

The ANZUS Alliance and Indonesia – *Malaysia Konfrontasi* 1963-1965 : An Examination of the Alliance's Perspective and Response

Sah-Hadiyatan Ismail* & Choo Chin Low

School of Distance Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia

*Corresponding Author : sah.ismail@usm.my

Abstract

This paper examines the role of the ANZUS Alliance in the context of the *Indonesia–Malaysia Konfrontasi* (1963–1965), focusing on the alliance members' positions on the formation of Malaysia and the extent of ANZUS's influence on the conflict. The central problem addressed is why ANZUS shaped Australia's response to *Konfrontasi* even though the treaty was never formally invoked. The formation of Malaysia in 1963, combining Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak, was opposed by Indonesia, which perceived it as a British-backed neo-colonial project. Australia and New Zealand supported the new federation diplomatically and militarily, viewing it as essential for regional stability and countering communist influence. The United States, while initially cautious, provided diplomatic backing and informal assurances to its allies. Although the ANZUS Treaty was not formally invoked, the alliance framework shaped strategic thinking and reassured member states of collective security. This study draws on primary sources from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, U.S. government publications, and documents from the National Archives of Australia. The research concludes that Australia's decision to engage militarily in the conflict was heavily influenced by the United States' assurances of support under ANZUS. These commitments gave Australia the confidence to act, believing that the United States would intervene if Indonesia escalated the conflict into a full-scale war. Thus, ANZUS played an indirect but critical role in Australia's involvement in *Konfrontasi*.

Keywords: ANZUS; Konfrontasi; alliance; conflict; Australia-U.S. relations

INTRODUCTION

In 1951, the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) was formed as a trilateral defence alliance between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Australia and New Zealand were deeply concerned about their security in the Pacific. The fall of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942 had exposed their vulnerability. The fall of China to the Communists in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 added uneasiness to Australia and New Zealand. Britain's declining role as a military power in Asia led both countries to seek a new security guarantor. At the same time, the United States, emerging as the dominant

Pacific power, was building a network of alliances to contain the spread of communism. The formation of the alliance was also due to both Australia and New Zealand concerned about their security in the light of the ending of the state of war between Japan and the United States. Australia and New Zealand sought a binding security arrangement with the U.S. in exchange for supporting the peace treaty with Japan. Successive Australian governments often assumed that ANZUS brought Australia into a 'special relationship' with the United States. The Australians viewed ANZUS as central to its defence and diplomatic alignment. It was the first defence treaty between Australia and the United States and signified a shift from Britain, the traditional defender of Australia, to the United States. However, from the perspective of the United States, there was nothing 'special' about its relationship with Australia. Washington viewed ANZUS as ordinary defence arrangements comparable to other alliances like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe, Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East, or its mutual defence treaty with the Philippines. Despite the differences in perception, Australia highly valued its position in ANZUS and tried hard not to offend the United States in its public statements or declarations. The Australian government also regarded ANZUS as the cornerstone of its military involvement in Southeast Asia. Australia often referred its military involvement outside the ANZUS Treaty to the ANZUS Council for discussion and approval from the Americans. ANZUS also had its influence on the formulation of Australian foreign policy, especially regarding its relationship with the Americans. The differences in interpretation and importance of ANZUS often frustrated Australia as the Americans refused to accept Australian views and suggestions. The Americans narrowly interpreted both treaties and refused to accept other treaty members' suggestion on military planning covered by ANZUS. Australia could do nothing over its dissatisfaction with the American treatment as Australia needed the alliance, assistance and support from the United States more than the United States needed Australia.

In the early 1960s, the strength of the alliance between the US and Australia received a new test in the form of the Indonesia – Malaysia Confrontation. The Confrontation, or *Konfrontasi* as it was popularly known, was an important event to Australia as it involved its nearest neighbour, Indonesia, and one of its defence partners, Malaysia. This article focuses on the Australian and American commitment in Southeast Asia especially in defence of Malaysia in the *Konfrontasi* period rather than on the *Konfrontasi* itself. Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States supported the idea of the formation of Malaysia against opposition from Indonesia and the Philippines. Although the US and Australia were on the same side in supporting the formation of Malaysia, the United States, however, took a different view from Australia and Britain on how to deal with this opposition, and especially with the *Konfrontasi* launched by Indonesia.

The American–Australian commitment to the defence of Malaysia during the Indonesia–Malaysia *Konfrontasi* (1963–1965) was crucial because it revealed the strategic importance both nations placed on maintaining stability in Southeast Asia amid Cold War tensions. Both countries support for Malaysia originated from determination to prevent the spread of communism and to ensure that the newly formed federation would not collapse under pressure from Indonesia. For Australia, defending Malaysia was not only about protecting a Commonwealth ally but also about reaffirming its relevance as a reliable US ally. For the United States, supporting Malaysia's security aligned with its containment policy and strengthened its influence in a region increasingly seen Communist threat. Although ANZUS was not formally activated, the conflict served as a practical test of alliance solidarity, reinforcing mutual confidence and shaping future patterns of strategic cooperation between the two countries.

Konfrontasi was declared by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr Subandrio on 20 January 1963. The policy of *Konfrontasi* was pursued by the Indonesians to prevent the

federation of Malaysia from being formed. *Konfrontasi* caused great concern for Australia, especially in the light of the West New Guinea problem. Australia and the United States took a different view on ways to solve the crisis in the earlier stages of the West New Guinea problem but in the end, Australia had to accept the Americans' point of view and opted not to challenge the US decision to settle the crisis in a way that ultimately favoured Indonesia. The emergence of *Konfrontasi* at the end of West New Guinea crisis put Australia once again in conflict with its biggest neighbour, Indonesia. Australia, as in the previous conflict, also tried to get the United States to be on its side and worked hard to involve the US militarily with Australian and British forces in defending Malaysia.

The study of the ANZUS Alliance and the Indonesia–Malaysia *Konfrontasi* (1963–1965) remains relevant today as it offers valuable insights into the dynamics of alliance politics and regional security in the Indo-Pacific. The crisis illustrates how Australia's reliance on U.S. support for its defence policy and cooperation during the Cold War. The same patterns continue to influence contemporary policies and regional responses to China's rise. It also underscores enduring questions about alliance credibility, middle-power countries, and the balance of power in Southeast Asia. The historical experience of *Konfrontasi* is a useful reference point for understanding current strategic challenges faced by Australia, the United States, and their partners in the region.

ANZUS PERSPECTIVES ON THE FORMATION OF MALAYSIA

The discussion of ANZUS members' perspectives on the formation of Malaysia must be understood within the broader context of Cold War power struggles and postcolonial situation in Southeast Asia. By the early 1960s, the decline of British imperial influence and the rise of nationalist and communist movements in the region had created uncertainty about the political situations in many Southeast Asian nations. For Western powers, especially the ANZUS members, the formation of Malaysia was not merely a local constitutional development but a strategic project to maintain regional influence, contain communist threat, and safeguard Western interests in the area.

Australia had initially supported the integration of Singapore with Malaya in 1956.¹ However, Malaya gained independence in 1957 without the inclusion of Singapore. Support for the formation of Malaysia was based on the idea of preserving the union between Malaya, Singapore and the British colonies in northern Borneo under a political institution favourable to a continued British presence in Southeast Asia and particularly to the continuation of Britain's naval and military base and the stationing of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in this area.²

In August 1961, the Australian government formulated its attitude towards the formation of Malaysia. Australia saw Malaysia as the best way to maintain a pro-Western orientation in the region, but it noted that the proposal might prove impossible to negotiate.³ Australia believed that "if the price of maintaining Western interests in Singapore (and ultimately Malaya) were the early termination of United Kingdom sovereignty in the Territories, that price would be, from a political point of view, worth paying".⁴ Furthermore, the progressive merger of the economies of the territories concerned would probably have only marginal effects on Australia's trade and economic interests. The Australian government concluded that "the United Kingdom cannot maintain indefinitely the *status quo* in Singapore because the longer Singapore's colonial status is maintained, the greater the likelihood of political power there passing to the extremists."⁵ This was especially true with the situation after June 1961 when Singapore seemed to have become a new focus and base of operations for the Communists. The Western powers, especially Britain and its Commonwealth allies, Australia and New Zealand thought that the independence that Singapore gained by joining

Malaysia was the best means to prevent Singapore from moving into close association with Communist China.

The Australian ministers therefore recommended that it was in Australia's interests that the Malaysia concept should be promoted provided that the Malayan and Singapore governments retained their current orientation. Australia should take the opportunity of influencing the terms of negotiation through consultation with the United Kingdom and Malaya. The support for Malaysia was also based on membership in the British Commonwealth where both Australia and Malaya were members. Australia's involvement in Malaysia was also as part of the ANZAM arrangements with Britain and New Zealand. Australia also considered the implications of Malaysia's stability and prosperity that affected Australia's "defence in depth" strategy.⁶ In this strategy, the presence of Australia's forces in Malaya was part of "forward defence" aimed at defending Australia at as great a distance as possible from its own coastline.

On 5 March 1963, the Australian Cabinet decided on Australia's approach towards the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation. Australia would support the formation of Malaysia and accept the risks this support would pose for Australia-Indonesia relations, and at the same time, Australian diplomacy would be directed towards maintaining its relations with Indonesia. Australia would also use what influence it could to curb Indonesian opposition to Malaysia and assist in resolving tension between the two countries.⁷ The beginning of *Konfrontasi* brought some important questions to the Australian government. The Australians were worried that the United States policy of "non-involved cordiality" in relation to the Malaysian conflict might produce a difference in both countries' interpretation of America's commitments under ANZUS.⁸ The difference in interpretation could bring problems to Australia as it might lead the United States to consider Malaysia outside the ANZUS area, and the Americans would surely be reluctant to become involved in another conflict besides Vietnam. Australia was also worried that if the US considered the Malaysian dispute beyond the scope of ANZUS, the US might have a different interpretation of the conflict and disagreed with Australia as it had during the West New Guinea crisis. Australia believed that if the American commitments under ANZUS were to be applied to the Malaysian conflict, it would be an effective deterrent to any Indonesian encroachment in Malaysia's area.

Sir Garfield Barwick stated in the ANZUS Council Meeting in Wellington in June 1963 that Australia had declared publicly and privately its support for Malaysia and viewed Malaysia as the best solution for all the territories concerned. Australia's support for Malaysia was based on Australia's belief that none of the territories (Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei) could survive independently but that each territory had sufficient similarities such as currency and British traditions of government to make a workable federation feasible.⁹

The declaration of *Konfrontasi* by the Indonesian government against the formation of Malaysia was viewed cautiously by Australia. Australia's initial response to the declaration was "to play down the heat generated by it and to minimize its impact on public opinion."¹⁰ This was especially important in early 1963 as Australia was determined to avoid another conflict with Indonesia. In most of the statements opposing Indonesia's policy, the official Australian spokesmen avoided any unfriendly references to Jakarta and made appeals urging Jakarta not to impair the nominally good relations between the two countries. *Konfrontasi* brought Australia into a dilemma as it had a special relationship with Malaya as a Commonwealth country and an interest in friendship with Indonesia, Australia's nearest and biggest neighbour. As *Konfrontasi* posed an indirect threat to Australian security, Australia began to play an active role in solving the conflict in early 1963, which involved diplomatic discussions with Australia's main allies, Britain and the United States, as well as both parties in the dispute, Malaysia and Indonesia.

The United States acknowledged that it neither participated in the negotiations during the formation of Malaysia, nor was it formally consulted by Britain or Malaya.¹¹ The Americans believed that Malaya and Britain, directly involved in the formation of Malaysia, should settle this matter.¹² In a memorandum to President Kennedy dated 17 February 1963, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that the US had followed the development of the Malaysian Plan closely. The United States did not oppose the plan, and the British took the lack of opposition as an indication of American approval. The United States once again stressed that it considered that the Federation of Malaysia was the best available solution for the future welfare of the people in the area.¹³ This view was also confirmed at the President's press conference on 14 February. In the press conference, President Kennedy mentioned that the United States supported the Malaysia Confederation and added that although "it is now under pressure from several areas (the Philippines and Indonesia) ... I'm hopeful it will sustain itself, because it's the best hope of security for that very vital part of the world".¹⁴ The US was concerned at the growing number of disputes in the Asian states because these disputes could lead to the expansion of the Cold War into these areas.¹⁵ The US administration added that it was also concerned at the effect on the American public and legislative opinion should Indonesia be linked to further deterioration of the situation in Southeast Asia. Should this occur, it would be very difficult for the US administration to extend any aid to Indonesia, which the US wanted to do. The United States aid to Indonesia, which amounted to US\$500 million, was vital to counter the influence from the Communist bloc, especially with the aid given by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's commitment amounted to USD\$840 million and the US believed this aid aimed "to be the seduction of the one remaining pro-Western element in Indonesia - the Army".¹⁶

The British government considered itself obliged to protect Malaysia against what it saw as Indonesia's expansionist "confrontation" policy partly because of Britain's commitments under the Anglo-Malayan defence agreement and partly because it felt morally bound to help Malaysia get off to a good start.¹⁷ From Britain's perspective, the conflict was seen as an aggressive and expansionist policy by Indonesia, aimed at destabilizing the newly formed Federation of Malaysia rather than a legitimate regional dispute. Britain's formal commitments to the defence of Malaysia stemmed from the Anglo-Malayan defence agreement of October 1957 negotiated at the time the Federation of Malaya became an independent country within the Commonwealth. During the Malaya-Britain discussions on the creation of Malaysia, a declaration of intention of November 1961 extended the British commitment to all of Malaysia and provided for continued British Commonwealth use of the naval base in Singapore. Australia and New Zealand, as British Commonwealth countries, associated themselves with both agreements and would assist Britain in defending Malaysia.¹⁸ The 1957 agreement provided for Britain's assistance in Malayan external defence, British training of the Federation defence forces and the stationing in Malaya of the forces needed to fulfil Britain's Commonwealth and international obligations.¹⁹ Britain's response was also an attempt to uphold postcolonial stability while managing its diminishing power in Southeast Asia. The confrontation also represented an early stage in the evolution of regional security cooperation during the Cold War, as Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States aligned their defence policies to contain potential communist expansion and preserve Western strategic interests in Southeast Asia. Britain's recognition of *Konfrontasi* as a hostile policy justified its own military and other Western powers involvement in the area.

The United States officials met with representatives of the British, Australian and New Zealand governments in early February 1963 to discuss the defence of Malaysia. In this meeting, the US government agreed with the initial proposal for the formation of Malaysia and made it clear that the United Kingdom and Malaya to be held fully responsibility for it. The US government would assume no responsibility and did not intend to give any military or

economic assistance to this new state. With regard to the issue of the defence of Malaya the American disagreed to be involved militarily. This was because the US felt “such involvement could impair our potential usefulness and react adversely upon our standing in the eyes of one side or another.”²⁰ However, the US would give Malaysia as a member of the United Nations the protection against external aggression which the United States would give to any friendly United Nations member.²¹ This was in line with the NSC 6012 - Statement of Policy on US Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia, that the US would support and assist the countries in the Southeast Asian area on the basis of their will and ability to defend and strengthen their independence. Military assistance by the United States, however, required the approval of the Congress. The President could also take immediate necessary action if emergencies or crises between these countries severely threatened the vital interests of the United States.²²

REASSURANCE WITHOUT COMMITMENT: ANZUS IN *KONFRONTASI*

A month after *Konfrontasi* was declared by Indonesia, Australia worried that it might be involved in this conflict against Indonesia and had quickly turned to the US, its ally in the ANZUS Treaty, for help. The Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Sir Arthur Tange, was sent to Washington in February 1963 to find out about America’s interpretation of its commitments under ANZUS. Tange held discussions with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Assistant of Secretary of Far Eastern Affairs, Averell Harriman, and Director of the State Department’s Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, David Bell. One of the purposes of the discussions was to ascertain the American views on the issue and propose American diplomatic intervention in persuading Jakarta to accept the Malaysian proposal. The American administration at this point was not prepared to give any defence commitment to Malaysia but it agreed to give “limited political support and attempt to restrain the Indonesians from any active interference”.²³ The Australian delegates, however, in their final analysis of the US attitude, still believed that “the United States may be prepared to come to the military assistance of Malaysia, [although] the United States will be influenced by its assessment of the effect which this would have on its long term relations with Indonesia and the degree to which Britain, Australia and New Zealand had committed their own forces”. This analysis showed that Australia continued to make assumptions that the US would help the Commonwealth forces although the US had specifically told it that the US was not prepared to be involved militarily except in the case of overt attacks by the Indonesians.

At the next ANZUS Council meeting held on 5 June 1963 in Wellington, Harriman told the Council that if an overt attack was launched on the Australian forces stationed in Malaysia the United States obligations under the ANZUS Treaty would come into force.²⁴ The US clarification proved the Australians’ assumptions in February that in the end the US would help Australian and New Zealand forces in Malaysia. Later, on 7 June 1963, during a meeting with the Australian Cabinet in Canberra, Harriman said that the United States would wish Australia to extend to Malaysia its present defence commitments towards Malaya. On the issue of invoking the ANZUS Treaty, Harriman clarified that if it was a problem of Malaysian internal security, the responsibility to overcome this problem belonged to Malaysia and the British countries. Harriman again stressed that the United States supported Malaysia, but wanted Britain, Australia and New Zealand to take the primary role in its security and defence.

The ANZUS communiqué issued on 6 June 1963 after the ANZUS Council meeting emphasised the essential character of ANZUS. The communiqué stated that “the Treaty is a forthright recognition of the fact that anything which happens in the Pacific area is of vital concern to all three and that a threat to any of the partners in the area, metropolitan and island territories alike, is equally a threat to the others”. This communiqué also declared “that in matters of defence, Australia, New Zealand and the US stand as one.”²⁵ The ministers attending

the ANZUS Council meeting also expressed their respective governments' support for the formation of Malaysia. The formation of Malaysia had been seen as "a major event in orderly decolonization by which several British territories will gain and exercise their independence as constituent members of a Federation."²⁶ The United States' support for Malaysia at this meeting and the statement from the US that "Indonesia represents a potential source of aggression in the treaty area" were important as they also acknowledged the Commonwealth's stand that Indonesia was the 'problem' in this area. Although the US realised that Indonesia was the problem, its policy towards Indonesia was based on the assumption that any concession which strengthened the elements of anti-Communism in Indonesia was worth taking.²⁷ Based on this policy, the US was trying to restrain Indonesia from taking military actions towards Malaysia and the Commonwealth countries. Based on the agreement reached in the ANZUS meeting in June 1963, Australia began taking aggressive steps and vocally announced its intention to support Malaysia in the confrontation launched by Indonesia.

At a meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Menzies on 8 July 1963 in Washington, Menzies stated that Australia currently did not have commitments to Malaya but was contemplating making one.²⁸ He said that he was hesitant to undertake a commitment unless he could be sure that the United States would back Australia should it get into trouble. President Kennedy agreed that Australia should know the exact commitment under ANZUS, especially regarding overt attacks towards its forces. The President added that Sukarno and other leaders should understand about this commitment promised by the US under the ANZUS Treaty.²⁹ Menzies had taken this statement as support for Australia by the United States. The Australian government had also been stimulated by this support to take strong public commitments such as publicly announcing its support for Malaysia. This announcement of support was also as a result of the statements made in the aide-memoire on ANZUS given by the US to Australia and encouragements by Harriman for Australia to support Malaysia.³⁰

The *Konfrontasi* escalated to a dangerous phase with the establishment of Malaysia on 16 September 1963. There were riotous demonstrations in Jakarta on the day after the declaration of Malaysia and the British and Malaysian embassies were burnt down by demonstrators. Following this situation, British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan sent a message to Menzies asking him to commit Australian troops to the defence of Malaysia. Barwick had stopped in Jakarta on his way to attend the inauguration ceremony in Kuala Lumpur and had spoken to both Sukarno and Subandrio. In the talks Barwick made it clear that the time for negotiated solutions had passed and Australia would back Malaysia and expected American support under ANZUS if there were armed conflict.³¹ Australia confidently took this bold step and directly warned Indonesia not to involve its military in this conflict. Its stance was based on the assurance of help from the US as mentioned by Harriman in the previous ANZUS meeting. Indonesian military leaders did not react to the warning issued by Australia as they themselves were having doubts about being involved "in a conflict larger than they were confident of being able to handle successfully".³² Based on its intelligence, the Americans were aware that the Armed Forces of Indonesia (TNI) was not fully supporting *Konfrontasi* and the US was confident that *Konfrontasi* would never be seriously escalated. Unlike the Americans, the Australians did not realise that *Konfrontasi* was Sukarno's idea and was not well received by the military.

On 17 September, Menzies told the Australian Parliament that Australia and Malaysia would exchange notes extending Australia's association with the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement to cover all of Malaysia. On 25 September 1963 the Australian government again announced its "unqualified pledge of military aid to Malaysia".³³ Menzies declared in the Australian Parliament that:

We are resolved and have so informed the Government of Malaysia and the Governments of the United Kingdom and New Zealand and others concerned, that if, in the circumstances that now exist, there occurs, in relation to Malaysia or any of its constituent States, armed invasion or subversive activity – supported or directed or inspired from outside Malaysia – we shall to the best of our powers and by such means as shall be agreed upon with the Government of Malaysia, add our military assistance to the efforts of Malaysia and the United Kingdom in the defence of Malaysia's territorial integrity and political independence.³⁴

The Prime Minister of New Zealand also tabled documents connected with New Zealand's association with the Anglo-Malaysian defence arrangements to the New Zealand Parliament on 20 September 1963. These statements of political approval by Prime Ministers of both Australia and New Zealand were appreciated by Britain. The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the ANZAM Defence Committee would agree to coordinate planned operations by the forces of the three member countries for the defence of Malaysia against the threat from Indonesia.³⁵

In his meeting with Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, on 4 October 1963, President Kennedy again stated that the US had some imprecise connection with Malaysia through ANZUS.³⁶ The "imprecise connection" mentioned by Kennedy referred to the vague description of the territories covered by the ANZUS Treaty and also the Australian military involvement in Malaysia that would affect its ANZUS partners the Americans. The American administration always wanted to avoid direct commitment towards the defence of Malaysia, but it strongly supported the British and Australian position in this area, especially under the ANZUS Treaty. The assurance given to Lord Home reiterated the statement given by Harriman in June 1963 in a meeting with the Australian Cabinet in Canberra. A later Memorandum from the Department of State to President Kennedy, dated 14 October 1963, the issue of armed attack on ANZUS, was clarified: "The ANZUS Treaty, in Articles IV and V, provides that in the event of an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties including on their armed forces, each party would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes".³⁷ All ANZUS members understood that this commitment was related to overt attacks and not to subversion, guerrilla warfare or indirect aggression. In the context of the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation, a direct attack on Malaysia per se would not trigger the treaty. Only in the event of an armed attack on the armed forces, public vessels or aircraft of Australia or New Zealand would the United States be under obligation to act under the treaty and even then, the obligation to act did not necessarily mean an obligation to commit military forces.

The US viewed the current guerrilla warfare and subversion, which involved only indigenous personnel from Borneo, even though trained by Indonesia, not as overt aggression within the meaning of the ANZUS Treaty.³⁸ In this situation even if the Australian troops were attacked, it would be a problem for Malaysia and the Commonwealth forces, as the ANZUS Treaty would only come to force if substantial numbers of Indonesian troops were involved in overt attacks or open warfare. This interpretation did not prevent Australia from deploying its forces under the Commonwealth banner in Malaysia as the Australians believed that Malaysia was essential to its defence against communism and Australia believed that the US would eventually support its troops if attacked by the Indonesians. This belief was strengthened by the paper outlining the US interpretation of its obligations under the ANZUS Treaty handed by McGeorge Bundy to Sir Howard Beale, Australian Ambassador in Washington, on 16 October. This paper was very important to the American-Australian relationship as it accurately outlined the US interpretation and commitments under the ANZUS Treaty regarding the Indonesia-

Malaysia Conflict. The Australians were assured that the US would come to its help if its forces, public vessels or aircraft were overtly attack by Indonesia.³⁹

The Department of State also provided guidelines for consultation with the Australians regarding the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict in October 1963. The Americans stated that Britain and the Commonwealth held the “primary responsibility” for the defence of Malaysia.⁴⁰ The Australians were encouraged to assume a greater role in the defence of Malaysia; however, the US insisted that the government of Australia should consult the US administration before Australia made further military commitments in the Pacific area outside Malaysia. The Americans also insisted that Australia and New Zealand made consultation on “the nature and timing of any statement which they feel obliged to make re [sic] U.S. assurances of support of their involvement in Malaysia”.⁴¹ The US clearly had its own way and insisted that its allies to consult them in matters that related to the military involvement in the Malaysian area. This action was taken as the US wanted diplomatic efforts to be taken to prevent *Konfrontasi* from escalating and encouraged Australia, Britain and Malaysia to refrain from any actions or statements which would tend to provoke Sukarno to more belligerent actions. The US stated that it “cannot put ourselves in the position of being dragged into the military defence of Malaysia if our diplomatic efforts are undermined by others”.⁴² This statement was a reminder from the US to Australia and other Commonwealth countries to concentrate on diplomatic efforts in resolving the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Besides the vagueness in the interpretation, the ANZUS treaty also did not define the kind of action the parties must take in the event of armed attack. The treaty also required parties to act “in accordance with their constitutional processes.”⁴³ The US would meet its obligation under the ANZUS Treaty if an overt attack against Australian forces in Malaysia were launched by the Indonesians. However, the US would not become militarily involved in this conflict until it believed that its ANZUS partners, Malaysia and Britain were fully committed. The form of action that the Americans would take would have to be a matter for consultation at the time the contingency arose.⁴⁴ The United States interpreted ANZUS Treaty in a narrow sense and clearly was reluctant to be militarily involved with its defence partners. The Americans underlined conditions for their military assistance and these conditions would not bring much help to the Australians. The United States definitely acted as a superpower and Australia could not do anything to object the conditions given by the Americans.

The defence of Malaysia was discussed again in the Quadripartite Meeting on Indonesia and Malaysia held from 16 to 18 October 1963. Representatives of Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States met in Washington to review the situation arising from the Indonesian confrontation of Malaysia. At this meeting, the Australian, New Zealand and the United Kingdom representatives reaffirmed that military and economic support for Malaysia was primarily a Commonwealth responsibility.⁴⁵ Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, W. Averell Harriman, stated in the meeting that the United States “doubted that Sukarno was pursuing a concrete long-range plan for expansion”.⁴⁶ The US saw Sukarno as “an opportunist, reacting to events and improvising as he went along”. The US did not see any clear role of the Indonesian Army in the Malaysia dispute and the TNI was not keen to be involved in the dispute. The American assessment asserted that the Indonesian Army leadership’s objection to Malaysia was based on fear that Malaysia would be a weak barrier to Chinese expansion. This objection was based on the fact that the creation of Malaysia would establish a single country with a sizeable population of Chinese that could easily be influenced by Communist China. The US also believed that Sukarno might share this fear.⁴⁷ This assessment was made partly on information obtained earlier in an interview on 26 September 1962 where Subandrio, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, made several off-the-record comments and stated that “in five years Communist China would be the chief enemy of Indonesia.”⁴⁸ Subandrio added that the Indonesian military build-up and its capability was

designed to meet this challenge from Communist China. Besides this, the Soviet Union had invested more than \$1 billion in Indonesia and rumours had been circulated in Western countries that the Soviets were attempting to build military bases in Indonesia.⁴⁹ In several discussions between the Indonesian leaders and Ambassador Jones, the leaders maintained that “the real threat to Indonesia is ultimately Chicoms [Chinese Communists] and that in last analysis the Indonesians rely on US military strength in Pacific to protect them against this threat.”⁵⁰

In the October Quadripartite Meeting, the Australian Minister for External Affairs Sir Garfield Barwick, presented the Australian view of the conflict. The Australians believed that the Western powers and Malaysia “had bent over backward to accommodate Sukarno”.⁵¹ Barwick added that since Malaysia already existed as a nation, the Western powers could not permit Sukarno to destroy it. The Australians, however, had reservations that Indonesia’s anti-Malaysia policy was motivated by its fear of China. Barwick felt Indonesia was driven by other obvious motives, such as its anti-Western powers’ establishment since the Indonesian army had made no secret of its determination to seek the removal of Western bases from the region.

Harriman informed the meeting that the US had already made its position in this conflict clear to the Indonesian authorities. Harriman added that Ambassador Jones was convinced that Sukarno fully understood that “the US would oppose him if Indonesia undertook overt action against Malaysia.”⁵² Sukarno told Ambassador Jones that “you do not have to worry about that. There will be no military action in connection with Malaysia.”⁵³ Ambassador Jones, however, did not specifically discuss with Sukarno the Indonesian guerrilla activities, but on several occasions made clear the US opposition to military activities in general. Ambassador Jones believed that Sukarno’s word related to *Konfrontasi* could be trusted and on many occasions, Sukarno openly spoke about his admiration of President Kennedy and invited Kennedy to visit Indonesia.

The United States also agreed to consider various actions to indicate its support for Malaysia. These measures would include the sale by the US of military equipment to Malaysia on credit. The US would extend invitations to Malaysian leaders to visit the US and US leaders would visit Malaysia. The US would also publicly reiterate their supports for the independence and integrity of Malaysia should appropriate opportunities arise.⁵⁴

In an earlier conversation with President Kennedy, Harold Holt, the Australian Treasurer, mentioned that Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies had told the Australian House of Representatives that Australia would give military assistance to defend Malaysia in the event of any armed invasion or subversive activity supported, directed, or inspired from outside Malaysia. Holt informed Kennedy that the statement of guarantee to Malaysia was the strongest guarantee that Australia had ever issued.⁵⁵ This strong public commitment made by Australia was a result of Harriman’s statement in June 1963 about the ANZUS treaty that the United States would help Australia if Australia’s security were threatened.

The Australian government hoped the United States would “welcome the Australian military commitment to Malaysia. But the United States gave it a cool reception”. The US reminded Australia to focus its military role in Asia against China but not against Indonesia, as “the United States was anxious to keep Indonesia out of the Communists bloc”.⁵⁶ In January 1964, after the abortive cease-fire in Borneo, the US tried to press Malaysia to agree to another summit meeting with Indonesia. President Lyndon B. Johnson then instructed Attorney General Robert Kennedy to meet Sukarno in Tokyo. This trip had two main objectives; “to make completely clear the consequences for United States-Indonesian relationship if Sukarno continues his present policies toward Malaysia” and “to further the over-all United States objective of getting the Indonesians, Malaysians and Filipinos to sit down together for talks looking toward an ‘Asian solution’ of the dispute.”⁵⁷ In his meeting with Sukarno, Robert

Kennedy managed to convince Sukarno to suspend military action in Borneo “if the Tunku will agree to meet with Sukarno and Macapagal.”⁵⁸ The US administration believed that Robert Kennedy’s mission was successful as Sukarno called for a cease-fire in Borneo and “the Tunku agreed to a foreign ministers’ meeting without insisting on recognition first.”⁵⁹

The Australia government, however, felt that “[Robert] Kennedy has been more concerned in making a ‘success’ in his mission than in trying to examine the probable consequences of the ‘solution’ [to the crisis] he has promoted” and Australia had a duty to itself and its allies to try to “shake the Americans into awareness of what they are really doing”.⁶⁰ This belief was strengthened by Howard Beale, Australian Ambassador to the United States, who informed Menzies and Barwick that he suspected Robert Kennedy’s trip was partly motivated by domestic politics and Kennedy’s own ambitions to contest the next US Presidential elections due to be held in November 1964. The Australia government came to a decision that it was willing to share the “strategic burden” should the Kennedy-brokered negotiations and summit meeting broke down. This included being prepared for the resumption of fighting and taking “immediate and active steps” to ensure that Sukarno understood the strength of Western opposition to his course of action.⁶¹

The differences of opinion between Australia and the United States were very obvious. The US reminded Australia that while “a free, pro-Western Malaysia was one of the essential elements of the West’s security in Southeast Asia, a break with Jakarta over Malaysia would be destructive” and it “might possibly lead” the PKI to a takeover of the Indonesian government.⁶² In a meeting with Malaysian Ambassador Ong Yoke Lin, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Hilsman informed him that “there were only 2 million Communists in Indonesia in the population of 100 million” and the Americans were attempting through its policies to prevent this 100 million becoming Communists.⁶³ Hilsman added that General Nasution from the Indonesian Army feared that “Malaysia will be captured by the Chinese and then go to the Communists” and stressed that “General Nasution was anti-British and not necessarily anti-Malaysia.”⁶⁴ This statement showed that the US already knew of Nasution’s attitude and that was why the US was interested in strengthening the Indonesian Army to counter the influence of the PKI, as mentioned earlier; the Americans were confident that they were moving in the right direction as they did not see the Indonesian army playing a dominant or enthusiastic role in pursuing *Konfrontasi*.

In dealing with Australia, the US put its national interests above all. The US continued to give aid to Indonesia as it believed that by cutting aid the Indonesians would retaliate by breaking diplomatic relations and undertaking “possible violent actions against US personnel and interests.” The US also believed that cutting aid would also endanger US foreign business investments in Indonesia which included \$500 million in American oil properties and “deprive the West of the crucial moderating influence which Ambassador Jones has been able to exercise on Sukarno.”⁶⁵ The US gave little considerations towards its ally’s views that Indonesia was ‘the problem’ in Southeast Asia as it believed that “the problem” was the Communists elements in Indonesia (PKI) and not the whole Indonesian government.

The Quadripartite talks between Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and the United States were held again on 10 and 11 February 1964 in Washington to discuss the situation in the Far East and Southeast Asia. Ambassador Beale stressed that Australia believed it was vital to “provide adequately” for the defence of Malaysia and stressed the need to maintain the Commonwealth bases. Beale also emphasised that it was essential for the Quadripartite powers to work together to stop Indonesia’s *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia; “Australia was prepared to take counter-action including, if necessary, military action” should *Konfrontasi* continue.⁶⁶ Ambassador Beale suggested three actions for the Quadripartite powers to take in the immediate future; work for the continuation of the cease fire; work for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from Malaysia; agree on a change of terminology, describing the situation

as “an Indonesian attack” rather than “the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute”. The United States’ representative, Averell Harriman, informed the meeting that the US had a different view of Indonesia. The US viewed Indonesia “as a problem in itself, not merely in relation to Malaysia.” The US primary objective in Indonesia was “to keep Indonesia from going communist.” To achieve this objective, Harriman added that it was important “to minimize rather than stress Sukarno’s differences with the West.”⁶⁷ The US realised that it had little hope for cordial relations with Indonesia as long as Sukarno was president, but at the same time it believed that threats of military force should not be used to replace Sukarno.

In February 1964 the Australian government reaffirmed its policy in the light of Indonesian hostility towards Malaysia. Australia’s primary consideration in this case was the stability and territorial integrity of Malaysia. Australia believed that the preservation of British and Australian bases in Malaysia was essential if Australia were to play any part in the defence of Southeast Asia and any bargain that would weaken the British position in Malaysia to buy off Indonesian hostility would not be acceptable to Australia. The Australian Cabinet also decided it would ask the US to support its military involvement in Malaysia should Indonesia attack its forces.⁶⁸ Australia also concluded that it should steer away from policies that were not supported by the Americans and would strive to show that any problem in *Konfrontasi* had originated from Indonesia. The Australian Cabinet action to steer away from policies that were incompatible with the American wishes and put the blame on the Indonesians was a strategy to get American support for the Australian military forces. The American support was important as the Australian forces in Malaysia were rather small and Australia needed back-up from the Americans to deter the Indonesians. The Australian attitude was not surprising as Australia since the early 1950s wanted the United States to be militarily committed in defending Southeast Asia from the Communists.

Despite the announcement to support Malaysia made on 25 September 1963, Canberra did not give active military support until 1964, and the first Australian military units were not sent to Borneo until February 1965. The delay in Australian military deployment in Borneo was partly because Australia was unsure how long Britain intended to contribute to the defence of Malaysia after its formation as Britain had made it very clear that it would be retreating from “East of Suez” in the late 1950s. Australia was also unsure as to whether the US would help its forces should it be attacked by Indonesia even after all the ‘guarantees’ given by the Americans. This situation might mean that if Australia made commitments to defend Malaysia, it would be left carrying a heavy burden of responsibility after the British withdrawal. Moreover, in the earlier stage of the formation of Malaysia, Australia had been informed about the American policy of “non-involved cordiality” on the Malaysian issue. Canberra also did not commit itself militarily in Malaysia before the US gave some indication of opposing Indonesia’s confrontation policy and a commitment to help the Australian forces. The Australian policy to deploy its forces was influenced by the United States attitude towards *Konfrontasi* itself. The Australian government on many occasions sought a guarantee of help from the US under the ANZUS Treaty. This move was taken by Australia in order to make sure that the American position would be different from the one adopted towards the conflict in West New Guinea as discussed in Chapter 4, which had leant towards Indonesia instead of fully supporting Australia.

The US administration’s continuous support to the Commonwealth involvement in Malaysia aimed both at providing moral encouragement to Commonwealth forces in defending Malaysia and at the same time persuading both parties to negotiate. In his 1965 State of the Union speech, President Johnson, without directly naming Indonesia, stated that “Our goal is peace in South-East Asia. That will come only when aggressors leave their neighbours in peace”.⁶⁹ On this occasion President Johnson had reaffirmed his support for the Commonwealth policy against *Konfrontasi* “from the grandstand of one of the most important occasions in his office”.⁷⁰ In August 1966, the US Ambassador to Australia, Edward Clark,

declared that “American power and prestige were ‘on the line’ where the future of Australia was concerned” and that “whoever attacked Australia would have to fight the United States over it.”⁷¹ This statement, according to Clark, was not based only on sentiment but on the US judgement of Australia’s importance in the world. The US also acknowledged that “The alliance between Australia and the US is one of the most vital we have entered into.”⁷² These speeches were highly appreciated and warmly received by Australia as they underlined US support for Australian involvement in Southeast Asia. The support given by the Americans in 1965 and 1966 brought to Australia a sense of being accepted in a true alliance by the US and as an ally.

The American verbal support for Australian forces involved in *Konfrontasi* was enough to get Australia to jump onto the US bandwagon in Vietnam. To the United States, the “real” problem was Vietnam and not Indonesia. The verbal support given by the United States to Australia for the Australian involvement in *Konfrontasi* was to persuade Australia to be involved in Vietnam. The US knew that the Indonesian army dragged its feet on *Konfrontasi* and *Konfrontasi* would not develop into an open war as the army did not fully support the *Konfrontasi*. Furthermore, the fight for influencing the Indonesian government between the Western powers and the Communist bloc was the main reason why the United States did not take military action on Indonesia’s actions during *Konfrontasi*. To the United States, the problem in Vietnam was much important compared to *Konfrontasi* as most Western countries believed that the Communist victory in Vietnam would have a serious psychological impact in Southeast Asia and other developing countries.

Australia had to handle the simultaneous pressures from Britain in *Konfrontasi* and from the US in Vietnam. The Australian government under Menzies in the early 1960s was internally weak with its tiny majority in the House of Representatives. With this in mind the Menzies government could not afford to be in a position of losing more public confidence over its conduct of foreign and economic policies. The US government was fully aware of this situation and felt that the Australians were taking actions which could be considered as “victories to Australia”.⁷³ These actions were taken mainly to uplift the Australian public’s morale and to show that the present Australian government was in a strong position. The US believed that the Australian government would like its support in its involvement in Southeast Asia as it needed to boost its popularity in the eyes of the Australian public.

Australia knew that the formation of Malaysia was an act of ending British influence in Southeast Asia and at the same time the US was becoming further involved in the Vietnam conflict. The diminishing role of Britain and the increasing influence of the Americans in the Southeast Asian area were fully understood by the Australian as to mean that they needed to comply with American policies, cooperate with American officials, and militarily contribute to American causes in Southeast Asia. However, after all the Australian support in the American policies, the Americans gave conditions that they would only intervene if Australia was overtly attacked by Indonesia. The Americans disagreed to deploy their military forces in Malaysian area based on the Indonesian subversion and guerrilla attack as wanted by the Australians.

CONCLUSION

Australia, Britain and the United States all agreed that the formation of Malaysia was a good idea to assist British decolonisation of its territories in Southeast Asia and at the same time to prevent these territories from falling to the Communists. This belief was strengthened as Malaya had already won its fight against domestic Communist subversion with the end of the Emergency in 1960. By having Malaysia, the Western powers hoped that a Malay majority, pro-Western country would overcome the Chinese majority in Singapore and check the influence of Communism on the island of Singapore.

The Australian policy of military involvement in Southeast Asia during *Konfrontasi* was officially announced in 1963 but actual military involvement was delayed because Australia needed assurances from the United States especially on the terms in the ANZUS Treaty. This was also partly because the politically weak Menzies government could not afford to be in a position of losing more public confidence over its conduct of its foreign policy and its economic affairs. By announcing its policy of involvement Australia demonstrated to the United States its willingness to take some responsibility and shoulder the burden to defend Southeast Asia, but the actual action was not taken by Australia until there was some indication that the US would back Australia.

The alliance between the United States and Australia was not severely affected by the difference of opinion in dealing with Indonesia. While differences occurred, Australia worked closely with the US and continuously tried to secure military support from the US for the Australian forces in Malaysia. However, the American administration did not agree that the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute had deteriorated to a point where the ANZUS Treaty could be invoked. This was partly because the US viewed Malaysia's defence as a Commonwealth responsibility and the Americans also believed that British, Australian and New Zealand forces in the area could adequately cope with the situation. The American reluctance towards invoking ANZUS was also based on the US opinion that *Konfrontasi* was not fully supported by the Indonesian Army. Australia seemed to be satisfied with the 'verbal support' by the Americans and never seriously contemplated that the treaty would be finally invoked. The Australian government showed great interest in trying to solve the conflict and with its strong support for the British view it hoped to bring the United States back to a more comprehensive and more realistic support for the Commonwealth in the *Konfrontasi* issue. Australia failed to get the US militarily involved in the Indonesia-Malaysia *Konfrontasi*, and was caught in the middle of the problems in Southeast Asia which it believed were important to its defence. It invested a lot of resources in the Malaysian area especially during *Konfrontasi* and hoped that the Americans would repay it with their military support.

To sum up, the Australian policy to be militarily involved in the Indonesia-Malaysia *Konfrontasi* was influenced by the US decision to help Australia under the ANZUS Treaty and the assurances from American officials that they would support Malaysia, Britain and Australia should Indonesia launch full scale military actions against Malaysia. The open support by the US towards Australia gave more confidence for the Australian government to become militarily involved in *Konfrontasi* since now Australia assumed that the US would eventually help Australia should Australia be overtly attacked by the Indonesians.

NOTES

¹ Submission No 1304 From Menzies to Cabinet in Moreen Dee (ed.), *Australia and the Formation of Malaysia 1961 – 1966* (Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005), pp. 1 – 9.

² Ibid.

³ Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, *Crises and Commitments*, North Sydney: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd. 1992. p. 255.

⁴ Submission No 1304 From Menzies to Cabinet, quoted in Dee (ed.), *Australia and the Formation of Malaysia 1961 – 1966*, pp. 1-9.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Hilman Adil, *Australia's Policy Towards Indonesia During Confrontation, 1962 – 1966* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977), p 30.

- ⁷ Cabinet Decision No. 675, 5 March 1963, National Archives of Australia: A4940, C3725 in Moreen Dee (ed), *'Not a matter for negotiation': Australia's commitment to Malaysia 1961-1966* (Australia: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005), p. 9.
- ⁸ Adil, *Australia's Policy Towards Indonesia During Confrontation, 1962 – 1966*, p. 33.
- ⁹ Report of the ANZUS Council Meeting, Wellington 5 and 6 June 1963, in A1945 (1945/42) 16/3/5 ANZUS Council Meeting 1963. TS1690, NAA.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, Washington, 17 February 1963, *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. XXIII, p. 710.
- ¹² Incoming Telegram, Department of State, 18 February 1963, Borneo General 2/63, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, JFK Library.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ See "Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy", *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. XXIII, pp. 710, footnote 2.
- ¹⁵ Outgoing Telegram, Department of State, 19 December 1962, in Indonesia General 11/62-12/62, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, JFK Library.
- ¹⁶ Memorandum from the Joint Chief of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Washington, 13 October 1961, *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. XXIII, p. 443.
- ¹⁷ Special article by CIA Office of Current Intelligence dated 25 October 1963, SC No 00615/63. *The John F. Kennedy National Security Files*, Box 140-153, Microfilm 7-01.
- ¹⁸ Although Australia is not a party to Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement in 1957, Australia was associated with the agreement as appears from the letters exchanged between the governments of Malaya and Australia in 1959. See Statement by Sir Garfield Barwick, 27th March 1963 in *Current Notes in International Affairs*, (March 1963), p.37.
- ¹⁹ Special article by CIA Office of Current Intelligence dated 25 October 1963, SC No 00615/63. *The John F. Kennedy National Security Files*, Box 140-153, Microfilm 7-01.
- ²⁰ Outgoing Telegram, Department of State 14 July 1961, in Malaysia & Singapore General 1/61 – 10/61, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, JFK Library.
- ²¹ Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 17th February 1963, *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. XXIII, pp. 710 – 711.
- ²² NSC 6012, Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia 25th July 1960, *FRUS 1958-1960*, vol. XVI, (US Government Printing Office Washington, 1990), p. 215.
- ²³ Submission No. 576 From Barwick to Cabinet, 26 February 1963 in Dee (ed.), *Australia and the Formation of Malaysia 1961-1966*, pp. 66-71.
- ²⁴ Memorandum for the Australian Ambassador (Beale) 4th October 1963, *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. XXIII, p. 734.
- ²⁵ Report of the ANZUS Council Meeting, Wellington, 5th and 6th June 1963, in A1945 (A1945/42) ANZUS Council Meeting 1963 TS 1690, NAA.
- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 June 1963, in A1945 (A1945/42) ANZUS Council Meeting 1963 TS 1690, NAA.
- ²⁸ Memorandum for the Australian Ambassador (Beale) 4th October 1963, *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. XXIII, p. 735.
- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, 17 October 1963, Roger Hilsman Paper, Chronological Files 9/63 – 12/63, JFK Library.
- ³¹ Edwards with Pemberton, *Crises and Commitments*, p. 255.
- ³² Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 70.

-
- ³³ Commonwealth Parliamentary Debate, House of Representative, vol. 40, 1963, quoted in Adil, *Australia's Policy Towards Indonesia During Confrontation, 1962 – 1966*, p. 42.
- ³⁴ Cablegram To All Posts, Canberra, 26 September 1963, in Dee (ed.), *Australia and the Formation of Malaysia 1961-1966*, p. 168.
- ³⁵ Extract from the Minute by the ANZAM Committee, Canberra, 3 October 1963 in Dee (ed.), *Australia and the Formation of Malaysia 1961-1966*, p. 169.
- ³⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, 4th October 1963, *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. XXIII, p. 737.
- ³⁷ Memorandum from the Department of State to President Kennedy 14th October 1963, *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. XXIII, p. 745.
- ³⁸ Ibid.
- ³⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, 16 October 1963, *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. XXIII, p. 749.
- ⁴⁰ Memorandum from the Department of State to President Kennedy 14th October 1963, *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. XXIII, p. 746.
- ⁴¹ Ibid.
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, The White House, 14 October 1963, Malaysia & Singapore General 10/63, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, JFK Library.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid.
- ⁴⁵ Quadripartite Meeting on Indonesia and Malaysia (attachment), in Memorandum of Conversation, 18th October 1963, *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. XXIII, p. 755.
- ⁴⁶ Quadripartite Talks on Malaysia and Indonesia, Summary of First Meeting, 16 October 1963, Malaysia-Indonesia Quadripartite Talks 10/16/63-10/17/63, Folder 18 Countries Series, Roger Hilsman Papers, JFK Library.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid.
- ⁴⁸ Information Report from Central Intelligence Agency, 13 October 1962, in Indonesia General 9/62 – 10/62, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, JFK Library.
- ⁴⁹ Quadripartite Talks on Malaysia and Indonesia, Summary of First Meeting, 16 October 1963, Malaysia-Indonesia Quadripartite Talks 10/16/63-10/17/63, Folder 18 Countries Series, Roger Hilsman Papers, JFK Library.
- ⁵⁰ Outgoing Telegram, Department of State, 16 January 1963, in Indonesia General 1/63 – 2/63, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, JFK Library.
- ⁵¹ Quadripartite Talks on Malaysia and Indonesia, Summary of First Meeting, 16 October 1963, Malaysia-Indonesia Quadripartite Talks 10/16/63-10/17/63, Folder 18 Countries Series, Roger Hilsman Papers, JFK Library.
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ Incoming Telegram, Department of State, 12 March 1963, in Incoming Telegram, Department of State, 22 February 1963, in Indonesia General 3/63 – 4/63, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, JFK Library.
- ⁵⁴ Quadripartite Talks on Malaysia and Indonesia, Summary of First Meeting, 16 October 1963, Malaysia-Indonesia Quadripartite Talks 10/16/63-10/17/63, Countries Series, Roger Hilsman Papers, JFK Library.
- ⁵⁵ Memorandum of Conversation 2nd October 1963, *FRUS 1961-1963*, vol. XXIII, p. 731.
- ⁵⁶ David Lee and Moreen Dee, 'Southeast Asian Conflicts', in Goldsworthy (ed.), *Facing North*, p. 271.
- ⁵⁷ Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 13 January 1964, *FRUS 1964-1968*, vol. XXVI, (US Government Printing Office Washington 2001), p. 29.
- ⁵⁸ Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, 18 January 1964, *FRUS 1964-1968*, vol XXVI, p. 42.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 52.

⁶⁰ Note From Hasluck to Hicks, Canberra, 5 February 1964. in Dee (ed.), *Australia and the Formation of Malaysia*, p. 239.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Lee and Dee, 'Southeast Asian Conflicts', in David Goldsworthy (ed.), *Facing North*, Carlton South: Melbourne Press, 2001. p 273.

⁶³ Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, US Aid to Indonesia and Maphilindo Relations, 27 November 1963, Roger Hilsman Papers, Memoranda and Conversations Series, 11/63, JFK Library.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, 7 January 1964, *FRUS 1964-1968*, vol. XXVI, p. 15.

⁶⁶ Quadripartite Talks on The Far East, Washington, 10-11 February 1964, Countries Files, 1961-1964 (Series 1), Malaysia – Indonesia, Quadripartite Talks, Roger Hilsman Papers, JFK Library.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Savingram To All Posts, Canberra, 6 February 1964, in Dee, *Australia and the Formation of Malaysia*, p. 242.

⁶⁹ Editorial, *The Age*, 6 January 1965 in A5954 (A5954/69) 1127/6, *United States Defence and Foreign Policy*, NAA

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Memorandum for the President, Department of State, Australia General 1963, Series 9, Countries, President Office Files, JFK Library.

REFERENCES

- A1945 (A1945/42) ANZUS Council Meeting 1963 TS 1690, National Archives of Australia.
- A5954 (A5954/69) 1127/6, United States Defence and Foreign Policy, National Archives of Australia
- Adil, Hilman. 1977. *Australia's Policy Towards Indonesia During Confrontation, 1962 – 1966*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Australia General 1963, Series 9, Countries, President Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
- Borneo General 2/63, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
- Crouch, Harold. 1978. *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Current Notes in International Affairs*, March 1963.
- Dee, Moreen (ed). 2005. 'Not a matter for negotiation': *Australia's commitment to Malaysia 1961-1966*, Australia: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
- Dee, Moreen (ed). 2005, *Australia and the Formation of Malaysia 1961 – 1966*, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
- Edwards, P. & Pemberton, G. 1992. *Crises and Commitments*. North Sydney: Allen and Unwin Pty Ltd.
- Department of State. 1990. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960, vol. XVI*, US Government Printing Office Washington.
- Department of State. 1994. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, vol. XXIII*, US Government Printing Office Washington.
- Department of State. 2001. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, vol. XXVI*, US Government Printing Office Washington.
- Goldsworthy, David (ed.). 2001. *Facing North*, Carlton South: University of Melbourne.
- Indonesia General 1/63 – 2/63, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
- Indonesia General 11/62-12/62, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
- Indonesia General 3/63 – 4/63, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
- Indonesia General 9/62 – 10/62, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
- Malaysia & Singapore General 1/61 – 10/61, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
- Malaysia & Singapore General 10/63, National Security Files, Series 1, Countries, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
- Roger Hilsman Papers, Chronological Files 9/63 – 12/63, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
- Roger Hilsman Papers. Folder 18 Countries Series, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
- Roger Hilsman Papers. Memoranda and Conversations Series, 11/63, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
- SC No 00615/63. The John F. Kennedy National Security Files, Box 140-153, Microfilm 7-01, Perpustakaan Hamzah Sendut 1, Universiti Sains Malaysia.

Published online: 31 October 2025