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ISRAEL'S SECURITY CONCERN OF ARAB UPRISINGS

The regional security of the Middle East has been changed since the so called Arab Spring started in late 2010. This paper seeks to study the Israeli strategic situation in the changing regional security of the Middle East since the Arab Uprisings incepted. The research questions focused on the main concerns for Israel since the Arab Uprisings incepted and the response of Israel. Israel looked to the uprisings as a strategic change which could affect its security. Even though Israel seems more stable while other regional powers were affected by conflicts, Israel has been faced new challenges in fragile region. The main security challenges emerged for Israel were the liquidity of the region for ambiguous future, the rise of the non-state armed groups within the region and the emerging influence of Iran in the region. Israel relied on its strategic relations with the US and other super powers and its strategic military superiority in the region to deal with the situation. It worked as well on developing its relations with the moderate Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia in face of Iran.

Keywords: *Arab Spring; Israel; Middle East; Regional Security*

Introduction

The Middle East has a strategic geopolitical location as a transcontinental region between the three continents; Asia, Africa, and Europe. As well as the Middle East overlooks the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Black Sea. Three of the world main straits are in the Middle East: The Strait of Hormuz, Mandeb Strait, and Suez Channel. In addition, the Middle East is the top oil supplier and has the largest oil and gas reserves in the World.¹ Then, the historical and religious dimension of the region gives the region an extraordinary attention internationally. Several major religions have commenced in the Middle East, including Islam, Christianity and Judaism. These factors have made the region gain a wide attentions and important to be studied.

The dramatic changes in the Middle East which started since so called the “Arab Springs” uprisings in late 2010 have influenced the regional security. Although the uprisings began peacefully in the sake of achieving cascaded

“democracy and development”², some of these uprisings have transformed to be more violent and kind of civil wars in cases like Libya, Syria and Yemen. In the cases which were able to move to held elections after toppling the former regimes, such as Egypt and Tunisia, the main outcome was the tremendous electoral victory of the Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular.³ These changes put the region in unprecedentedly political and security situation.⁴

Since years, the position from Israel is a crucial driver for the regional alignments in the Middle East.⁵ For the super powers, the US in particular, the security of Israel is one of the most important determinants of their positions regarding the regional security of the Middle East and the changes took place there. Although Israel seem away from these changes, Israel considered as one of the most affected players in the Middle East. At the beginning, the Israeli position was very cautious regarding the political changes took place in the surrounding countries, as the Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu, described the Arab uprisings as an “Islamic, anti-western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli, undemocratic wave”.⁶ Although the inception of the uprisings shock Israel as well as the other regional actors, Israel was able to adopt policies to deal with the changes around. This paper aims to study the main Israeli security concerns in the changing regional security in the Middle East and Israel’s response.

The paper includes three main sections. The first one, which was divided to two subtitles, explains the regional environment on the way to the Arab uprisings and the regional politics in this regard. The second section highlights the main Israel concerns considering the changes in surrounding states. Finally, Israel’s response to the changes and security concern discussed in the third section.

Israel and Changing Middle East

The way to 2010 Arab uprisings

After five years of the second Intifada, 2005, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a new political scene has emerged for Israel at the Palestinian arena. As part of Cairo talks among the Palestinian factions, Hamas has agreed to participate in the Palestinian legislative elections which held in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.¹ Hamas has achieved a surprised electoral victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council election. As a result, Hamas has formed the government in the West Bank and the Gaza strip. Most of the regional and international actors were unwelcomed to Hamas victory and government and refused to deal with it.⁸

This new situation creates a challenge for Israel as Hamas gain more rooms to work and build its political and military capabilities in the Gaza Strip. By the end of 2008, Israel decided to attack the Gaza Strip to end Hamas’ control and release one of its soldier who was captured by Hamas in 2006.

Israel considered Hamas sweeping victory in the election as an earthquake and a threat which required a high level of concern. In its first meeting after the election, the Israeli government decided to put a pressure to cripple Hamas government, “such as financial transfers, passage of Palestinian MPs between Gaza and Judea and Samaria, etc. After consulting with all the relevant bodies, we will formulate decisions and act accordingly.”⁹ The Israeli opposition leader, at that time, Benjamin Netanyahu, wrote that Israel must retrieve its unilateral policies and reaffirm its security in front of Hamas victory who seen as a victory for Iran as well. From his side, the head of the foreign affairs and security in the Israeli Knesset believe that Israel failed in its war against Hamas and it had to prevent Hamas victory even if that caused a problem with the US. The Israeli government announced that the PA that ruled by Hamas is a “terrorist” organization and it will not deal with it any more. Dr. Matti Steinberg, who was an adviser to the Israel security agency Shin Bet director, wrote that the problem is not Hamas victory itself but Hamas’ leadership of the Palestinian People which could affect the conflict dramatically.¹⁰ Israel was able to convince the International Quartet for the Middle East (The US, Russia, The EU and The UN) to impose its conditions; to recognize Israel, to renounce the violence (Armed resistance), to accept the previous agreement between PLO and Israel, on Hamas to be accepted in the international community which Hamas rejected that conditions.¹¹

At the regional level, the Second Lebanon war in 2006 with Hezbollah came to end a long period of calm for Israel. The war itself and its outcomes were considered as a shifting point in the Israeli strategic position in the Middle East. Hezbollah, who is backed by Iran and Syria, was able to steadfast for more than a month in front of Israel who never has experience like this very long war before. The Israelis have seen the war as a part of their indirect conflict with Iran and Syria. The war created a feeling among the Israelis that they were the loser. This feeling led to form an investigation committee to assess the outcomes of the war and the political and military performance during the war, so called Winograd Commotion.¹² There was a huge rift in the Israeli assessment to the impact of the war on Israel strategic position. While some Israeli officials and experts believe that the war enhance the deterrence with Hezbollah, others insist that the war discover the weakness of Israel strategic position in case it face a wider attack.¹³

In the period between 2005 and 2010, the Middle East regional politics was divided to two main axes; the Arab Moderate axis and the Resistance axis. The moderate axis was including mainly Egypt, Jordan, the PA and the Gulf countries while the resistance axis was consisted from Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. Israel was closer to the moderates who were offering the Arab Peace Initiative with Israel.¹⁴

Internationally, Israel was still receiving a high support from the US Administration who continued its pressure on Israel’s enemies in the region.

At that time, the US administration put a heavy pressure on Iran regarding its nuclear program and its relations with Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance movements like Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. In addition, the US has continued its policy to protect Israel in the UN institutions to prevent any decision condemns Israel's violations of the international law.

Arab Uprisings and Regional Politics

By the end of 2010, several popular uprisings have taken place in many Arab countries. These uprisings or revolutions (which so called the Arab Spring) have led to a dramatic political change in the Middle East when four authoritarian Arab leaders were ousted in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Saikal argues that uprisings created an atmosphere of freedom and enhanced the willing of change among the Arab masses in most Arab countries. The waves of change landed on Syria which has been transferred to be a kind of civil war. In the kingdoms of Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan, a limited constitutional reform took place there. Despite their limited leading role in the uprising in Egypt and other Arab states, the Islamists will benefit politically. Regarding to the regional implications, the main three regional powers; Turkey, Iran and Israel, have been affected in different ways and levels. Arab Spring and the Egyptian Revolution have affected Israel negatively in particular. Loosing Mubarak who replaced with a democratic government might give vent to popular anti-Israeli sentiment has seen as an initial outcome of the political change in Egypt which Israel is worried about.¹⁵

Looking to the positions of the major regional powers toward the changes in the Arab countries and the region, Iran, despite from the supportive statements of some of its religious symbols, was conservative and unwilling to the changes since the situation before the Arab Spring was more stable for Iran and its allies. The Syrian revolution, basically, has affected the Iranian position toward the Arab uprisings. Iran, as well, was afraid that the wave of change could hit its peach eventually. From its part, Turkey saw in the Arab Spring an opportunity to spread the philosophy of democracy and enhance its influence being inspiring model for newcomers (the Islamists). It also reinforces its role as a bridge between the democratic West and the Arabs people who are looking for it. Turkey has appeared as a supportive actor for the Arab revolutionists. Israel as suspicious regarding the mysterious future of the region. The Israeli leaders are very anxious from the changes in the region. The major Israeli anxiety was the overthrow of Mubarak regime in Egypt and emerging the Muslim Brotherhood. Israel has expressed its concern relates to Hamas's roots with the Muslim Brotherhood. Israel also has worried that a more "hostile" regime in Egypt could aid Hamas in Gaza.¹⁶

This scene contributed to the emergence of a new realignment in the region based on the position from the Arab Spring. The Arab Gulf States

(except Qatar), Jordan, and Israel, stood as supporters of the coup Egypt, which is the most prominent appearance of the setback of the Arab Spring and its decline. While Turkey and Qatar stood with the rule of the elected Egyptian President, Mohammad Morsi, and with the Muslim Brotherhood. Iran focus was on Syria and strength its influence by supporting and using the Shiite groups in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. In other arenas, such as Yemen and Syria, things are more complicated due to a conflict of interest among the major regional powers in the Middle East, Iran, Turkey and Israel. Arabs, who have lost important components- namely Iraq, which become an almost failed state, Syria which subjected to a kind of civil war, and Egypt, which entered an internal critical impasse after the coup- found themselves under the leadership of the biggest Gulf state, Saudi Arabia .

This complexity and the game of dangerous edges in the region when the main powers are very close to direct clash, pushed the international factors, the US and Russia to change their strategies of ensuring balance and not let things slide to a direct conflict in the Middle East. In contrast to a popular opinion that the United States was reluctant and has no strategy to deal with the situation in the Middle East, the Obama administration has early identified the basic parameters of their position on what is happening in the Middle East .

The Middle East witnesses a new stage of reforming, which could lead to create new state or divided current entities. The wide speaking on the Kurdish state in the heart of the region, which affects the sovereignty of Syria Turkey, and Iran and independent entities for Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs in Syria and Iraq, give an indication on possibility of emerging new Middle East. It is also reflecting the emerging influence of the external forces on expense of the regional powers of the Middle East. The emergence of ISIS (The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) and its control of the areas of Sunni Arabs enhances the chances of a sectarian Sunni-Shiite conflict (or civil war), which often end the process of disengagement between the two components and create new entities on sectarian and ethnic lines. This kind of sectarian conflict could also lead to a clash of major regional powers like Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This scene, which will contribute mainly to enhance the power of Israel on the expense of the Palestinians, has affected on the priority of the Palestinian Issue for the Arab governments. The scenario has led also to more interventions from the super powers in Syria, Iraq and Libya .

It is unlikely that the international powers to allow the situation in the region to move without their control. Therefore, the super powers have worked hardly to maintain the state of balance between the regional powers and contain them. In this context, the Iranian nuclear deal with the west or so called group (5+1) came mainly to maintain the balance between the regional powers, Turkey (NATO member), Israel (the US strategic ally), Iran (the potential partner), the Arabs (in need of protection).¹⁷ It is not guaranteed that the international factor attempts will lead to ensure a balance between regional

powers or to prevent these forces from clashing with each other. However, some events recently show that Turkey and Iran, as they face same challenge from the establishment of a Kurdish state, have managed to cease the tensions between them and allowing talks to work .

Israel's Main Concerns

Unpredicted Results

The Israeli position has evolved from the Arab uprisings due to the developments in the region. With this development, Israeli security concerns have also been emerging. The most important of these concerns in the first period, from early 2010 to mid-2013, is the ambiguity and difficulty in estimating the results of the changes occur. As the uprisings were a surprise and have shocked the Israeli experts and officials, the prospect of the fate of the region and the nature of the new arrivals was a main concern to the Israelis.¹⁹ This was expressed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by saying in his first comment on the uprising in Tunisia ‘the region we live in is unstable ... we see that in several places in the geographical space where we live’.²⁰

The Islamists' evolution in the elections in Egypt and Tunisia has increased Israel's fear.²¹ In addition to that, the growing of Islamic ideology and movements in Syria, Libya and Yemen has reinforced the impression among Israelis that the future may come in oppose of their interests.

The arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt is the height of Israeli fear as the Muslim Brotherhood is a big supporter of Hamas and share with it ideologically and politically. “During an address before the Knesset on 23 November 2011, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's view that the Arab uprisings were becoming an ‘Islamic, anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli, undemocratic wave’, a view shared has strong popular appeal in Israel.”²² For instance, the President of Egypt at that time, Mohammed Morsi, refused to communicate with the Israelis until his refusal to mention Israel in his speeches at all. As well as, the escalation between Israel and Hamas in November 2012 was a practical test of those fears.²³ Where Egypt adopted a firm position appeared as a supportive position to Hamas at the political and diplomatic level. President Mohamed Morsi, in cooperation with Turkey and Qatar, exerted a major diplomatic effort to press Israel to halt the escalation after only 8 days, the shortest escalation since Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2007.

The strategic ambiguity in the region for Israel has raised fears of new alignments in the region that weaken its strategic position. Those fears were largely focused on the future of relations between Egypt, Turkey and Iran significantly. However, the crisis in Syria and the differences of views between Iran on the one hand and Turkey and Egypt on the other hand mitigated the

Israeli fears but did not cancel them.²⁴

The other fear of the region's ambiguity among Israelis is the growth of armed groups in a situation of considerable liquidity in the region, especially in Syria, Sinai and Libya. These groups were generally anti-Israeli and had hostile intentions toward them, as the Israelis believed.²⁵ In the stages of peaceful street uprisings, slogans were raised pro-Palestinian and against Israel. The same was during the armed conflict stage, armed groups in Syria, Sinai, Libya and Yemen, despite their preoccupation with internal conflicts, have been raising anti-Israel slogans and rejecting its presence.

Iran Axis

The first decade of the second millennium witnessed the emergence of the axis of resistance that includes Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. This axis has posed a real threat to Israel as they have confrontations in 2006 with Hezbollah and 2008/2009 with Hamas when Israel was unable to get victory. With the outbreak of the crisis in Syria in early 2011, there was a dispute between Iran and Syria on one hand and Hamas on the other, which led to the departure of Hamas from Syria and semi-cessation of Iranian support. The Iranian-led axis appeared to be more preoccupied with the crisis in Syria and Iraq. With the rift among the resistance axis, Israel seemed relieved.

The turmoil in the region has created a state of heavy liquidity that has raised security and strategic concerns among all major players in the region, notably Israel, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. From its side, Iran seemed in favor as it was an opportunity to increase its influence and presence in the region. Iran has stepped up its interference in Bahrain, Yemen and Syria in various forms. Iran's growing influence has raised fears among Israel and Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt.²⁶ Israel was the most affected. Especially that Iran and in cooperation with the Lebanese Hezbollah has strengthened its military and strategic presence in Syria. Iran has also worked and still clearly to support President Assad, who is in hostile to Israel. In Yemen, Iran has supported the Houthis, who are raising slogans against the existence of Israel. Iran sent troops and experts to help the Houthis develop their military and missile systems, eventually leading to the Houthis' control of power in Sanaa.

The fear from Iran and its influence in the region, has pushed the axis of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to further cooperation with Israel and the United States to pressure Iran.²⁷ During the first five years of the Arab uprising, Iran did not retreat from its progress in the various issues. Thus, Iran has become one of the most important players in the region. Making Israel increasingly vulnerable to a series of air and missile attacks on Syrian, Iranian and other Hezbollah targets in Syria. Israel also attacked the Gaza Strip in 2012 and 2014 to reduce the Iranian threat surrounding it.

Israel has relied on its strategic relations with the United States and its military air superiority in reducing the Iranian threat. It also supported in one way or another the military coup in Egypt to overthrow the Muslim Brotherhood for fear of the development of their relationship with Iran, which will make the situation the security threat to Israel strategic. As the military came to power in Egypt, Israel felt a certain sense of reassurance. Because the relationship between Egypt and Hamas is no longer good and Egypt tightened its blockade of the Gaza Strip, where Hamas' military power. It also strengthened the Arab alliance between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan, which considers Iran a strategic threat as Israel sees it

Considering the political change in Egypt, among the most important for Israel, Israel decided to escalate the situation with Hamas in Gaza by assassinating Hamas top commander Ahmed AL Jabari months after the new elected President Muhammad Morsi came to office in Egypt. The Gaza war 2012 was the first test for Israel, Hamas and Egypt after the Arab uprisings took place in 2010. The 2012 war was the shortest among the Israel wars on Gaza since 2007. The role of the new Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi, at that time, was crucial to put a heavy pressure on Israel to stop its aggression on Gaza. For Israel, it was very clear sign on the possibility of new policy in the changing Middle East. Six month later, a military coup took over the power in Egypt which receive a huge support from Israel by gaining the International support for the leader of the coup Abdel Fattah al Sisi to become president which actually happened later .

In Syria, Israel was pleased to see its main enemies; Iran, Syria and Hezbollah are busy in the very complicated conflict in Syria. At the same time, Syria was concern regarding the new comers after Syria. So, Israel preferred not to intervene in the conflict. Despite of this policy, Israel committed several attacks against Syrian and Hezbollah targets in Syria. Israel claimed that its policy in Syria was against the activities which could impact its security. In this regard, Russia military intervention came with full consideration to the Israeli concerns. Israel announced that it works actively with Russia to prevent any developments could affect its security .

At the mid of the strategic regional changes in the Middle East, the west (the five permanent members of the UNSC and Germany) has reached to nuclear agreement with Iran, an important development, which has a strong opposition from Israel. The Israeli PM Netanyahu said that the Iran nuclear agreement is the worst in the history for Israel. Although the agreement has suspended Iran military nuclear activity for fifteen years, Israel believes that the agreement, which gradually release the international sanctions on Iran, will help Iran to extend its hegemony in the region.

These developments make Israel and Moderates Arab regimes closer in front of Iran and its allies. Israel has worked to employ the historical convergence of interests between Tel Aviv and what he called the "moderate

camp” in the Arab world countries to achieve a political settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians serve the interests “of Israel.” It was incumbent on the “moderate” camp in the Arab world should be aware that the Arabs have played a major role in the bombing of the Palestinian issue and therefore they should have to bear the responsibility for solving them. The current conditions are “favorable” to the request of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan to play a central role in resolving the conflict with the Palestinians to serve the interests of Israel. The moderate Arab states are facing major crises such as the repercussions of the Arab Spring and the growing Islamic terrorism, Sunni-Shiite conflict, and the growing power of Iran, coupled with the weakness of the United States and the rift, which increases the common area between these states and Israel, which is a suitable opportunity for decision-makers in Tel Aviv to try to pass the demands of Israel. The contagious paper that it is incumbent on the “Israel” do not hesitate to exploit the fears of these countries and try to push it to assist in the completion of the settlement serves the interests of Israel.

Israel’s Response to Arab Uprisings

The Arab uprisings are the main strategic development influenced the region and Israeli strategic environment. The Israeli position from these uprisings has developed at two stages: first, the shock stage when the cautiousness or “wait and see” policy was the main determine, second, indirect intervene stage, as Israel adopted policies to influence the changes based on its own security. The second stage, which it more important was built based on main principles. a) Israel viewed the uprisings as strategic changes which may affect its security at the short term and its existence at the long term. b) Israel has worked to help its allies in the Arab countries such as in Egypt. c) Israel was very suspicious regarding the crisis in Syria and pay its main attention to the Syrian crisis since Israel’s main enemies are all in eye of the crisis; Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas in some stages.²⁸

Some Israeli experts and officials have described Arab uprisings as an “Islamic winter”²⁹ that could pose a threat to Israel’s long-term interests. In this term, Israeli officials have worked to focus on the state of chaos and instability in their description of developments in the region rather than on them as movements of freedom and democracy in their narrative to the international players.³⁰

After six years of Arab uprisings and the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, Israel was able to avoid direct security effects while other regional powers have intervened in such internal conflicts. For instance, in its response to the Syrian crisis, Israel did not intervene in the crisis by sending troops or obvious siding one of both sides. At the same time, Israel has designed three ‘red lines’ in this context: (1) attempts by Syria or Iran to transfer ‘quality

weapons' to terrorist organizations, with an emphasis on Hezbollah; (2) the transfer of chemical weapons; and (3) violation of Israeli sovereignty.³¹ In this regard, Israel has waded several air strike on Syrian, Iranian and Hezbollah's targets in Syria.³²

On Israel's concern of the rise of political Islam parties, especially the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab Spring countries, Israel did not hesitate to support the regional or local parties who stood against the changes which have brought the Islamists. When the general Abd Al Fattah Al-Sisi has overtaken the power after toppling the President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt, a new phase has begun for Israel, which described as an anti-Arab spring wave restored by previous regimes. Thus, Israel diplomacy has worked hardly to support the coup in Egypt and to cease the reaction in the international community.³³

The region's liquidity has led to the emergence of armed conflicts that have contributed to the emergence of numerous of non-state armed groups in Syria, Sinai of Egypt, Libya and Yemen.³⁴ These armed movements have had a role in the security of the region and engaged in open wars and confrontations. Most of these movements are hostile to the existence of Israel. This situation has worried Israel and the need to develop its strategy to deal with threats from non-state armed organizations Israel was able to survive during the last six decades with threats came, basically, from surrounding states.³⁵

The growing of the sectarian conflicts in the region has led to further tension between some Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia and Iran. This formula has allowed Israel to announce upon its relations with Arab states with which have no diplomatic relations with it. Israel appeared to be in an undeclared alliance with Arab states led by Saudi Arabia against Iran.

Israel has adopted a policy of "waiting and monitoring"³⁶ and the lack of direct field intervention in the conflicts around it to avoid its entry into the crisis and perhaps uncalculated sinking. Israel has done its diplomatic and propaganda efforts with the international powers to warn of the future of change in the region and the possibility of its transformation into an "anti-Western and anti-Israel"³⁷ environment controlled by Islamists and Iran.

Conclusion

The chaos and liquidity in the Middle East is a strategic development on international security. Given the importance of the geostrategic region, the Middle East will remain on the focus of international forces and a place to compete for major projects. The fact that Israel is the strongest ally and "pampered girl" of the United States makes it always in the eye of conflicts and alliances that are transiting the region. Israel's main dilemma remains its existence as a normal state in the region sharing with other forces the regional security and economic development. Despite the disruptions caused by the uprisings of the Arab Spring and its consequences of open political and military

conflicts among the Arab states, Israel is still facing the dilemma of normal existence as the chance of a solution with the Palestinians have been reduced.

The Arab uprisings, which broke out at the end of 2010, led to a state of political and in some cases violent conflict between the “revolutionary” parties and traditional Arab regimes. This open conflict has weakened the Arab situation which became more fragile. What made the situation worse in some cases is the intervening of external powers such as in Syria, Libya, Yemen which turned most of these cases to civil war. The internal violent conflict in Israel’s surrounding Arab countries weakened the Arab armies and affected its legitimacy. In the light of this scene, Israel has become more secure from the threats come from the surrounding Arab states ‘armies.

The Middle East is likely to witness more conflicts and divergences, which will affect the nature of regional alliances, including Israel. Problems such as the Kurdish issue, sectarian strife, nation state collapse and loss of control will provide a wider scope for international powers to play bigger roles in the region and try to impose their own agendas. The Syrian crisis, the war on terror, the Iraqi crisis and the decline of democracy and freedom are still open and escalating crises.

Israel has always placed both Hezbollah and Hamas among the most prominent threats it faces. Despite the general weakness of the Arab states, Hezbollah and Hamas still have a power and control, in a way or another, over a geography that allows them to move and develop their military abilities, making the conflict with Israel open to all choices.

The prospect of a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially the two-state solution, despite it appears to be in interest of Israel, as Israel is building more settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem and imposing a new reality at ground, Israel felt that it is not pressured to give any concessions with the Palestinians, so it suspends the peace process and continues with its policy of construction illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

Finally, it is not guaranteed that Israel may remain permanently far from these radical transformations that may affect the region’s basic structure and affect its importance as international attention grows in areas such as East Asia and South-East Asia. One of the topics that may be important to be discussed and studied is the future of the importance of the Middle East to the international powers and Israel’s position in the American strategy.

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