

## The Movement of Opposition Political Parties in Social Media: Case Study of Relocation the Indonesia Nation's Capital Policy

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### ABSTRACT

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) is a minority opposition in Parliament Indonesia; other political parties are in the ranks of supporters of President Joko Widodo's government. One of the government policies rejected by PKS is the relocation of the National Capital City (IKN). PKS uses it to voice its criticism consistently by utilizing Twitter. Therefore, this research aims to analyze the PKS opposition movement using Twitter in the IKN relocation policy. This research uses a qualitative method with a case study approach. This research uses Nvivo 12 plus to analyze data. The findings of this study are that disturbing economic recovery is the most dominant content spread by PKS on Twitter as a criticism of the IKN relocation policy. Likewise, the narrative spread by PKS on Twitter is to bring up why the party rejects the approach. Then, PKS involved its elite cadres in actively spreading its criticism on Twitter. PKS's digital opposition movement became more intense when the IKN Bill was passed. However, the dominance of the government coalition in parliament still determines the smooth running of the policy. Thus, the conclusion of this study emphasizes that social media has become a new space for minority opposition political parties to criticize as a form of balancing against the power of the government coalition. The formal opposition movement joins other entities outside the system in the digital space to seek to shake the policies of a government whose majority is approved by parliament.

**Keywords:** *Political parties, digital opposition, social media, PKS, IKN.*

### INTRODUCTION

The existence of opposition political parties is an inherent institution in a democratic system. The opposition party is an essential instrument in the legislature (Jesudason, 1996; Schneider, 1992). Its role as a checks-and-balances system is undoubtedly fundamental as it counterweights the policies passed through the majority votes (coalition parties) supporting the government. The dynamics in parliament determine the direction and policies, and opposition political parties must be able to present concrete steps so that their presence as a counterweight lull good result (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Onis, 2019).

Reflecting on the Indonesian case, opposition forces are a minority in parliament, but as a political force, they remain a pressure group. This phenomenon is closely related to the existence of a highly hegemonic and repressive government, as in the case of single-party rule, when the political opposition does not disappear but only changes hide and move underground (Romli, 2018). The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) is the only party that has consistently been in the opposition in President Joko Widodo's leadership era. PKS is a minority opposition in parliament, and other political parties are in the ranks of supporters of

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President Joko Widodo's government. The PKS Central Leadership Council (DPP) emphasized that it will continue to be an opposition party to President Joko Widodo's government until 2024. Chairman of the DPP PKS for Political, Legal and Human Rights Al Muzammil Yusuf stated that PKS plays an active role by providing constructive criticism to the government (CNN Indonesia, 2022b).

One of the government policies rejected by PKS and accepted by the majority of parties in parliament is the relocation of the National Capital City (IKN). The Prosperous Justice Party faction of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia rejected the Draft Law on the National Capital City (RUU) to be enacted into a Law (UU) in the Plenary Session of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia. Member of the House of Representatives Hamid Noor Yasin, PKS faction, assessed that the discussion of the IKN Bill was rushed, so many substances needed to be thoroughly discussed (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, 2022). Moreover, PKS explained that the plan to move to the new capital city in the early semester of 2024 needed to be timelier amid an economic crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Moving to the new capital city takes a long time, especially when building several basic facilities such as water resources, roads, bridges, and settlements. Financing the new capital city will at least use the State Budget (APBN) to more than Rp90 trillion. This condition is impossible because the country's economy is sluggish due to the pandemic (CNN Indonesia, 2022a). It is known that of the total cost of Rp 466.98 trillion for the construction of the new capital city, 53.5 percent of which comes from the state budget. At the same time, the remaining 46.5 percent is from Government Cooperation with State-Owned Enterprises and the private sector (Farisa, 2022).

However, PKS cannot do much regarding rejecting the capital relocation policy. This is because PKS is a minority opposition in parliament. Meanwhile, other opposition representatives, namely the Democratic party faction, continue to accept the capital relocation policy with several critical inputs (Paat, 2022). With PKS's position as a minority opposition in parliament, one way to consistently voice its criticism of the capital transfer policy is to utilize information technology such as social media, especially Twitter. PKS massively uses Twitter to criticize the capital transfer policy. Nowadays, social media has become a way to do this. Access and familiarity with technology have become essential for the success of political and social movements (Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2013). Social media is increasingly vital for political and social movements (Jost et al., 2018). Social media's facilities make it a significant platform for political and social movements (Sandoval-Almazan & Ramon Gil-Garcia, 2014). In particular, Twitter has played a substantial role in influencing government decision-making and shaping the relationships between governments, citizens, politicians, and other stakeholders (Larson et al., 2019). Twitter can be used for mutual communication, interaction, and conveying information to the public. Twitter has established itself as one of the most popular online activities and one of the most effective channels of communication and information sources (Mansour, 2018; Subekti et al., 2022). Twitter is a platform for communication. The platform allows people in a shared network to interact, share content, and collaborate online. Twitter is a platform for people of common interests to connect and share information openly and transparently. Twitter's most significant advantage is that it allows for unlimited interaction and communication worldwide (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013; Eom et al., 2015; van Vliet et al., 2020).

Furthermore, the movement from PKS that rejects the construction of IKN is part of voicing the aspirations of several Indonesian people who disagree with this policy as data released by Indostrategic (Institute for Democracy & Strategic Affairs) states that the number of respondents who are less and disagree with the policy of moving the national capital is more dominant, reaching 57.3 percent. Meanwhile, only 40.1 percent agreed and strongly agreed with IKN. In this data, there are also three main reasons why most people have differing views that IKN will immediately move to the archipelago in East Kalimantan. The first reason is that the cost of building IKN is considered more valuable if used to deal with problems in Indonesia. Second, the construction of IKN in East Kalimantan is deemed to be done in a hurry. The third reason is that DKI Jakarta is still considered feasible and appropriate as the capital of Indonesia (CNN Indonesia, 2023). This shows that PKS is not an independent entity in the context of the IKN rejection movement, but there are also circles of Indonesian society that share the same views (Asmaaysi, 2023). PKS, in this case, indeed absorbs the aspirations of its constituents regarding this issue, which results in this attitude being officially conveyed in parliament. Moreover, this movement is also a tangible form of PKS's consistency to be in an opposition position to the Joko Widodo administration (Muhtarom, 2023). Politically, this is part of PKS's investment to maintain its voters who dislike Joko Widodo in preparation for the following general election (Firmansyah, 2023).

Some previous studies have addressed the issue of social movements of political parties, as research shows that protests can build political movements that ultimately influence policymaking. They do so by influencing political views, not just expressing existing political preferences. This is in line with research Cowell-Meyers, (2014) that explains that movement parties can be an effective mechanism for changing patterns of democratic representation of marginalized groups. Likewise, research [\[1\]](#) demonstrates that this wave of protests was heavily conditioned by the party system's alignment with the market liberalization process, which determined whether the established parties could channel public disapproval of market orthodoxy.

Moreover, previous research discussed the opposition movement of political parties. Opposition political parties did not get the maximum number of votes despite demonstrations by the people against the government. Opposition demonstrations gather sizable crowds and vocal support, but opposition parties need to garner a significant portion of the vote in parliamentary elections. A momentary opportunity for voters to publicly and performatively affirm those aspects of their political subjectivity that this reductive interpretation of their vote elides is created by opposition rallies (Chua, 2020; Persson et al., 2019). Then, political parties positioned themselves as opposed to being outside the government for reasons of a pragmatic political strategy. When a party is involved in a governing coalition, it is more likely to pursue a clientelist strategy; conversely, when a party becomes the opposition, it is more likely to pursue a programmatic approach (Capozzi, 2020; Kılıçdaroğlu, 2020; Manning & Smith, 2016).

Based on the discussion of previous research on social movements of political parties, the focus has been on fundamental movements in the field so far. Then, prior research on the opposition movement of political parties also only focuses on two topics: the votes obtained by opposition political parties in the election are not directly proportional to the anti-government community protest movement and the position of opposition parties as a political strategy. However, previous research has not comprehensively explained the opposition political party movement using digital media. Therefore, the novelty offer of this

research focuses on the opposition political party movement using social media Twitter. Thus, this study aims to analyze the opposition movement of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) using Twitter in the policy of relocating Indonesia's capital city.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### *Political Parties of Opposition in the Democracy System*

The ability of democracies to transform societal tensions into institutionalized patterns of political interaction makes them distinctive. Only in democracies can we hope to find opposition groups that acknowledge the legitimacy of the existing administration, have their legal rights upheld, and are represented in the legislature (Izumi & Medeiros, 2021; Wolton, 2015). The existence of opposition parties, which hold governments responsible for their actions while in office and give voters an effective alternative to those in power, is essential to democratic forms of government (Best, 2013; Gkinopoulos, 2020). The structure and caliber of representation through administrations and oppositions depend largely on parliamentary political parties in established democracies because these significant functions have been mainly given to political parties (Stiers, 2019). The traits of parliamentary opposition are so closely linked to the party system that they are frequently compared. Political party accounts are almost always included in discussions of institutionalized parliamentary opposition, although extra-parliamentary opposition sometimes seems associated with non-party resistance (Kwayu, 2022).

Over time, more work has been done to distinguish between opposition parties and opposition outside parliament. Since the 1950s and 1960s, the electoral party system—from now on referred to as the post-war era's post-war electoral party system—has grown dramatically in almost all the established democracies covered here (Dahl, 2020). The legislative party system, usually the number of parties in the legislature, has also grown. Likely, these increases in the number of political parties have also altered the features of parliamentary opposition because the distribution of electoral support among political parties strongly influences the kind of opposition present in a democracy (Dahl, 2008).




Figure 1: Network mapping of political parties' opposition concept

Data visualization in Figure 1: the data source comes from the Scopus database with the keyword "political parties' opposition," getting articles from as many as 21 documents. It was then processed using Vosviewers software with the network feature. Figure 1 displays a network of opposition political parties consisting of five clusters. The first cluster in green consists of keywords consolidation, democracy, opposition, political communication, and populism. The second cluster in red consists of the keywords policy approach, government, party politics, policy oppositions, legislation, and legislative speechmaking. The third cluster in yellow consists of the keyword's legislative opposition and black movement. The fourth blue cluster consists of the keyword's political parties and anti-politics. The five purple clusters consist of the keyword's inclusion and political violence.

### *The Movement of Political Party in Social Media*

Social media is becoming more prevalent. Platforms like Facebook and Twitter can increase political engagement. Twitter is an excellent platform for users to disseminate general information and political opinions publicly through networks of political institutions such as politicians, political parties, and political foundations (Stieglitz et al., 2012). Social media must be planned, communicated, and programmed to increase the credibility of political campaigns. In this case, political parties' organizational communication is essential to ensure adequate interaction on social media platforms (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2013).

Social media is a group of internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 and allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010; TAN et al., 2024). The principal feature of social media is co-creation by the users. Web 2.0 provides the platform for this collaboration, spanning all connected devices to encourage content creation, organization, linking, and sharing (Chun et al., 2010). Following this reasoning, web 2.0 is more related to the technical platform where social media applications are built to create and exchange user-generated content (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012). Another path to understanding social media is through their functions or services. Social media services include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Four Square, YouTube, and Flickr. Accordingly, social media is "a set of tools and systems that allow an organization to achieve these social capabilities." Recent research about the use of social media for cyberactivism supports the idea that internet technologies allow protesters to organize in a decentralized fashion and without central authority. This organization creates more flexible forms of collective action, radically changing how grassroots politics operate (Gonzalez-Bailon & Wang, 2013). However, an analysis of 450,000 Twitter messages of two different social movements – the outraged and occupied – from Spain states that "global connectivity depends on a small percentage of users and that the two movements are mostly concerned with their local struggles."

More than that, internet activism uses electronic communication technologies such as social media, especially Twitter and Facebook, YouTube, e-mail, and podcasts, for various forms of activism to enable faster communications by citizen movements and the delivery of local information to a large audience (Wall, 2007). To understand this phenomenon, we should go back to the social media origins of the Web 2.0 platform. Research linking social media and social protest presents the first international reports about the use of technology in social protest (Kalathil & Boas, 2010). Zhang et al., (2009) Analyze civic participation and online networking cases and their relationships. Friedland & Rogerson, (2009) organize a literature review based on four typologies for social media protest online: the first one

conceives the internet as a space in which people meet; the second is the types of organization and internal communication patterns; the third section is how this group communicates externally; and the fourth is how they use social media technology to affect internet-based mobilization.

Some political movements are related to political parties (M. A. Schwartz, 2010). Using the Internet, political movements have evolved into more organized global political protests (Feixa et al., 2009). In recent years, social media tools have helped to organize political demonstrations (Wall, 2007). Are social movements changing because of technology? This question is difficult to answer; however, some scholars' research seems to indicate that technological tools improve the organization of political movements (Salter, 2003; Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2009). Political parties have adapted to new communication technologies and shifting electoral settings to increase their prospects of winning national and local elections. Increasingly, political actors use the Internet and social networking sites as their primary means of communication, even outside of election seasons (McNair, 2017). The potential for political parties to connect, communicate, mobilize, fundraise, and affect the news agenda through social media are some of the strategic reasons why political parties are increasingly performing online politics (Kalsnes, 2016; Narasimhamurthy, 2014; Olof Larsson, 2021). Digital technologies such as social media allow candidates, political parties, and other interest groups to take advantage of significant breakthroughs in data-driven political campaign techniques (Chester & Montgomery, 2017). Political parties have created digital media techniques for political campaigns, allowing them to reach out to voters more personally. Websites have evolved into social media hotspots where voters can be engaged before, during, and after elections. The parties' outreach to voters continues between elections, primarily through regular email, social media, and text communications to supporters, reinvigorating the parties' electoral role (Subekti & Qodir, 2020).

## METHODOLOGY

This research uses a qualitative method Creswell, (2016) with a case study approach Yin, (2009) to analyze the opposition movement of the Prosperous Justice Party in digital media regarding the policy of moving the capital city of Indonesia. Most political parties in parliament accept the policy initiated by the government, but only PKS rejects it. The primary data source of this research is the PKS Twitter account; this is because the political party massively uses Twitter as a means of its opposition movement in the context of the policy of moving the capital city of Indonesia. Moreover, PKS is also the only party that has consistently been the opposition in President Joko Widodo's government for two periods. The PKS Twitter account data is collected from January 2021 to December 2022. This is because the period includes before and after the ratification of the policy of moving the national capital into parliament into law. The number of Tweets analyzed in the PKS Twitter account is 4464.

Then this research also uses secondary data as additional data derived from credible and reputable online news such as Kompas.com, Liputan6.com, Detik News, CNN Indonesia, and Tempo.co, and relevant journal articles. Furthermore, in data visualization and analysis from PKS Twitter accounts, this research uses Nvivo 12 plus software (Edlund & McDougall, 2018). The features used in Nvivo 12 plus are crosstab query, which is used to analyze content; chart analysis to visualize the intensity of the PKS opposition movement on Twitter; and word frequency, which is used to analyze the PKS opposition narrative on Twitter regarding the

policy of moving the capital city of Indonesia. Figure 2 displays the flow of research data collection and analysis.




Figure 2: The flow of research data collection and analysis

Figure 2 explains the flow of research data collection. The data is taken from the PKS Twitter account using Ncapture in the first step. The second step is entering the files obtained as ris into the Nvivo 12 plus software. In the third step, after entering Nvivo 12 Plus, the data is analyzed using the chart, word frequency, and crosstab query features. In the last step, the analysis results visualized in Nvivo 12 plus are displayed in this study and then analyzed. Then, the data analyzed and visualized is discussed based on empirical facts and compared with previous findings and existing theories. After the data has been discussed, conclusions are drawn to become the basis for answering the objectives of this research.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### *Content and Narrative Analysis of the Prosperous Justice Party's Opposition Movement on Twitter*

Even if the parties have done an excellent job adjusting to mass media logic, they still need help doing the same with social media, especially given the possibility of political interaction and engagement. Social media logic, or networked media logic, refers to the features and mechanisms of these platforms that promote exposure and attention, information processing, and communication (Kalsnes, 2016; Klinger, 2013). Political parties have begun to adjust the logic of social media by seeking to use it as a tool that can benefit political interests. As a popular social media source, Twitter has also been used by opposition political parties to criticize government policies. This is done as a form of opposition to the government's shift to the digital world (Russell, 2020). The primary purpose of using Twitter by opposition political parties is to find alternative ways outside the parliament to convey discrepancies related to policies decided by the government (Kwayu, 2022). Another goal is to seek and gain sympathy from people who dislike the guidelines issued by the government, thus creating a common heart in criticizing the government (Anduiza et al., 2014; Bennett, 2012; Lim, 2012).

Likewise, the opposition movement of the Prosperous Justice Party on Twitter criticized the policy of moving the capital city of Indonesia. The content spread by PKS through

Twitter criticizes the policy of relocating the capital city: disrupting economic recovery, burdening state finances, and laws on moving the capital city that are problematic and has environmental impacts. These contents show PKS's disagreement with the government and most political parties in parliament. Figure 3 of the NVIVO 12 plus analysis results with the crosstab query feature show the dominance between these contents.




Figure 3: Prosperous Justice Party's dominance of opposition content on Twitter

Figure 3 shows that the most dominant content disseminated by PKS to criticize the policy of moving the capital city is disturbing economic recovery with a figure of 40,00%. This can be interpreted as the most significant focus of the PKS opposition movement to argue with the government regarding the policy because it argues that it will disrupt the post-COVID-19 economic recovery of the Indonesian people. Contrary to the arguments of the Government of Indonesia through the acting Regional Director II of the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) Mohammad Roudo, who said that the relocation of the archipelago's capital city (IKN) is an effort to overcome the pandemic by making economic transformation. In the master plan, six industrial clusters and two supporting clusters will be made (Fauzia, 2022). Meanwhile, in terms of financing the relocation of IKN, optimization of Government and Business Entity Cooperation (KPBU) and other schemes involving the private sector will be encouraged (Vernando, n.d.).

The arguments from PKS are a form of opposition to overseeing the government's performance outside the parliament using digital media. This resulted from the minority of opposition political parties in the parliament during the era of President Joko Widodo, so PKS did not have sufficient power. The institutionalization of the opposition in parliament has faced many challenges, especially from pro-status quo groups. Still, as a force of resistance outside of parliament, the opposition in Indonesia appears so strong because it has succeeded in pushing the democratization process (Aspinall, 1996; Ufen, 2009). The PKS opposition movement on Twitter is also a political strategy to increase public trust. If the opposition party can carry out its role effectively, it will positively impact the public appreciation of the opposition party. These functions include being able to question/expose government policies that commit injustice. Criticize government policies if they are considered not aspirational to the interests of the people, express their disagreement (dissent) with government policies



deemed not in favor of the people, convey alternative approaches, and build public opinion to pressure the government (Lyons, 2016; Manning & Smith, 2016; Wahman, 2013).

Then, the second PKS criticism content on Twitter about the policy of moving the national capital is a matter of law with a figure of 30,00%. This finding data, PKS has the opinion that in terms of legislation, the relocation of the national capital needs to be more formal and materially problematic. At the same time, the law is an essential policy component because it is a foundation for implementation. The Prosperous Justice Party faction of the House of Representatives rejected the Draft Law on the National Capital City (RUU IKN) to be enacted into law in the House of Representatives Plenary Session. Said Member of DPR RI Hamid Noor Yasin, F-PKS assessed that the discussion of the IKN Bill was rushed, so many substances had not been thoroughly discussed. Likewise, the President of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Ahmad Syaikh, revealed several reasons that made the party reject the State Capital Law (RUU IKN). Syaikh said PKS left it because the IKN Law had problems formally, procedurally, materially, or substantially (Yahya, 2022).

Furthermore, the third PKS criticism content on Twitter about the IKN relocation policy is the environmental impact, with a figure of 20,00%. This finding shows that PKS also pays attention to environmental issues from its criticism regarding the relocation of IKN. This is inseparable from the location of the relocation of the capital city, which is located on the island of Kalimantan, which has a geographical tropical forest, also known as the lungs of the world. The biggest concern of the policy of moving the capital city to Kalimantan is that it will damage the forest ecosystem, which has been the natural source of life for the world. This issue is indeed conveyed by the local community of Penajam Paser Regency as the location of the relocation of the National Capital Region (Detik News, 2022).

Therefore, PKS, as the opposition government, is responsible for conveying the community's aspirations (Capozzi, 2020; Persson et al., 2019). In line with one of the theories of the functions of political parties, namely political means, political parties have the task of conveying or channeling the aspirations of various types of society. Political parties become a forum to accommodate the aspirations of the community's interests, formulated as a suggestion or policy proposal offered to the government to be used as a public policy (Luna et al., 2021; T. Schwartz, 2021). However, the problem is that the role of opposition parties as critics, suggestions, and so on needs to be more effective. Efforts to incorporate the party's aspirations in its position as a minority voice are often hampered by the voting system applied by parliament. Hence, minority voices usually lose out on decision-making and strategic government policies (Effendi, 2022).

Furthermore, the fourth content related to PKS criticism on Twitter is burdening state finances with a figure of 10,00%. This finding data explains that PKS believes that the capital relocation policy will interfere with state finances, in this case, the State Budget (APBN), because it will cost a lot of money. Contrary to that, the government said that the financing of IKN is not only from the state budget but also from other sources. Based on Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 17 of 2022 concerning Funding and Budget Management in the Framework of Preparation, Development, and Relocation of the National Capital and Implementation of the Government of the Special Capital Region of the Archipelago. The Government Regulation is a derivative regulation of Law Number 3 of 2022 concerning the National Capital City (IKN). Article 3 Chapter II on Funding Sources and Schemes states that funding for the preparation, construction, and relocation of the National Capital and the implementation of the Special Regional Government of the IKN comes from



role as determinants in a democratic system and are a significant pillar in the institution of the political system. The part of political parties is also worth mentioning as a link between the state and society because people's capacity in political parties can influence the direction and policies taken by a country. Thus, political parties should be able to bridge the community's aspirations (Adeola, 2016; Lambright, 2014; Paget, 2019).

The opposition party group positions itself not as a supporter; in other words, the party is free to criticize and provide input to the government (Pratama, 2015). Likewise, PKS criticizes the IKN relocation policy for utilizing digital technology, in this case, Twitter. Opposition parties are checks and balances against all policies taken by the government, both legislative institutions at the central government level and local governments. So, it is unsurprising that most people tend to look at opposition parties to voice their aspirations when government policies, which have the full support of supporting parties, are considered not in favor of the people (Hamdanny & Mukhtar, 2021).

However, opposition parties in parliament have always been a minority force in the long journey of Indonesian democracy. This situation weakens the supervisory function and widens the distance between the people's aspirations. The existence of opposition parties, which are always a minority group in parliament, is further exacerbated if decision-making cannot be resolved through deliberation and consensus; then, decision-making is carried out based on the majority vote (voting). Then, the minority opposition will not be able to influence government policy. The impact is that if the voices of coalition parties or government supporters dominate the determination of public policy, the born policies tend to be authoritarian and oligarchic (Effendi, 2022).

#### *Analysis of Actors Involved in the Prosperous Justice Party Opposition Movement on Twitter*

In politics, especially in a democracy, the opposition has several primary functions; first, it is counterweight to power. Balancing in substance can mean that there is a force outside the government that provides alternative thoughts or attitudes and causes a balance so that the government does not get too far away from the interests of most people. Second, the importance of the opposition is to keep alternative policies voiced. The opposition will allow more policy options or alternative improvements to government policies to emerge. Third, the importance of opposition is a stimulus for healthy competition among political elites and the government (Svåsand, 2013). Therefore, it is clear that strengthening the opposition is related to upholding policies that align with the people's interests and avoiding oligarchy. Opposition is not just an anti-government stance or being different but an existence that provides criticism and offers alternative policies and control over government administration (Noor, 2016).

In the context of the PKS opposition movement on Twitter, several accounts of political actors are mentioned as a form of cooperation to disseminate content and narratives of criticism of the IKN relocation policy. Figure 5 shows the actors involved in the Pks opposition movement ON Twitter. Figure 5 is the data analysis results from Nvivo 12 Plus. Some actors involved are @syaikhu\_ahmad, @salimsegaf, @pakmul63, @aboebakar15, and @nurwahid. More details can be seen in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Actor involved in Twitter

The data in Figure 5 found that the actors involved in the PKS opposition movement on Twitter were its elite party cadres. The @syaikhu\_ahmad account is the most contributing actor, with 189 tweets. Then, salimsegaf was in second place with 171 tweets, and @pakmul63 contributed 136. Furthermore, accounts @aboebakar15 and @nurwahid have 52 tweets each. The Twitter account @syaikhu\_ahmad belongs to the president of the Prosperous Justice Party. PKS President Ahmad Syaikhu said that the relocation of IKN was rejected because Indonesia's debt has reached more than Rp6,700 trillion. Therefore, according to him, compared to moving the IKN, Indonesia needs more recovery in the economic sector, which the COVID-19 pandemic has hit. Furthermore, Ahmad declined, and his party rejected the relocation of IKN even though the costs did not come from the state budget. However, the IKN Law states that 52 percent of the state budget is, and if it is built, the people will bear it (Agnesia, 2022).

Opposition parties in the reform era are in an awkward position and are isolated from the public opinion about the government, which the government itself often manipulates. However, not all groups then withdrew from the opposition position. Some groups, such as the mass media, intellectuals, NGO activists, and party cadres, continued resisting the government. However, until almost two decades of reform, especially during the SBY administration, the role of the opposition was played more by non-party and extra-parliamentary circles, which unfortunately were sporadic and could not be used as a barometer of effective control over the government. As a result, instead of being a realm for a healthy democracy, Indonesia is currently trapped in oligarchic practices that still place the interests of the few above the interests of the many. Government policies for the people are often held hostage or manipulated by the interests of a group of people close to power (Noor, 2016).

### *Analysis of the Intensity of the Prosperous Justice Party Opposition Movement on Twitter*

In political reality, the recognition and implementation of democracy in a country will not mean much if the existing government runs without a counterweight or effective control from the opposition. Such a government is closer to an oligarchic or authoritarian form of government than a democratic one. Indonesia, as a country that recognizes democracy, has not successfully fostered a strong opposition (Noor, 2016). Opposition is not just about being different or against government policies, but rather a group outside the government that can exercise firm control and provide informed policy alternatives (Chua, 2020; Lim, 2012); likewise, in the context of the PKS opposition movement on Twitter in the IKN relocation policy. Figure 6 displays the intensity of the PKS opposition movement on Twitter before and after the IKN law was passed in parliament.




Figure 6: The intensity of the Prosperous Justice Party's opposition movement on Twitter

The data in Figure 6 shows that in January 2021, there were 120 tweets. Then, in April-June, there were 221 tweets; in July-September, there were 115 tweets; and in October-December, it was the highest in 2021 with 664 tweets. Meanwhile, in 2022, the intensity of opposition on Twitter increased; in January-March, there were 376 tweets, and in April-June, there were 1,025 tweets. Then, in July-September, there were 1,048 tweets, and in October-December, there were 664 tweets. Based on these data, this study found that the intensity of the Pks opposition movement on Twitter was higher after the IKN law's passing. The Draft Law on the National Capital City (RUU IKN) was passed into law number 3 of 2022 on February 15, 2022. This means that before the IKN law was passed, the PKS opposition movement was centered on delivering criticism in parliament. However, due to the minority vote that PKS has, it does not have full power to prevent the law from being passed. The majority of political parties in parliament supported the bill.

Furthermore, after the IKN law was passed, the PKS opposition movement continued. PKS utilizes digital technology, in this case, Twitter, to continue criticizing IKN policies. This is an effort to convey people's aspirations through digital media. Moreover, the PKS movement on Twitter is a strategic step in gaining sympathy from people who disagree with the policy. This finding reinforces the theory that, in essence, forces outside the government can participate in maintaining the sovereignty of the people. The role of those outside the government or opposition is essential, mainly to ensure that the government remains on track

of the people's interests. In other words, the existence of the opposition is closely related to the interest of upholding popular sovereignty (Van Biezen, 2012).

### CONCLUSION

This study concludes that the content of the PKS opposition movement on Twitter is disturbing economic recovery, problematic law, environmental impact, and burden on state finance. Among these contents, alarming economic recovery is the most dominant in the spread of PKS on Twitter as a criticism of the policy of relocating the national capital (IKN). PKS focuses on highlighting that the approach taken by the government will have an impact on the economic recovery of the Indonesian people after the COVID-19 pandemic. The main point of PKS criticism is that the policy of relocating the national capital has no urgency to be ratified at the current moment; the government, with the existing budget, should be more focused on restoring the economy of the Indonesian people. Likewise, the narrative spread by PKS on Twitter as a form of its digital opposition movement is to bring up why the party rejects the IKN relocation policy. Then, PKS involved its elite cadres, such as the president, chairman of the syrup council, and several administrators of the central governing board of the prosperous Justice party, to actively spread their criticism on Twitter. Furthermore, the intensity of PKS's digital opposition movement turned out to be more massive when the IKN Bill was passed into law. This is because before the IKN law was passed, the PKS opposition movement was centered on delivering criticism in parliament.

Furthermore, the implications of this research are expected to describe the opposition political party movement in the new arena by utilizing digital technology. This is an effort by opposition political parties, which are a minority in parliament, to continue to carry out their responsibilities as checks and balances against the government. However, this research has limitations in that it only explains one issue. Therefore, recommendations for future research can take several issues as case studies to get a more comprehensive perspective.

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