

Robert Sandeman: As a Social Reformer in Balochistan, 1875-1892

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Abstract

The British advent in the Northwestern frontier regions of the Indian subcontinent during “The Great Game” era, 1672-1725, could be traced to their lofty and challenging developments in Balochistan. The social infrastructure of Balochistan was presenting almost every characteristic of backward society, such as tribal feuds, hostility, isolation, chivalry, group feeling, hospitality, and animal husbandry. Indeed, there was hardly any area that could be considered as an urban settlement. The whole society demonstrated every aspect of old traditions in all walks of life, such as social relations, politics, and economic institutions. However, as a social reformer, Robert Sandeman (1835-1892) had made it possible for the British to intervene in the region without engaging any military force. Therefore, this paper discusses the historical study of Balochistan's strategic importance, Sandeman's forward policy, and its implications on local power politics. Moreover, it closely examines his policy of divide and rule that had overcome the traditional authority of tribal chiefs that ostensibly had played a vital role in the empire-building of British in Balochistan.

Keywords: Balochistan; Robert Sandemen; Social reformer; Forward policy; British annexation of Balochistan

INTRODUCTION

Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan, having about 347,188 square kilometers with a population of 6,511,000.¹ The location of Balochistan depicts a unique contrast. Its vast stretch of mountainous land is punctuated with deserts and some green valleys too. Indeed, Balochistan's most important strategic location contains a long coastal line. The rest are touching upon Indus Valley in the North, Afghanistan in the Northwest, and Iran in the southwest. Most importantly, the history of Central Asia, South Asia, and Iran may not be

intelligible unless referring to the historical events in Balochistan. Furthermore, the worth mentioning fact here is that most of the region is non-arable due to water scarcity. The dominance of primitive traditions among the population has discouraged the hosting of empire builders passing through its muddy terrains or occupation. Being at the juncture of military and trade routes, Balochistan has ever been the center of attraction for adventurers between east and west on the globe. Even contemporarily, Balochistan being the largest province of Pakistan has been the core attraction of international politics.²

Map 1, Geographical Location of Balochistan




Source: <https://images.app.goo.gl/P8ha3CHt66GgXGMG9> [11 April 2021]

Keeping in view the significance of this region, Major Robert Sandeman, a British military officer, was given the charge of Northwest frontier regions, especially Balochistan. He was born on 25th February 1835 in Perth, where his father's family had been settled for generations.³ His ancestral association with the British administration had followed him too to be the part British Army in 1859. Moreover, he was known for his services at a young age, twice severely wounded, and once reported as killed during his service. He was the forerunner of British policies in frontier regions of British India. Eventually, he was deputed to the northwestern frontier region of the Indian subcontinent to counter the Russian threat during 'The Great Game'.⁴ For the said reason, he was deputed to intervene in the international affairs of Balochistan without disturbing the traditional local system.⁵ Moreover, he wanted to bring the local chiefs under his control because these chiefs and tribal leaders were key factors in the subjugation of the entire region without engaging any force.⁶ Since the society of this region was depicting to be a conglomeration of mud and representing the characteristics of a desert society, especially in terms of education, health, and other modern developments, that is why it was effortless for Sandeman to curb tactically. Therefore, he mainly opted to develop strategic communication and worked on economic incentives for the local people in the trade, medical aid, developing irrigation systems, and preserving forests for a major social influence. It was meant to curtail the centralized authority of Khan (noble king) over the tribal groups in Balochistan. Khan of Kalat', however, used to be the title of the Baloch former rulers of the

Khanate of Kalat.⁷ Sandeman eventually got success in curbing Khan's control by improving personal relationships with tribal leaders of various tribes in the region. For this reason, he signed a treaty in 1876 with Mir Khudadad Khan (1857-93) the then Khan of Kalat, the central authority in Balochistan, to ensure legal interference in the region. It had also recognized the status of Sandeman as a sole arbitrator of the British in case of any clash among the tribes.⁸ Furthermore, this treaty had opened the way for the British to establish a permanent presence in Balochistan. However, the British military presence in the region was followed by development projects like the construction of Railways, telegraphs line. In addition, the Khan was restricted to refrain from engaging in any negotiation with Afghanistan or any other foreign power. Eventually, the Khan of Kalat, the old traditional authority in Balochistan, was reduced to merely a showpiece. Indeed, the role of Balochistan was effectively left to act as a buffer zone or launching pad fully dependent on British administration.⁹

Map 2, Administrative Map of Balochistan under British India



Source: Drawn by the Author¹⁰

The British administration's successful incursion in Balochistan was carried through Robert Sandeman's forward policy which means the policy of divide and rule directly dealing with Sardars without using force. This again changed the internal power structure of the traditional tribal system of Balochistan.¹¹ In terms of policy application, this region was dealt with differently from previous Sind and Punjab policies. Nevertheless, Sandeman's devotion and charisma as a social reformer had brought this region under a complete suzerainty of imperial rule. Still, Balochistan was ever a challenging task for any military officer since the early British development in the Northwest frontier regions because of its proximity with Afghanistan and Iran. Thus, Sandeman had accepted this challenge by effectively planning reforms in society's traditional norms from 1876 onward.¹² His effective role as a social reformer was followed by a triumphed consolidation of the whole region in the final fixing of Afghanistan's borderline in 1893.¹³ This is because the establishment of the final fixing of the frontier with Afghanistan is a milestone in the British's development in the north-western region of the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, the British advancement, particularly in Balochistan, was always aiming to be very important to counter the envisaged Russian and French threats. Similarly, by the 1830s they wanted to establish trade relations with the Central Asian countries. Owing to that, the British policies could be divided into two phases i.e., 1839-1854

and 1854-1876 respectively.¹⁴ Similarly, in the second phase (1876) it was inevitably important for the Sandeman administration to make friendly relationships with Baloch and Pashtuns of Balochistan to take their confidence to ensure peaceful maneuvering of the forward policy.¹⁵ Thus, his vigorous role in implementing a divide and rule policy was materialized by segregation of the whole region into various principalities protected by local force subjected to their Sardars paying them huge sums of money.¹⁶

This topic has a wide range of scholars' attention on both national and international levels regarding the subject matter. Similarly, the historical overview of Robert Sandeman's role as a mediator of British rule in Balochistan is worth mentioning. Despite the facts, this area needs further historical exploration to draw lessons from Sandeman's policies for contemporary policy application in Balochistan. However, enormous data already exists in the academic world in the shape of personal libraries but still lacks proper access. Owing to that, this study shall be distinctively trying to explore Sandeman's hundred years policies based on both primary and secondary sources. Based on primary data, personal visits to Balochistan in the shape of firsthand information, this paper is taking Robert Sandeman's role in Balochistan as a case to study to justify its historiographical worth of subject matter. In addition to that, this research qualifies in the historiographical method analysis that can provide a base to the future research especially for critical evaluation of the collected data, interpreting the existing data, development of a new concept and, above all, predicting the discourse. To achieve that target, archival research is being used in the collection of the data. For this study, the researcher has visited AG Office Quetta, Sandeman Library Quetta, National Library Islamabad, NIHCR Islamabad, and Syed Hashmi Library Karachi.

A plethora of literature already exists, touching upon the importance of Balochistan or imperial entry in this region. Bruce (2002), Axmann (2008), Haider (2007) have discussed the historical development of the British rule in Balochistan. Moreover, Ewans (2001), Tucker (1979), Singer (1984) have shown British influence in Balochistan in the context of countering 'Great Game' in Afghanistan.¹⁷ In addition to that Baloch scholars, Baloch (1978), Ayub Bakhsh Awan, Dehwar (1994), Qudus (1990), Baloch (2006), and Breseeg (2004) have explored the British policies and constraints in Baloch nationalist perspective.¹⁸ However, the main literatures are still missing with an approach to explore the policies of a military general by Major Robert Sandeman, who had eventually ensured British rule in Balochistan through his successful policies. Though the British rule in Balochistan has been considered by the scholars in their work, Robert Sandeman's closed border and forward policy need a closer look, which lacks attention in the available literature, to deduce Sandeman's role as a social reformer.

BIOGRAPHY OF THE MAJOR ROBERT SANDEMAN

Before unfolding the charismatic personality of Robert Sandeman, it is very pertinent to know his life. He was born on 25th February 1835 in Perth, Scotland.¹⁹ They were settled here for a long time. Similarly, Sandemans, formally called Sandymanns, were of Scandinavian origin but had mostly been settled in British territory.²⁰ Moreover, his great-grandfather named Thomas Sandeman has remained as a Treasurer and Magistrate of Perth. His family had a strong relationship with Perth regarding services paid to the East India Company, particularly in Cadetship granted to Thomas Sandeman's grandson, Robert Turnbull Sandeman, by Town-Council. Similarly, taking his forefathers' opportunity, Robert Sandeman had also decided to enter East India Company's military service in 1854. Besides, promotion to higher distinction quickly had also given him the control of a brigade in Punjab. He was entrusted with a higher level of rankings for his wonderful achievements at the early age following his retirement at the age of 27 in 1862. He died in 1876.²¹

Robert kept in view the rich history of his family; however, his father's relationship with him was affectionate. Indeed, Robert was enjoying better status as compared to other family members as he was the sole person among ten family members educated at Perth Academy and had a higher degree from St. Andrew's University which was a great honor too.²² Since childhood, Robert was very much ambitious to become a military officer. His sincerest devotion and determination made him a soldier in the army. He was inspired by the portfolio of his father and was always determined to join the military. Eventually, in 1856, he was recruited as a Lieutenant in the first Cavalry of Sikh.²³ Since he was a devoted soldier, he got several setbacks during his military operations. He was severely wounded twice and even reported as killed during service. Sandeman's enthusiasm and smartness as a young officer had also offered him an honorary place in Punjab's commission that he eventually joined hesitantly in May 1859 as a gazetted Assistant Commissioner in Punjab State.²⁴ Upon his successful Punjab services, he was given the extra charge to extend British authority to North-western Frontier regions. Thus, he decided to march towards Balochistan which was already a challenging task for other military officers.

Sandeman first arrived in Quetta as an Agent to the Governor-General in 1876. In the beginning, he was given charge of other areas well along with Baloch territories. Those areas include Pashtoon areas such as Quetta, Pishin, Zhob, Chaman, and Loralai. It was not an easy task to deal with a diverse society. Nevertheless, Sandeman subdued these areas successfully by making negotiations with Khan of Kalat under the accomplishment of a treaty in 1876-76.²⁵ As a result of this treaty, the Khan of Kalat had given some areas to the British on lease. Moreover, the sanction of leased areas is a turning point in the British administration's hegemony because they had started to station their biggest number of armies in Quetta after that. Over time Quetta became the biggest army garrison in British India. The Army officers from the entire subcontinent were willing to remain ready to move to Quetta. Above all, this treaty had also given Bolan Pass control that had given indirect control of the British's main trade between East and West.²⁶

Robert Sandeman was a pseudo-arm of the British to enter Balochistan. As his appointment in Balochistan was with some ultimate responsibilities which included:

- i. To collect information about the local feuds i.e., among Murri, Bugti, and Brahui tribes or their collective tussle with Afghans
- ii. To inquire about a possible solution to the settlement of these long-lasting tensions among various tribes
- iii. To intimate the central imperial authority about the turmoil in the region and the failure of the commissioner in Sindh to control it; and
- iv. To report the information about the general relationship between the Marri and Bugti tribes and their relations with Khan of Kalat, a traditional authority in Balochistan".²⁷

Robert Sandeman's effective policy of divide and rule had made it possible for the successful advancement of the British in the region. He put forward gradual exploitation of the region through a systematic Sandemanization or divide and rule policy that consequently ensured his hegemony over the entire Northwest frontier regions till the rise of the Twentieth century. His triumphed influence in Balochistan had also reduced the traditional authority of Khan of Kalat to serve as a vassal merely. In addition to that, the establishment of cantonments and construction of Railroad/link road beside Afghanistan and Iran's borders had secured the frontier regions against Russian and French threat.²⁸

Robert Sandeman as a Social Reformer

Local chiefs highly appreciated Robert Sandeman's diplomatic entry in Balochistan. He was honored with a great welcome showing he had the full confidence of the local tribal leaders. They had finally assured him obedience in the summons of the meeting that took place in Rajanpur. Similarly, the chiefs' undue support for the commencement of 'tribal service', i.e., a Sardari System, was a predominant feature of the 'Sandeman' method in frontier regions.²⁹ It had also ensured peace and solidarity among the local population on either side of the border. Moreover, it had ripened the scenario even easier to carry out result-oriented policies for his administration's development. In addition to that, Sandeman organized yearly gatherings of the tribal chiefs in Sulaiman's at his summer headquarters purposely meant to discuss tribal matters. Similarly, these Jigas, over time, continued to be held at Sibi in winter and in the same way at Quetta in hot weather.³⁰ Indeed, Robert Sandeman's these tactics were perpetually meant to take the local population in confidence for the empire-building future fortunes in North-Western regions.

There were some blood feuds of old standing among the tribes of Marris, Mazaris, and Dreshaks during the early days of Sandmen's entry into this region. These feuds were very old and prevailing in society since First Anglo-Afghan War. Keeping in view the advantage of these feuds, Sandeman was an experienced officer and decided to settle them through matrimonial relationships.³¹ Moreover, he settled the blood feuds of old standing by making matrimonial relationships among Marri, Mazaris, and Dreshaks, respectively. Sandeman had successfully convinced the Chief of Marri tribe to give his niece in marriage to the Chief of Mazaris and Dreshaks. The decision was logically endorsed from either side because the solution was made at the cost of blood. Subsequently, he took more steps in the same regard by manipulating the situation for further development of British rule without using any military. Sandeman had chosen Kharan, Marris, and Bugti purposely meant to increase his influence for restoring the old main trade route between Punjab and Kandahar through Chotiali.³² Indeed, this Hill of Chotiali is titled 'Fort Munro' in honor of the then General A. A. Munro. This meeting was also held in Rajanpur at the back of Sandeman, who had made it possible by calling Hill's chiefs, which was not an easy task at all. Robert Sandeman's systematic policies are revolutionary in curbing the traditional feuds and extending the economic development of the imperial authority, particularly in Balochistan.

Another milestone contribution of Robert Sandeman to the British advancement in the region was seen in his specification of Balochistan's territory with Punjab and Sindh. During his early advancement in Balochistan, he was responsible for safeguarding Dera Ghanzi Khan's borders against Marris, Bugtis, and Khetrans. They were also restricted to ensure rigidity in the protection of outrages from outside in Dera Gahzi Khan. Nevertheless, they were successful in fulfilling their due responsibilities but unfortunately failing to restrict the raids from Sindh because it was the territory of the Chief of Kalat, where Khan was already at war with Sindh for a long time.³³ Moreover, it took about six years for Sandeman to bring this long-lasting disagreement to the table for any solution. Having said that, in 1876 he contacted Sir William Mereweather, the Commissioner, under the fort polio of forwarding policy for a complete settlement. The commissioner in Sindh had opposed the engagement of Sandeman that over time had raised some serious questions in collision with imperial frontier policy.³⁴ It was not easy to bring about a concrete solution, but Robert Sandeman's six-year determination eventually brings the disagreement to a victorious peace. This victory on the part of Sandeman had far-reaching results for imperial existence in the region. Indeed, Sandeman's forward policy had desperately paved the way for successful British existence in Balochistan for more than a hundred years.

SANDEMAN'S ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN BALOCHISTAN

Balochistan has always been the center of attraction for international politics due to its most important strategic location. That is why it was important for the British administration to extend its influence in this region to counter Russians' external threat to get access to the Arabian Sea. Similarly, they also wanted to dominate the regional politics in Russia's influence toward the South.³⁵ Contrary to regional politics, it was also inevitably important for the British administration to curb the local politics in Balochistan. It was quite clear from local politics in Balochistan to maintain the balance of power among the traditional leaders of tribes for further development of their administrative policies. However, keeping in view the strategic importance, the territorial land specification was important for their future fortunes in terms of administrative interest.³⁶ Robert Sandeman was already deployed in the region to best tackle the situation according to the traditional norms of Balochistan. It is believed that he realized achieving imperial policies in the region by preserving the old traditional system. For this reason, he had eventually decided to take the tribal chiefs in confidence to ensure peaceful rule.³⁷

Moreover, Sandeman had decided to take tribal leaders in confidence to exploit them for peace and order in the tribal areas of Balochistan.³⁸ Therefore they opted to preserve and institutionalize the tribal norms by supporting the tribal chiefs unless they used it against another tribe or for his glory. It is envisaged that in pursuance of the said reason, however, Sandeman had used intra tribal feuds to support other leaders in counterpart who, if necessary, may be used as a tool to sustain influence.³⁹ Despite all political and economic subsidies to the tribal chiefs, the British had also kept alive the intra-tribal feuds because they wanted to use them for certain aims without engaging their military force.⁴⁰ Indeed Sandeman wanted to intervene indirectly without disturbing their tribal norms because the tribal groups sometimes used to be very strong had threatened to raid India's settled areas. Thus, the tribal tensions played a very productive role in recognizing Sandeman's role in the region's local affairs.

It was keeping in view the importance of the traditional local system. Sandeman had decided to intervene in the regional affairs without disturbing the tribal norms and engaging military force. He used the predominant colonial divide and rule policy for covert designs and overt aims.⁴¹ For this reason, Sandeman inevitably had to intervene in the endless inter and intra-tribal feuds of local people, the Baloch, to legitimize his administrative interference and to keep a subsequent eye on the local politics of regional tribal Sardars and Khan. Moreover, the British, to keep the balance of power in the regional politics, had provided certain privileges to the local Sardars and Khan so that they may be able to manifest a predominant grip over the region for future fortunes of longstanding aims.⁴² Similarly, in the beginning, the British administration's utmost aim was to specify and secure their authoritative engagements in the region. They were always able to retain a complete hegemony with indirect consolidation in the region regardless of engaging a permanent and sizeable military.⁴³ Similarly, Robert Sandeman was deputed for set policy application. Indeed, he was being diplomatic and shrewd and achieved the required results with extraordinary skills by applying three distinctive administrative measures.

Firstly, the Sardars were taken in confidence by giving them financial support along with some administrative responsibilities. They were given honorary names by decorating with fascinating titles to restore their traditional position. The British wanted to acknowledge the authoritative concerns between local Sardars and Khan to diminish the provocative conflicts.⁴⁴ As a result, the sardars being thirsty for glorification and economic privileges had ambitiously accepted them with both hands and ceasing to anticipate future circumstances. Despite the fact, lack of political awareness and backwardness of the region had paved the way for the successful development of the British administration to manage the situation under the effective policies

of Sandeman.⁴⁵ Secondly, he had used a local ‘Council System’ to prevail justice at the grass-root level in a very diplomatic manner to get the desired results. He had introduced the councils of inter-tribal elders (*Jirga*) system among the local Baloch people, which meant settling the local disputes peacefully.⁴⁶ However, these jirgas were enormously result-oriented for the British administration and got wide acceptance for Sardars in the entire region. Robert Sandeman’s aforesaid measure had subsequently followed so much recognition that it still exists in contemporary intra-tribal affairs of the recent Balochistan, especially in its justice system. Thirdly, Sandeman had initiated a unique security system for the sustainability of authority in the entire region. This system was called a ‘Police and Levies System’ consisting of warriors from all tribes. The main purpose of the Levies System was to safeguard the state machinery and develop a feeling of judicial obligation at the grass-root level among the local people of all tribes.⁴⁷ However, it was purposely aimed to inculcate sentiments of identification with a defense of their motherland. Furthermore, it was designed to create welfare for statehood and responsibility of defense for the civil authorities. Similarly, the Levies System had been proven to be very successful as per the British administration's set results. The Levy guard was recruited and served in their indigenous areas; however, the salaries were paid by their Sardars from the special levies allowance given by the British for the said purpose. The levies were dual in nature of allegiance because it was responsible to both Sardar and political officer of the British. Nevertheless, when any doubt was seen in the levy’s corporation, Sardars would ask for any immediate change of the person or any other dominant action. However, their control was quite diplomatic if a Sardar himself was caught failing to maneuver their due responsibility or proved to be hostile to his tribes. That would immediately result in the conditional suspension of levy funds from the British administration.⁴⁸

Robert Sandeman had introduced the Levy System to establish complete social control over the entire region. Similarly, they wanted to exploit the local population to secure civil authorities, British military intelligence, and above all, to best defend the country. Moreover, the Sardars had found this system very friendly where they appreciated recruiting their relatives as levy officers. It was also followed by a merger of the Levy system with the old local traditional tribal system that was eventually glorious in triumph at the Sandemanization of the tribal system in Balochistan. However, this system was so friendly with permission to bear arms to rank among the tribal population. Eventually, this system was transformed to compensation with occupation in paying them a monthly salary that predominantly proves to be a very effective tool of authority for the quasi-self-supervision of the tribes for the British administration.⁴⁹ These three measures of Sandeman had far-reaching consequences for the British in Balochistan. Moreover, these policies paved easy indirect access to the regional politics and, above all, to have authoritative hold in keeping them accountable.⁵⁰ Indeed Sandeman's cunning policies had long-lasting repercussions for the development of British rule in the region.

Since the British administration was always in the position to curb the political situation in Balochistan without disturbing its traditional norms, for this reason, they had been using various versions of policies while incorporating with the local population to keep their authority alive in internal affairs and local politics. Indeed, their policies were quite simple and a few in terms of predominant long-lasting results keeping in view the demography of Balochistan.⁵¹ Contrary to the British (Sandeman) previous "Closed Border Policy" enforced in 1854-72 of direct intervention in the region's internal affairs, they decided to apply Robert Sandeman's new policy named "Forward Policy" 1874-92.⁵² This policy was meant to indirectly deal with the traditional power structure of Khanate of Kalat in Balochistan. Nevertheless, this policy had abruptly changed the internal power structure that signaled a new policy in the tribal areas. However, it was a kind of typical British action in otherwise indirect recognition of their colonial authority in tribal areas of Balochistan. Similarly, indirect rule was making a system

of egalitarian arrangement, giving every group the same natural status of old fashion in terms of authority.⁵³ Contrary to that, this new system was different from the previous one because the Khan was the ultimate authority in the past, but now it was reversed. Now the total shift in authority increasingly relied on Sardars as the sole representative sustaining law and ensuring the peaceful development of their local self-administration. Eventually, they wanted to set up a system where the local population may live subjected to local elders' domain without making any change to the old local political norms of Balochistan.⁵⁴

Furthermore, the tribal system in Balochistan was exploited according to the need for the required results. The policies of Sandeman had brought much attraction and got the willingness of the Sardars and Khans to participate in their internal political affairs. Now the British position in the region was quite favorable in terms of the tribal leaders' eventual subjugation. The British administration's position was guaranteeing an overreaching political hold that resulted in the British's emancipation from getting rid of their dependency on tribal support. Additionally, the tribal leaders were liberated to the extent that their loyalty was conditionally pre-requisite to make the traditional system diplomatically more autocratic. Nevertheless, the excessive increase in the political and economic power of Sardars from outside assistance had given rise to a controversy among the local leadership in Balochistan. Similarly, Scholz argues that the conflicts and rifts that occurred after the First Anglo-Afghan War 1939, resulted in the British policy of making the position of Sardar stronger in counterpart to Khan.⁵⁵

The Treaty of 1876 had inevitably replaced the British indirect rule's traditional tribal system following a decentralized political structure economically dependent on British subsidies.⁵⁶ The forward policy of Robert Sandeman's 'Sandeman System' had profoundly transformed the tribal status of Sardars and Khan.⁵⁷ Despite the fact he had curtailed the position of tribal leaders and increased their dependence on the British. Sandeman tactically influenced dependency on the British to both local levels as well as their leadership. However, Khan's status was made equivalent to Sardars, a predominant requisite of their policies to ensure an ultimate authority in the region.⁵⁸ Thus Robert Sandeman's system proved to be very successful and highly appreciated by the imperial authorities. Indeed, the system adopted by Robert Sandeman had eventually brought an ultimate consensus among conflicting local tribes according to their interests through a foreign arbitration.⁵⁹ Khans and Sardars were left as *de jure* heads being employed as maintaining peace and prosperity and, above all, working as custodians of highways in their jurisdictions in reward of a nominal amount of money paid to them according to their efficiencies. Similarly, the British used to impose heavy fines on Sardars and Khans in case of disobedience to their duties of encouraging trade and imparting security to the means of communication. Indeed, the logic behind their triumphant rule was a balanced and unfaltering appeasement policy but not a spasmodic and punitive interference.⁶⁰

The policies of Sandeman were quite result-oriented in terms of covert objectives, particularly in Balochistan. His divide and rule policy had produced a politically scattered Balochistan with several power centers; however, Khan was one of them. Moreover, the division in tribal society had made them weaker to rely upon the British administration to achieve the set aims. Similarly, Khudadad Khan, who was the then Khan of Khanate, a state in Balochistan, and his subsidies were increased to an awesome amount that he had been successfully using for strengthening his position in Khanate. In return, he was also obliged to pay an amount of 80,000 annually to the British from his already stable income.⁶¹ Nevertheless, this increase in subsidy was a kind of exploitative obedience of the Khan's authority in Balochistan. Contrary to that, the Khan's old glory was by now lost to the British existence in Khanate. Likewise, the central role that he was playing before was lost anymore. Sandeman's policies aimed to subdue Khan's central authority to mold their due interests and set them to rely upon British administration.⁶² This systematic transformation had eventually led to a

paradigm shift in traditional tribal norms. In addition to that, the arbitration of old tribal feuds and maneuvering of their tribal interests was now entrusted to a group of British political agents or heads of *Jirgas*. However, *The First Administrative Report of the Balochistan Agency* narrated in 1886 that:

The Agent to the Governor-General has practically taken the place of the Khan as head of the Baloch confederation. His highness is still the nominal head, the Sarawan and Jhalawan Chiefs still sit on his right hand and his left in the Darbar as of the old, and till he is invested by the Khan with the Khilat or mantle of succession a Sardar is not to be legitimized as the representative of his tribe. But in the essential question of the nomination of the Sardars, the summoning of peace in the country, the Agent to the Governor-General is recognized all over Balochistan as having taken the place of the Khan, and his mandate naturally commands a great deal more respect and obedience than ever did that of his Highness.⁶³

It was all about Sandeman's effective role that had made it possible for the British administration to have steady command over Balochistan. Indeed, he is a key player behind successful British aggrandizements in overcoming traditional tribal authorities' influence. The Sardars who were lower in status to Khan were eventually brought counterpart to Khan in function, and their status was considered a new ray of hope for Sandeman in maneuvering his policies successfully in the region.⁶⁴ Despite the fact, the Sardars' undue support to the British administration had mainly pushed the suzerainty of Balochistan in their hands. Meanwhile, Sandeman's regime had widely divided the power and function of the tribal chiefs. It was controversial that no Sardars and Khan could claim his ultimate say regarding his traditional power.⁶⁵ The era witnessed much decay in Khan and Sardars, who acted as nominal heads over time, and their status eventually reduced to a dummy. Furthermore, Khan's position was reduced merely as a ceremonial head of the state, particularly used to develop political integration among the tribes. In contrast to that, the primary position of Khan was in principle still maintained.⁶⁶ Similarly, in 1876 the day Sandeman took over as Agent to the Governor-General, he had superseded the status of Khan, which was already overvalued to Sardar. The nationalist scholars in Balochistan had argued that Sandeman cunningly subdued and bribed the heads of tribes at the cost of a local population that eventually recognized them as autocratic regardless of traditionally elected chiefs (Sardars or Khan).⁶⁷

Quetta City, the capital of recent Balochistan, was the main junction of trade in terms of the vicinity to Bolan Pass. The British development in Balochistan had followed a further intervention by seizing the control of Quetta through a nominal amount paid to Khan of Kalat. At the juncture of the main trade route between east and west, the Bolan Pass had chosen Quetta as a strategic base for the military since the First Anglo-Afghan War.⁶⁸ Moreover, their military engagements were followed to make Quetta a defensive and strategic stronghold. In 1878-80 during the Second Anglo-Afghan War 1879, the British administration had successfully managed to convince the sitting Khan of Kalat Khudadad Khan (1857-1893) to have administrative control of Quetta. In return, a lump sum of Rs. 80,000 was annually paid to Khan for further concessions.⁶⁹ However, an agreement was signed. The British owed complete jurisdictions of civil and criminal powers of administration and authority to collect taxes of main trade on Bolan Pass between east and west.⁷⁰ Eventually, in 1877, they had established a British administered Balochistan Agency with Quetta as its headquarter and Robert Sandeman as a serving Agent to Governor-General.⁷¹

Besides that, their containment policy was followed by further territorial annexation. After Second Anglo-Afghan War, they had also got control of Sibi, Pishin, South of Quetta, and north of Thal Chotiali, which were already part of Kandahar.⁷² Moreover, in 1889 they had

successfully established a cantonment in Loralai after suppressing a long-lasting rebellious Apozai tribe; however, the subsequent control of these strategic territories was of great importance and justified their complete claim and control over the entire north of Balochistan.⁷³ Similarly, further concessions on the part of Khan in terms of territory were made in the subsequent years of 1894, 1899, and 1903. The British wanted to regularize the control and regional integrity of Bolan Pass with the previous right of the historical connection between Afghanistan and British India.⁷⁴ In 1903 and 1905, the British took a narrow strip of railway land stretch along Quetta-Sindh from Khan of Kalat to further develop communication that had already been completed up to Sibi in 1880, Quetta in 1887, and 1888 Chaman and Gulistan.⁷⁵ However, this development was singularly meant to have easy access to the remote border areas near Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

Having stated that, it could be argued that Major Robert Sandeman, a military man was a founding father of British Balochistan. His charismatic persona of leadership made him successful in curbing the local Baloch population because he understood the tribal system better than his peers as his origins were of a highlander. When Sandeman was deployed to Balochistan, he found it easier and even cheaper to handle tribal leaders tactfully instead of directly controlling the tribes. Nevertheless, he was against the British previous "Closed Border" policy of flouting their traditional norms and rather used them to get more interests. Similarly, he found Sardars and Khan thirsty for traditional authority, withholding guns, money, and horses to sustain his power. Sandeman had cunningly bartered gun, money, and horses to Sardars for their bargain allegiance and guaranteed maintenance of local law and order for the British administration. Furthermore, he had also encouraged the local chiefs to raise their local guard system called 'Levies Force', which was exemplary in maintaining law and order in their territories. Owing to that, those who were found hesitant to the British authority were declared ruffians and traitors. Above all, Sandeman had never been found hesitant to use brute physical force in case of any treachery to his power.

Moreover, the northwest frontier region's territorial annexation was part and parcel of Sandeman's forward policy. *Sandemanization* in Balochistan was aimed to comprise all Baloch areas with Afghanistan border stretching from the Persian border in the West and Pashtun tribal areas in the northeast with a narrow strip of land adjoining them with British India via Bolan Pass. Furthermore, the long-lasting presence and construction of modern traffic arteries had fully transformed the traditional tribal system. Similarly, Quetta, the capital of today's Balochistan, was gradually developed into one of the biggest military garrisons and systematically developed to become a major political, economic, administrative, cultural, and social hub. Even the military officers from other provinces of British India preferred to station at Quetta rather than other areas. Despite these facts, Sandeman wanted to push the development projects from Kalat to Quetta to attract the local population in an attempt to reduce Khan's authority in Kalat. It was followed by establishing a cantonment in Quetta that later turned the whole city into one of the largest military garrisons of the British Empire. Eventually, Quetta became a metropolitan city economically more developed, linking British India with Afghanistan and Iran through railway lines. Due to that, abrupt aggrandizements were seen in the trade too.

Robert Sandeman's charismatic leadership had brought a paradigm shift in the demography of Balochistan. He had transformed the means of trade and transportation of goods to a modern means of transport by encouraging the construction of warehouses and depots at main railway stations. This shift in the transport sector to railways was mainly aimed to streamline transportation trafficking from North-South to the east-west direction in

Balochistan. With this, the Arabian Sea had also lost its old importance of trade connected to Afghanistan by caravans. Thus, the main traditional towns in caravan routes such as Kalat state had lost their importance.

Similarly, the main coast of Sonmiani Arabian Sea located in the southeast of Balochistan in Pakistan, previously considered to be the most significant port of Balochistan, had also lost its importance because Karachi port, over time, emerged to be the main trade hub on the entire coast. Finally, it was all about Robert Sandeman's skillful and tactful policies that made it possible for the British to rule this part of the Indian subcontinent. In Balochistan, he was a pioneer, a triumphant administrator, and, above all, a pacifier who eventually converted the region from the anarchic state into an orderly province. Indeed, many lessons could be drawn from Sandeman's policies to apply to contemporary issues in Balochistan. The government of Pakistan should oversee the educational, health, and development policies in Balochistan to restore the confidence of tribal leaders. Owing to that, in the future, the new generation can inevitably replace the traditional Sardari System to bring about ultimate peace and development in Balochistan at par with the rest of Pakistan.

NOTES

¹ "Provincial Census Report of Balochistan", Statistic Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. 2001, pp. 58.

² Iqbal Chawla, "Prelude to the Accession of the Kalat State to Pakistan in 1948: An Appraisal" *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan Vol 49, No. 2, July-December 2012, pp. 81-106.*

³ Fred Scholz, *Nomadism and Colonialism: A Hindered Years of Baluchistan 1872-1872*, Karachi: OUP, 2002, p. 90-92.

⁴ Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game, On the Secret Service in High Asia*, London: John Murray Publisher, 2006, p. 72-74.

⁵ "The other well-established and widely known institution in the Baloch society is the Sardari system. This system appears to have had its origins in the Mughal period of Indian history, but it is believed to have assumed its present shape rather late, during the period of British colonial rule. In contrast to the marked egalitarianism that pervades tribal organisation among the neighbouring Pathans, the sardari system is highly centralized and hierarchical". Taj Mohammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development up to 1980*, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004, pp. 70.

⁶ Rai Bahadur Heto Ram, *Tarikh-e-Balochistan*, Urdu, Quetta: New Quetta Stall, 1977, p. 220.

⁷ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baluch Nationalism*, Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1987, pp. 99-102.

⁸ "In this year, the Khan received further boost from the death of Kabul's ruler, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan. In fact, the British Agent in Qandahar reported to the government that Khan of Kalat, Mir Khudadad Khan (1857-1893) had offered the province of Shal (Quetta) to the ruler of Qandahar if the Latter would assist him in consolidating his position at Kalat." Haider, "The British Advent in Balochistan," 61.

⁹ Richard Issaq Bruce, *The Forward Policy and its Results*, Lahore: Dost Associates, 2002, pp. 354.

¹⁰ Khan, Gulawar., 2014. Politics of Nationalism, Federalism, and Separatism: The Case Study of Balochistan in Pakistan Thesis, PhD, University of Westminster, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, UK, pp. 177.

¹¹ L. P. Tucker, *Sir Robert G. Sandeman Peaceful Conqueror of Balochistan*, Lahore: Yakki Gate, 1979, pp. 1-9.

- ¹² Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, pp. 140-142.
- ¹³ Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans Bc-Ad- 1957*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1976, pp. 375-378.
- ¹⁴ Iqbal Chawla, "Prelude to the Accession of the Kalat State to Pakistan in 1948: An Appraisal" *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan Vol 49, No. 2, July-December 2012*, pp. 81-106.
- ¹⁵ Syed Iqbal Ahmad, *Balochistan its Strategic Importance*, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992, pp. 80-43.
- ¹⁶ Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans Bc-Ad- 1957*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1976, pp. 375-378.
- ¹⁷ Bruce, *The Forward Policy and Its Results*, Axmann, *Back to the Future*, Haider, *The British Advent in Balochistan*, Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History of Baluchistan*, Tucker, *The Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan*, Singer, *Lords of the Khyber*.
- ¹⁸ *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baluch Nationalism*, 1987. Ayub Bukhsh Awan, *Baluchistan: Historical and Political Process*, 1985. Malik Muhammad Saeed Dehwar, *Contemporary History of Baluchistan*, 1994. Syed Abdul Quddus, *The Tribal Baluchistan*, 1990, Habib Jalib Baloch, *Balochistan: Statehood and Nationalism*, 2006. Taj Mohammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development*, 2004.
- ¹⁹ Tucker, A. L. P. *The Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan: Robert Sandeman*, Lahore: Tariq Publishing House, 1979, pp. 8.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-e-Balochistan*, Urdu, Quetta: 1954, pp. 66.
- ²³ Tucker, *The Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan*, pp. 9-11.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001, pp. 75.
- ²⁶ Bruce, *The Forward Policy and Its Results*, pp. 18.
- ²⁷ Andre Singer, *Lords of the Khyber: The Story of the North West Frontier*, London: Faber and Faber Publication Ltd., 1984, pp. 128.
- ²⁸ Syed Javed Haider, "The British Advent in Balochistan," *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture XXVIII*, no. 2 July-December 2007, pp.53-76.
- ²⁹ Tucker, *The Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan*, pp. 21-30.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Rao Bahadur Hoto Ram, *Tarikh-e-Balochistan*, Quetta: New Quetta Book Stall, 1977, pp. 110.
- ³² Singer, *Lords of the Khyber*, pp. 125.
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, pp. 40.
- ³⁵ Tucker, *The Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan*, pp. 35-37.
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Syed Iqbal Ahmad, *Balochistan, Its Strategic Importance*, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992, pp. 76.
- ³⁸ Tucker, *The Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan*, pp. 37.
- ³⁹ Syed Iqbal, *Balochistan, Its Strategic Importance*, pp. 99.
- ⁴⁰ Tucker, *The Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan*, pp. 41.
- ⁴¹ Haider, *The British Advent in Balochistan*, pp. 53-76.
- ⁴² Heto Ram, *Tarikh-e-Balochistan*, pp. 220.
- ⁴³ Haider, *The British Advent in Balochistan*, pp. 69.
- ⁴⁴ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, pp. 33-35.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid.
- ⁴⁶ A. Aziz Luni, *Afghan of the Passes*, Vol. 2, Quetta: Zeeshan Printing Press, 1994, pp. 36
- ⁴⁷ Haider, *The British Advent in Balochistan*, pp. 53-76.

⁴⁸ Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, pp. 372-97.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Anzar Malik, *Derajat in the British Administration: A Politico-Administrative Study* (M. Phil thesis, Department of History Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 1988, pp. 6.

⁵² Aurang zaib, The Lesson Drawan from the British Rule in Balochistan: An Appraisal, A Journal of Management and Humanities Petronas University Kuala Lumpur 02, No. 1, December2019, pp. 13-24.

⁵³ W. A. J. Archold, Afghanistan, *Russia and Persia: Cambridge History of India*, Cambridge University Press, 1932, pp. 116.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 125.

⁵⁵ A. Aziz Luni, *British Balochistan 1879-1947*, Karachi: Fazl sons, 1994, pp. 150.

⁵⁶ Edward G, Oliver, Across the Border: Pathan and Baloch, London: Sang-e-Meel, 2000, pp. 21-23.

⁵⁷ Tucker, *The Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan*, pp. 41.

⁵⁸ Luni, *British Balochistan 1879-1947*, pp. 177.

⁵⁹ Tucker, *The Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan*, pp. 42.

⁶⁰ Lal Baha, *NWFP Administration under British Rule 1901-1919*, Islamabad: NIHCR. 1978, pp. 22-24.

⁶¹ Shah Muhammad Marri, *BalochQaum*, Urdu, Lahore: 1967, pp. 112.

⁶² Singer, *Lords of the Khyber*, pp. 167.

⁶³ Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan, A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 129.

⁶⁴ Haider, "The British Advent in Balochistan," pp. 53-76.

⁶⁵ Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan, A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 147.

⁶⁶ S. A. Akhtar Kazmi, *Anglo-Afghan Tussle*, Karachi: PIDC Printing Press, 1984, pp. 35.

⁶⁷ Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, *Baloch a Nation*, Lahore: 1947, pp. 116.

⁶⁸ Shah Muhammad Marri, *Baloch Qaum*, Urdu, Lahore: 1967, pp. 110-113.

⁶⁹ Aurang Zaib, The Lesson Drawan from the British Rule in Balochistan: An Appraisal, pp. 13-24.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Tucker, *The Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan*, pp. 47.

⁷³ "The Pashtoons had been residing in Zhob, Loralai, Harnai, Quetta and Pishin districts of Baluchistan for thousands of years. They had resisted the invaders throughout the ages. In 1338, the Kakars of the area had fought against Peer Mohammad, the grandson of Amir Taimur. Ahmad Shah Abdali had assigned the Sardari of Zhob to a pious Jogazai, Baqaneka and entitled him as "Badshah-i-Zhob". The Jogazais fought against the British also. The most active person against them was Shah jahanJogazai. He inflicted heavy losses on them. He fought two major battles with the British. In 1879, a British force of about one thousand troops under General Biddulph challenged Shah jahanJogazai's 500 men at Baghai near Sanjawai. The British wanted to occupy Loralai. But the Jogazai force equipped with primitive swords repulsed the well-armed troops. Consequently, till the next year, the British could not dare another expedition. On August 16, 1880, Colonel T.W. Pierce was sent at the head of 300 soldiers of Bombay Infantry. Shah jahanJogazai and Sardars Faiz Mohammad Khan Panezai led Panezais, Aranzais and Kakars of Zhob. The ill-equipped indigenous tribal forces repulsed the British army in a tough three-hour long fight. The last two battles of 1883 and 1884 are very remarkable which were fought at ThalChotali against the British. Shah jahanJogazai stood

victorious in these fights and the British had to bear heavy losses. Shah jahan fought the British till his death. The British had acknowledged his bravery.” Haider, “The British Advent in Balochistan,” pp. 53-76.

⁷⁴ Tucker, *The Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan*, pp. 45.

⁷⁵ Muhammad Anwar Khan, *England, Russia and Central Asia*, Peshawar: 1963, pp. 4.

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