thinking between the British in Malaya and London as to what an American program should consist of”. The Melby Mission arrived in London in late October 1950 and held discussions as arranged. MacDonald could not attend but some of his officers were present and were of much help to Melby. In London, the Mission received an additional list of requirements for a small amount of equipment for the police in Singapore. The talks indicated, as MacDonald had revealed, that British officials in London were less eager than their counterparts in Malaya to request aid from the United States. Nevertheless, aid was requested because Anglo-American cooperation was necessary to contain Communism.

The findings of the Melby Mission in Malaya and in the other Southeast Asian countries that it visited were incorporated into an “Area Report on Southeast Asia”. This Report was completed on November 22, 1950 and submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff under “Mutual Defense Assistance Programs for Countries of Southeast Asia”. The Report surveyed, evaluated, and made recommendations for the type and scope of U.S. military assistance for the countries of Southeast Asia, including the organization required for handling such assistance. Enclosed with the Report were the basic country summary reports as originally submitted to the FMACC. The “Army Report on Southeast Asia” recommended a priority list as follows:
Malaya was placed last not because it was unimportant but because the British were managing very well in that country. For example, the Area Report noted Britain’s superiority in naval and air power. Malaya was also placed last because of its strong economic position which was emphasized repeatedly during discussions about reimbursable aid. For example, the Army Report recommended that military assistance for Malaya be furnished on a “reimbursable basis” because Malaya was “a large dollar earning country well able to pay for any military equipment required”. This problem of grant or reimbursable aid was settled in the main “Area Report” which indicated that both types of aid would be used in Malaya. While most aid would be reimbursable, “certain military assistance would be provided under grant aid in order that time of delivery of required items would be shortened and in order to keep the military strength of Malaya in line with that of other grant aid countries in the area”. Both the Area Report and the Country Report stressed the menace of Communism and the significant role that the United States could play to contain that threat. The Final Report on the Melby Mission, submitted by Melby on December 8, 1950, stressed these same themes. The Final Report also complained of the lack of definition of American policy and objectives in Southeast Asia. It claimed that this resulted from “the failure of responsible American policy circles to answer and define in detail two basic questions”:

1. What is Southeast Asia worth to the United States?
2. What is the United States able and willing, within the confines of its over-all commitments and its overall resources, to pay for Southeast Asia?

By asking these questions, Melby probably hoped to elicit positive responses from American policymakers. Melby stressed that “to sell the menace of Communism”, America needed to identify itself with nationalism. Melby also recommended, as had the Jessup and
Griffin Missions, that an American representative be appointed for the area, with "coordinating and advisory responsibilities, but without executive or administrative authority". The job was to be similar to that of the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia. However, Melby suggested that "the title of Commissioner-General or Commissioner not be used in order to avoid the association with British and French colonialism". Instead, the terms Ambassador-at-Large or Diplomatic Agent were more appropriate. Much of his time was to be spent travelling and his staff was not to exceed two or three officers with supporting staff.

In connection with the appointment of such an American representative, Melby supported General Erskine's suggestion about the establishment of a regional MDAP organization. This was to be attached to the American representative's office. Melby's own preference was for a broader regional association, "along lines somewhat comparable to the British organization in SEA which surrounds the person of Malcolm MacDonald". It was to be based in Manila because that was the focus of American activities in the area.

The Final Report stressed emphatically that "the time of decision on the future of Southeast Asia has long since arisen above the horizon and is reaching for the zenith". The U.S. had three choices: to "disengage ourselves entirely from the mainland of Southeast Asia", to carry out "a holding operation", by continuing present policies, or to decide that "Southeast Asia can be held and the United States can pay the price". The report concluded: "Everything we have seen and heard convinces us that the area can be held if we will it. But it must be done now".54

While Melby and other American officials expected that the Melby Mission's recommendations for Malaya would be approved and implemented as quickly as possible, this was not the case. Melby explained to MacDonald that the delay or "difficulty in translating the recommendations into action was probably due to "the enormous world-wide demands on the United States".55 To Kenneth Landon of the State Department, however, the delay was due to objections on "specific points" and to "some sore quarters in the Department [of State] who are just unsympathetic to any U.S. efforts which might gratuitously relieve the British responsibility in Malaya". The last reason had to do with Anglo-American tensions and to some fears, on the part of Americans, that Britain might leave the onus of defending Malaya to the United States. Even some members of the Melby Mission had feared that the British might ultimately ask America to provide the forces to defend Malaya.56
Eventually, however, the Melby Mission’s recommendations were approved and implemented by the State Department. The recommendations for road construction were the first to be met. ECA funds totalling US$369,950 were allocated in December 1950 to assist the Federation’s road constructing project, to cover the cost of equipment, supplies and transportation, including twenty tractors and six tandem graders. In approving the funds, the American and British governments gave special consideration to the need for combatting the Communist guerillas in the Federation and for facilitating the resettlement of Chinese squatters. A project which received particular attention was the planned road extension between Kuala Lumpur and Kuantan, which would reduce mileage from 284 to 171 miles. By April 1951, MacDonald was thanking Melby for the “great help” that the British were receiving in Malaya as a result of his Mission. MacDonald referred specifically to the equipment received for the roads and communications development programs.

Because roads had a “primarily military value”, a two-year road construction program was announced in June 1951. Later that month, Washington provided a loan of US$4,430,000 to build roads vital for military operations against Communist guerillas in Malayan border areas and to expand the power plant then serving a tin producing area of Malaya. The loan was approved by the ECA. The British Government accepted the loan on behalf of the Federation of Malaya. Malaya was to provide half of the capital needed for the project while the ECA loan was to provide the other half. The sum of US$3,350,000 was to be used to help double the capacity of the Connaught Bridge Power Station near Kuala Lumpur from 40,000 to 80,000 kilowatts. The major part of this new power capacity was to be utilized to increase tin output in Malaya, the world’s principal tin producer. Shortages of tin supply had caused concern to America and the nations of Western Europe as they used large quantities in defense programs. The remaining US$1,000,000 of the loan was to cover part of the cost of building a network of roads in the northern border and the central areas of Malaya. The roads would permit movements of heavy military vehicles and armoured equipment to increase mobility of Malayan and British Government forces in their campaign against Communist guerillas. Later, these roads were to be used for peacetime purposes, such as moving strategic materials and agricultural products, and thus contribute to the economic development of the area.

Meanwhile, tear gas equipment for the Federation of Malaya police was also being shipped to Malaya from the United States in
line with the Melby Mission’s recommendations for military assistance. This equipment was “essential in anti-Communist operations” and “very urgently needed” as police stocks were “low and old.” In addition the request for American-Chinese interpreters for the Malayan police resulted in the State Department sending a trained linguist, Dr. Nicholas Bodman, to serve as the Director of the Hokkien Language School in Cameron Highlands. Dr. Bodman instructed Police officers in Chinese dialects for one year and was a great success. He was so good in his work that the Deputy Commissioner of Police, N.N. Robinson, claimed: “One Bodman is worth 100 tanks.”

Thus, one by one, the Melby Mission’s recommendations for Malaya were translated into concrete military assistance for fighting the Communist menace in the country. This assistance though modest in scope, was a vital contribution that British officials greatly appreciated as they were fighting the Emergency against Communist insurgency. Since both Britain and the United States were united in their common goal to contain Communism, there was much cooperation between them over Malaya. The outbreak of the Korean War, following so closely the fall of China, probably prompted more Anglo-American cooperation. The Mission’s visit to Malaya depicted Anglo-American cooperation at one of its highest levels. Greater cooperation was needed in what seemed like a bipolar world made up of two camps, Communist and anti-Communist. The Korean War also prompted the United States to play a more active role in the region by providing military aid. There was heightened concern for Malaya not only because of the Emergency but because of Malaya’s importance as a leading producer of strategic raw materials needed for the war effort. This importance increased fears about Malaya’s vulnerability to Communism. The Melby Mission to Malaya and the other Southeast Asian countries represented a determined and concerted effort by America to thwart Russian and Chinese designs to spread Communist influence in the area. In the case of Malaya, since the Emergency was brought to a successful end in 1960, in part with American aid resulting from the Melby Mission, the conclusion can be drawn that the Melby Mission contributed to that victory against the Communist.

NOTES

1 For a list of the representatives from the State Department, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Airforce, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the ECA, see the Papers of John F. Melby (hereafter Melby Papers), Harry S. Truman Library (hereafter Truman Library), Independence, Missouri.
Although the Melby Mission planned to visit Burma, the visit was cancelled because of internal problems in that country. See the letter dated August 29, 1950, by Ambassador John F. Melby to Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, Commissioner General of the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, Melby Papers, Truman Library.


7 Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, January 20, 1950, enclosed in the report by Johnson to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 6: 6.


17 The State Department's reference to "Malaysia" thirteen years before that federation was formally created, is one of the earliest American uses of that term. See "State Department Notes on Visit to Singapore" attached to *Ibid.*
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
22 For the American version of the meeting, see Bukit Serene Conference, August 8, 1960, 2:30 pm. Melby Papers, Truman Library. For the British version of the same meeting, see Memorandum: Visit to Singapore of the United States Joint Defence Survey Mission (Melby Mission), by the Office of the Commissioner General, Singapore, August 22, 1950, Melby Papers, Truman Library.
23 Bukit Serene Conference, August 8, 1950, Melby Papers, Truman Library. According to Melby, the Mission’s orders from Washington were to “stay as long as necessary to do the job, but to get back as soon as possible.”
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Phoenix Park Conference, Singapore, August 9, 1950, 9.00 a.m., Melby Papers, Truman Library.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 21 battalions were available for operations, 3 for training and equipping while there were 2 armoured car regiments. These troops also undertook many non-military duties, such as helping with the resettlement plan and screening operations. See “Continuation of Meeting of Phoenix Part at 9 a.m., 9th August 1950”, Office of the Commissioner-General, Singapore, 14th August, 1950, Melby Papers, Truman Library.
31 Phoenix Part Conference, Singapore, August 9, 1950, 9.00 a.m., Melby Papers, Truman Library.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 See “Continuation of Meeting at Phoenix Park at 9.00 a.m., 9th August 1950”, Office of the Commissioner General, Singapore, 14th August, 1950, Melby Papers, Truman Library.
38 Ibid.
40 Memorandum for General Erskine, August 16, 1950. Melby Papers, Truman Library. According to this memorandum, a total sum of US$463,000.00 was available for Southeast Asia, with the largest allocation for Indochina.
41 See Melby Mission: Final Meeting, 10 a.m., Saturday, August 19, 1950, Phoenix Park, Office of the Commissioner-General, Singapore, 22nd August, 1950, Melby Papers, Truman Library.

42 See the telegram by Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to the US Consul-General in Singapore, Langdon, August 7, 1950. in FRUS 1950, 6: 130.

43 Melby Mission: Final Meeting, 10 a.m. Saturday, August 19, 1950, Phoenix Park, Office of the Commissioner-General, Singapore, 22nd August 1950, Papers of John F. Melby, Truman Library.

44 Federation of Malaya: Summary of Requirements Submitted to the American Joint Defense Survey Mission, Melby Papers, Truman Library.

45 Ibid.


47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.


50 See Letter from John F. Melby to Malcolm MacDonald, Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, March 9, 1951, Melby Papers, Truman Library.


52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.


55 See “Comment on Report to Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating of Joint MDAP Survey Mission to Southeast Asia”, by the Consul General at Singapore, Langdon, to the Secretary of State, January 2, 1951, FRUS, 1950, 6: 186-188.

56 Melby to MacDonald, March 9, 1951, Melby Papers, Truman Library.


58 Telegram by Acheson to the American Consul General in Singapore and the American Consul in Kuala Lumpur, December 19, 1950, National Archives
(hereafter NA), Washington D.C., Record Group (hereafter RG) 84. Folder 500: The Melby Mission.

59 MacDonald to Melby, April 15, 1951, Melby Papers, Truman Library.

60 Telegram by Acheson to the American Consul General in Singapore and the Consul in Kuala Lumpur, June 27, 1951, NA, RG 84, Folder 500: The Melby Mission.

61 Telegram by the American Consul in Kuala Lumpur, Poole, to Acheson, January 6, 1951, NA, RG 84, Folder 500: The Melby Mission.

62 Hendrik van Oss, American Consul in Kuala Lumpur, to the State Department, August 19, 1952, NA, RG 84, Folder 50: Bodman (Aid Program).