This article explores methodological approaches to the study of pre-and early-modern state systems in southeast Asia, the study of which has remained, almost exclusively, the preserve of anthropologists, ethnographers, archaeologists and historians. Notwithstanding the regularity with which southeast Asian history and anthropology have been informed by political science methodologies, with a few very notable exceptions, political scientists, themselves, have rarely sought to extend their discipline into the pre- and early-modern eras. Recognising that neither states, power nor politics began in the 1950s, this study aims to redress that situation by seeking, overtly, to integrate a range of political science methodologies into the existing anthropological and historical literature on power and statehood in pre- and early-modern southeast Asia. In doing so it aims also to establish the utility of political science methodologies to the analysis of the remoter past in southeast Asia (and, by implication, to other areas of the world).

Keywords: Southeast Asia, Political Science, Power, Statehood

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The article, first, delineates the three broad methodologies found in existing literature about power and statehood, before identifying a number of their shortcomings and proposing a more integrated, interdisciplinary, typology for the analysis of pre- and early-modern Southeast Asia.

One major objection to this project derives from the idea that ‘politics’ are not a universal form of human activity. Deriving from the scholarship of Hans Baron, the proponents of this view argue that ‘politics’ requires a self-conscious participation in a public sphere, *conceived of as such*. Baron identified in Italy during the late 14th Century, the emergence of “a new philosophy of political engagement and active life, developed in opposition ideas of scholarly withdrawal”.3 Such ‘Civic Humanism’ created the necessary public space for *self-conscious* participation, a space occupied, according to Pocock, by “intersecting persons rather than of universal norms and traditional institutions”.

These ideas have been applied with insight to colonial Malaya by Anthony Milner, who drew on Baron and Pocock, as well as Habermas, in seeking to delineate the “invention of politics in colonial Malaya”.5 Although Milner claimed to have discovered “the invention of politics in the intertextuality of Malay ideological dispute”,6 as I have suggested elsewhere, the new loyalties that he uncovered, along with the new modes of political action, described as they were in a new political vocabulary, were evidence of the transmutation and reconception of politics, rather than of its invention.7 However profound the changes in identity, political action and vocabulary that Milner has delineated, they did not erase earlier struggles over material resources, loyalties and authority which have been (and remain) enduring elements in the drama of power in Malay, and other, southeast Asian state systems.8 Furthermore, even if accepted, Milner’s analysis, or those of the scholars on whose insights he built, would not relieve political science of the challenge of exploring the remoter past but, rather, would provide for it a more complex and theoretically challenging subject with which to engage.

Area Studies scholars have developed three broad conceptual frameworks for the study of non-western politics. These frameworks, which relate, in fact, to three types of power and three sorts of evidence, are economic structuralism, structural functionalism and culturalism. It is a central tenet of this study that each of these methodologies on its own is inadequate for understanding a political system.

**Economic Structuralism**

Michael Mann noted that economic power “derives from the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organisation of the extraction, transformation, distribution and consumption of the objects of nature”.9 It is possible to analyse politics in terms of the organisation of resources, and to
account for change, or its absence, by locating inconsistencies, changes or contradictions in the economic structure and its dependent social structure. Writing about southeast Asia, Victor Lieberman expressed the assumptions of economic structuralists clearly:

How did economic expansion influence political and cultural life? In the short term, by creating land and monetary shortages and by aggravating center-periphery and intra-elite conflicts, economic growth repeatedly destabilized mainland polities. In one realm after another, breakdowns during the 14\textsuperscript{th}, 16\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries followed periods of rapid demographic and/or commercial growth not easily accommodated by existing political arrangements.

Such essentially utilitarian analysis, deriving from Thomas Hobbes, has a long tradition in English and U. S. American scholarship. Marxism is its most important modern variant.

Economic structuralists do not concentrate on social or cultural particularities. Thus Norman Owen, in studying nineteenth century “peasants in a colonial society moving from subsistence to commercialisation”, considered that “a deeper knowledge of their culture, however valuable it might be in interpreting the precise forms taken by their thoughts and actions, is not really necessary to explain the major facts of the social and economic history”. J. H. Kautsky would agree. On the basis that people behave according to economic or social interests, he asserted the validity of generalisations which are broad enough to encompass French knights and Tutsi warriors. Through economic and social structure, he would compare polities widely separated by time and space. Such a methodology not only facilitates comparison and encourages the identification of similarities, it also obscures real differences. As Michael Mann observed, to “concentrate, as Kautsky does, upon the similarities of regimes such as the Inca Empire and the Kingdom of Spain (both ‘aristocratic empires’) is to forget what happened when 180 Spaniards entered an Inca Empire of millions.”

\textbf{Structural Functionalism}

As methodologies which had been developed to analyse liberal democracies, and which focused on the separation of powers and election patterns, proved inadequate for analysing the politics of the newly independent states of Africa and Asia, David Apter and others discovered that the work of Evans-Pritchard and other anthropologists “seemed to have more important things to say about politics than most political scientists”. These political analysts adopted and adapted structuralism from anthropological theory because it provided a methodology for comparing different societies. Rather than focus on the structure of an economy and society, structural functionalists study the structure of politics, within a society and, having identified the elements of the structure, allocate political functions to them. By locating the performance of universal functions within the structure of the political systems, political
scientists hoped to develop a more dynamic framework than the relatively static structuralism.  

Structural functionalists define the functions of a political system primarily in terms of the maintenance of the system itself. They see most parts of the system as performing functions which enable the system to survive. Those functions that are necessary for the maintenance of the system are political socialisation and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation and political communication on the one hand, and rule-making, rule-application and adjudication on the other. Structural functionalists define the political system itself so as to exclude the economy, culture and social structure, which, though they contain sources both of conflict and of power, are seen as constituting the environment of the political system. 

But politics is not just about the maintenance of systems. It is, as the structural functionalists themselves concede, about “the drama of power”. By excluding from the political system sources of power and of conflict, structural functionalism de-emphasises conflict and the sources of conflict, and the pursuit and use of power. In focusing on the functions necessary for the survival of the system, structural functionalism emphasises implicit functions in a political system at the expense of the explicit functions. Whether or not we agree with Engels that the state is “a machine for the oppression of one class by another”, one of the primary functions of pre- and early-modern states was extractive and their history is, explicitly, a history of domination of peoples and struggles over resources. In pre- and early-modern southeast Asia, as elsewhere, the state provided a structure to mobilise resources for the maintenance of the ruler and his court.

Structural functionalism does not focus attention on these central issues, and thus is vulnerable to criticism for its conservative bias. Although Sullivan goes too far in claiming that structural functionalism “celebrates the given social order, however that order may adversely affect certain groups”, as a methodology, it helps to sanitise politics by not focusing centrally on power and conflict.

**Culturalism**

Structural functionalists initiated a closer examination of the role of political culture in political development. Because of their preoccupation with the structure of political systems, however, many structural functionalists failed to perceive the central importance of political culture in engendering political activity and, indeed, in defining the role of specific institutions.

Culturalists perceive that cultures provide value systems which motivate individuals, shaping political perspectives and actions. Such scholars try to establish “not only ... the function of a particular institution ... on the level of performance, but also on the level of meaning.”
focus engenders consideration of different bodies of evidence from those considered within other methodologies, resulting in different assessments of the ‘functions’ of institutions, forcing us to recognise, even, that the concept of ‘function’, itself, is culturally conditioned.  

Culturalists, however, often fail to explore the economic relationships which both underpin political systems and provide the frameworks within which cultural perceptions are developed. Shelly Errington dismissed attempts to do so. She noted that “humans make real through practice what they think is real, their ideas about these things are not superstition or false consciousness but what becomes socially real”. Errington seemed even to deny the relevance of economics. She ignored:

what could be called the mechanics of economic power: land tenure and rents, and the devices by which the rich maintained themselves as such. I have concentrated instead on the poetics of power.

The failure of Errington and other culturalists to integrate imagined realities with material ones is a central problem in culturalism. The importance of culturally based perceptions and realities does not diminish the need for humans to sustain themselves or the role of systems of social power in regulating the levels of that sustenance, a point Errington has recognised elsewhere. Anomalies between material and imagined sources of power need to be resolved, and culturalism is at its most vulnerable in its failure to provide a framework for establishing relative hierarchies and importance.

Towards An Inter-Methodological Approach

The study of southeast Asian history and politics does not need additional methodologies. Economic structuralism aids our understanding, for example, of the material basis of elite power in Perak and how it was exploited; structural functionalism helps us analyse the organisation of traditional Malay polities; and culturalism is an essential tool for understanding how Malays conceived and described politics. To comprehend a political system, we need to draw on all three perspectives. “In the real world”, as Dennis Kavanagh remarked,

political activity connects with history, law, culture, society, and so on. It is necessary to take these phenomena into account in any explanation of politics and to use other approaches, where they can be helpful.

When Weber sought to ‘decompose’ political sociology into material interest, authority structures and value orientation it was to aid analysis of all
three rather than to deny their essential interdependence.  
I am not arguing that distinct methodologies should be collapsed into one, even if that were possible. One of the most important functions of methodologies is to direct the researcher to evidence which might otherwise be ignored. Patrick Sullivan, in also noting this, outlined the ‘dialectical relationship’ between conceptual frameworks and empirical research:

*The perception, selection and ordering of data requires, on the one hand an epistemology, an assumption of how the object can be known, and on the other hand implies a theory of the relationship of objects of knowledge. Natural facts, whether historical or otherwise, do not surrender up their meaning in the moment of perception*  

The process of comprehending the meaning of ‘natural facts’ is essential to both the methodology used and the process of structuring facts into sequences embodying causes and effects. That different methodologies bring to our attention different sorts of evidence does not allow us to ignore that evidence which does not fit our methodology. We should be prepared to combine methodologies so as to encompass the complexity of apparently conflicting material rather than to seek to reduce the evidence to conformity with a single framework.

It is not sufficient that, as Oran Young observed, different conceptual frameworks “tend to interact with each other over time”. They are individually incomplete and need to be in constant interaction. Michael Mann’s identification of four sources of power economic, political, military and ideological provides a useful framework for interrelating and elaborating these methodologies.

**The Economic Bases of Power**

Economic power derives from the universal need of humans to sustain themselves materially, that is, to secure food, clothing and shelter, and from the consequent potential (which these needs underpin) to monopolise control of the organisation of “the extraction, transformation, distribution, and consumption of the objects of nature”. Control of economic sources of power gives rise to other sources and forms of power because human dependence on the objects of nature is absolute: “the constraints of economics are prior to the constraints of morality and law”. Control of the economic system which sustains a community precedes the formation of states. Further, control of “the resources necessary for the maintenance of the polity” ensures dominance within the polity.

The resources necessary for maintenance of the state can be derived from control of production or control of distribution or exchange. Resources
derived from control of distribution or exchange are vulnerable to changes in
distribution routes and socio-economic configurations far from the influence
of the dependent elites. Such resources might have the advantage, however,
of reducing the need for elites to extract goods and services from their own
populations, thereby facilitating the development of perceived group interests
and shared cultures.

The Political Bases of Power

The desire of elite groups to extract from subject groups goods and services
gives rise to parallel political structures which themselves then become a
source of unequal political power within the community involved.

Patron-Client Relations

As a concomitant of the development of unequal control over the production
and distribution of goods and services, vertical relations of dependency
develop. These are primary political relationships. James Scott elaborated
their operations from the work of anthropologists, defining them as:

>a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely
instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-
economic status (patron) uses his own influences and resources to
provide protection and/or benefits for a person of lower status (client)
who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and
assistance, including personal services to the patron.43

Scott argued that, although the relationship between patron and client
was unequal, clients had sufficient resources under their control for a degree
of reciprocity to exist. Therefore, client-patron relations are not characterised
by command. Inequality is essential to the relationship, however, since
the patron seeks to bind the client by “a debt of obligation”.44 The client’s
inability to repay the debt results in the development over time of “a cluster
of asymmetrical obligations”,45 which diminish the client’s capacity to form
new relationships with other patrons or to “square the debt” and terminate the
relationship. It is possible, even, that this dependence becomes underpinned
by emotional bonds which strengthen other links between client and patron as
“repetition and familiarity” between the two develop, over time, into “interest
and affection”.46 These clusters of political relationships are functional, in that
they operate to the (unequal) benefit of both parties, both of whom therefore
develop an interest in maintaining the relationship. Although clients can
assert their own interests within the relationship by using the weapons of
peasant resistance, “footdragging, dissimulation, false-compliance, pilfering,
feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage”, 47 such forms of resistance operate to maintain patron-client networks. They allow the clients to protest incrementally, applying pressure on patrons to modify their demands or to increase the benefits they provide for clients. These forms of resistance do not challenge the economic and power inequalities that underpin the patron-client relationship in the way in which class struggle would, however. The classic constraint on southeast Asian governments was not the threat of revolt, but the threat of “flight and evasion of taxes” by peasants and commoners. 48

The disincentives for resistance and joint actions by clients against the impositions of patrons should not be overstated, however:

Notwithstanding the ideological constructs which underpin and legitimise clientage, resistance is endemic in patron-client systems. Although such systems institutionalise the patron’s power, they also institutionalise the value of the client to the patron. In addition to the dyadic conflict which this implies, patron-client systems provide a structure within which numbers of clients can jointly resist the exactions of their patrons in an attempt to maximise their economic and political autonomy. 49

As I have observed elsewhere, for clients to engage in joint resistance against patrons requires their already having formed bonds among themselves stronger than the pressure to compete with one and other for the patron’s attention and favour. In spite of:

the capacity for patron-client ties to cross ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural boundaries, the extractive force of the relationship will be diminished when it transcends boundaries of social identity and loyalty. In fragmented and fissiparous societies, in which communications are primitive and difficult, and political and social identities local, these bonds are likely so be at village level. 50

Entourages and Circles

The economic inequality which underpins the development of patron-client relations encourages the creation of multiple relations by the patron, who will develop as many relationships as are needed or can be sustained. Thus clusters of dependent relationships develop around a patron, giving rise to what Lucien has termed the “entourage”. 51 Patron-client relations facilitate, moreover, the development of complex, layered structures since patrons can also be the clients of even more powerful figures and clients the patrons of less powerful people. This network, of patrons and their clients and the clients’ own clients, Hanks termed the “circle”. 52 These linkages are not only resilient, they are
expansive, associating large populations over wide areas into an interlocking political hierarchy. Errington suggested that:

>a large polity could be constructed, arranged in a pattern of entourages whose size, power, and control of human and material resources ... decline with increasing distance from the ruler at the centre of it all. Each smaller entourage would be similar in principle and in organisation to the larger entourage encompassing it..33.

Systems of patron-client relations were not only endemic to pre- and early-modern southeast Asia, they characterise much of its contemporary politics.

The development of patron-client links is a primary political process underpinning the development of structures of social and territorial control, such as chieftaincy, aristocracy and sovereignty, and is central to both conquest and indigenous theories of the origins of states.54 It also underpins the development of cleavages within the elites as patrons compete with each other to attract clients, giving rise to factional politics.55 Each member of an entourage is focused on his or her own relationship with the patron rather than on relationships with other members of the entourage. This not only precludes the development of class identity, it promotes indifference and hostility, particularly among higher ranking clients, as they jostle for the patron’s favour or resources.56 Thus the “most enduring and solid relations are between leaders and followers rather than among followers”.57 Patrons also compete for clients, whose interests they represent to higher ranking patrons. Patrons need clients in order to maximise their own status within the hierarchy of the ‘circle’. Kautsky is mistaken, therefore, in arguing that “aristocratic politics takes place within aristocratic society alone and not within the total and overwhelmingly non-aristocratic populations of the aristocratic empire”.58 The role of individual clients is not equal to the role of individual patrons, and the processes linking them into the structure of political conflict may not be obvious, yet the roles of both, and the processes, are pervasive.

Rulers, Chiefs and Officials: Aristocracy and Bureaucracy

The ways that patron-client linkages are organised and described can express different ways of organising power, and can create various sorts of power. I have already noted that, as patrons develop their resources base and can sponsor the development of more patron-client networks, they create entourages and circles of supporters. At any stage in the relationship between patron and clients, the clients must choose whether their interests are better served by attending primarily to their duties as clients rather than by developing their potential as patrons; that is, whether they should seek to expand their client

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base and maximise their independence, or whether they should seek to increase the power of their patrons, in whose glory and success they share. Thus, as Machiavelli noted, the kingdoms known to history have been governed in two ways:

\[
either \text{by a prince and his servants, who, as ministers by his grace and permission, assist in governing the realm; or by a prince and by barons, who hold their position not by favour of the ruler but by antiquity of blood.}\]

The distinction relates less to the antiquity of blood than to whether the notables “were directly appointed by and primarily beholden to the ruler”, or whether they “owed their position to their own primacy within some sub-group within the rulership”. The two types of position embody different relationships between the ruler and chief or official, and between the chief or official and the subject people. Rulers depend for power on the support of chiefs and the chiefs’ capacity to mobilise their subject peoples in the ruler’s support. Officials derive their authority from the ruler, who mobilises the support of his population and is able to absorb any independent sources of power he may confront. Although Kautsky argued that “officials in bureaucratic empires served the same function as aristocrats in all aristocratic empires”, governing to enrich themselves, the distinction between chiefs and officials is important. It defines a process in political development where the ruler’s authority and power expands and contracts, and where the balance of power in a political system moves from the centre to the periphery or vice versa. It can also be a source of political tension in a polity. Errington found that, in Sulawesi, the need of elite figures to balance their access to both types of power created tension. In Sulawesi, nobles could afford to be neither “cut off from the highest prestige center by the lack of connections in the court ... nor cut off from influence, wealth, and power by lack of regional followers and loyal henchmen”.

O. W. Wolters explored the formation of entourages and circles in southeast Asian state formation. He described how “men of prowess” attracted followers, including other, lesser men of prowess who saw that association with the primary patron would facilitate their greater access to power than would their independence. The greater the number of magnates a ruler could attract, the greater the resources and power available for use in attracting more clients. Moreover, the greater the number of followers, the greater the personal esteem a follower gained by a ranking among them. Potential small rulers would gain prestige by achieving a high ranking position within a more powerful ruler’s entourage. They might prefer “being a great lord to being a petty king”. As Wolters observed of seventh century Cambodia, “what we would define as ‘the kingdom’ was no more than the territorial measurement of
Thus Malay datus in the Indonesian archipelago sought dependent positions at the court of the Maharaja of Srivijaya, and centuries later the same process was discernible when the rulers of Palembang and Bentan were described as following the progenitor of the Malacca sultans to Singapore. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Sultan Ahmadoddin of Perak sought to evade the political demands of his Bugis rivals by recognising Sultan Mahmud of Riau-Lingga as his overlord. Even the tributary relations between many of the states of pre- and early-modern southeast Asia and China were “solicited by the donors rather than imposed”. The process underpinning these transactions is that the ruler absorbs the power of the follower, who then derives status and power from his association with the empowered ruler. Wolters described the resulting networks of relationships in southeast Asia as “mandalas”. The importance of such retinue-forming to political processes in the Malay world is confirmed by the development of sumptuary laws which prohibited lesser figures from mobilising followings comparable to those of their rulers.

Because political relationships change, and foci of power and loyalty shift, individual members of a ruler’s entourage can seek to establish their own primacy within the authority the ruler. Or they can respond to the ruler’s diminishing power by developing their own separate authority as independent rulers. The very flexibility which makes entourages and circles so important in political development keeps the power balances within them fluid, often precluding the entrenchment of particular relationships. D. A. Low noted of 17th Century India the “striking” frequency with which officials tended to establish chiefly (and, eventually, sovereign) power. Similarly, during the late 18th Century, the great court officials of the Riau-Lingga sultanate secured regional power bases which they were then able to develop into independent sultanates. Moreover, these fissiparous tendencies can actually be encouraged by the ruler’s success in expanding the theatre of his power, each success increasing the technical difficulties of government. Within a century of Charlemagne’s death “his centralised empire became the heartland of decentralised western European feudalism”.

Centralising and de-centralising pressures are likely to co-exist in any political system at any time. The challenge for most rulers has always been to maintain sufficient control of the resources of the state to increase or maintain their primacy. However the processes that led to the accretion or dismantling of political relationships were perceived in various cultures, such changes were the outcome of competition over the mobilisation and deployment of resources. The flow of power and authority between centralising rulers and their entourages on the one hand, and chiefs and feudal nobles on the other, has provided communities and individuals with opportunities to achieve political change. Through decentralisation of power, local communities had opportunities to establish new structures or change old ones. Through
centralisation, they acquired opportunities to form political relationships which could contain the power of local lords. Therefore Weber’s distinction between patrimonialism and feudalism is not just one of “ideal types used for analytical purposes” as Kautsky claimed,\textsuperscript{77} but representative of historical reality and political choice.

The development of institutions which embody political and economic relationships creates new sources of power in a society.\textsuperscript{78} To create power, institutions need both to integrate the support of people and to meet their demands. Not all institutions are effective in this. In Samuel Huntington’s terms, an organisation’s inability to provide a framework for balancing support from people with their demands, and the consequent alienation of a population from its political institutions, causes a “motivation-organisation vacuum”.\textsuperscript{79}

\section*{The Military Bases of Power}

Military power is a third form of organisational power which “derives from the necessity of organised physical defence and its usefulness for aggression”.\textsuperscript{80} It is closely allied with political power, of which it is a particular type.\textsuperscript{81} Military power is distinguished, however, by the element of terror which is essential to its operations. Military organisation and activity can contribute to the development of power only by producing or threatening terror. Walter distinguished the ‘victim’ from the ‘target’ of terror. “The victim perishes, but the target reacts to the spectacle or the news of that destruction with some manner of submission or accommodation”.\textsuperscript{82}

Terror can be used by political elites to overcome threats from outside as well as from subject groups already located within the polity.\textsuperscript{83} Although military power can force the submission of people, it has limited utility in establishing control over a population without support from other sorts of power. Reliance just on military power to control a population would succumb to Huntington’s ‘organisation-motivation vacuum’. Nonetheless, military power should be identified separately from political power, first, because of the intensity of the violence it deploys, secondly, because of its utility as a means of both mobilising a community under its leadership and, thirdly, because of its capacity to provide beneficial returns to populations that deploy it successfully. Through the application of military power rulers can mobilise to protect the economic basis of the polity, and to expand it. When used successfully military power provides patrons with increased resources to disburse to clients. The use of force is, as Clausewitz argued, a policy option for governments.\textsuperscript{84}

\section*{The Ideological Bases of Power}

Ideological power, according to Mann, derives from three related processes. First, humans “require concepts and categories of meaning” to structure
and interpret their world. Secondly, groups of people establish norms, that is “shared understandings of how people should act” and, thirdly, groups establish aesthetic/ritual practices which both reflect the meaning and norms and contribute to them. These processes constitute political culture. Political culture is central to the issue of power. It gives “meaning, predictability, and form to the political process” But it does not just constrain or colour political activity. As Milner, Errington and Siddique (among many others) have demonstrated, it can provide primary motivation for political activity. Political culture renders political and social, and even some material, realities relative:

*What is ‘real’ to a Tibetan monk may not be ‘real’ to an American businessman. The ‘knowledge’ of the criminal differs from the ‘knowledge’ of the criminologist.*

There is a fundamental disagreement between economic structuralists and culturalists. Some economic structuralists see political culture simply as elite ideology. Caldwell condemned *Meaning and Power* “as elite ideology, divorced from its economic and political base”. For Kautsky, exploitative relationships between aristocrats and peasants “can be ideologically concealed by some concept of reciprocity prevailing” between them, concealed by a ‘culture of the manor’ which created the impression that peasants were dependent on lords, whereas the lords were entirely dependent on the peasant’s work. Shaharuddin similarly argued that dominant cultures are, simply, the ideas of the ruling group.

Not all economic structuralists, nor all Marxists, would agree. Although Wallerstein considered cultures to be “the ways in which people clothe their politico-economic interests and desires in order to express them, hide them, extend them in space and time, and preserve their memory”, he argued also that they “are our lives, our most inner selves but also our most outer selves, our personal and collective individualities”. Similarly, Raymond Williams considered culture of central importance for political analysis because it is the means through which humans communicate, experience, explore and reproduce social order.

The processes of internalisation of culture and its reproduction which Wallerstein and Williams both suggested were explicated by Berger; a three staged process which involves the establishment of structures and values which reflect and serve human needs (externalisation), the recognition of this reality as external to its creators (objectification) and, finally, internalisation of this reality. It is a dialectical relationship whereby theories are developed to legitimate already existing social institutions. The theories are believed by the people affected by the institutions and, eventually, institutions are changed to make them accord with existing theories. At this point, importantly, human
imagination has replaced the material basis of existence as the primary political motivator.

The order of the three processes is not fixed beyond their initial establishment. Economic changes, for example, could engender changes to the values within a society and institutions adapted accordingly. The values within a society will affect economic activities and processes and help shape the institutions within it. Political cultures therefore change in response to changed external conditions and external conditions are variously perceived according to political cultures. Changes in one will engender changes in the others. Berger noted that the interdependence of objective and subjective (legitimising) realities provides a ‘plausibility structure’, a way of presenting phenomena plausibly and coherently. Individuals interpret their experiences, including their economic experiences, according to their expectations and values. When these are outmoded, they will adapt or change them, or even adopt new expectations and values. Wallerstein seemed to agree, arguing that:

Tradition is always a contemporary social creation. ... we are not free to be totally arbitrary. There must be some surface plausibility to the continuities asserted.

Moreover, changes in culture can be achieved deliberately by changing its economic or institutional plausibility structure. Peasant cultures are unlikely to survive, indefinitely, the migration of peasants to cities and large, surplus incomes are essential to the maintenance of aristocratic cultures. These changes might occur as the result of organic changes to plausibility structures, or they might be encouraged deliberately by individuals or organisations with power over elements of the plausibility structure.

Tradition, therefore, is both manufactured and contemporary, constantly changing to reflect “constantly and subtly shifting relationships of real power”. The fact that tradition is ‘invented’, that it reflects power relationships, that it changes, does not diminish its importance. It increases its complexity for study.

Conclusion

Political cultures and economic and political structures are closely interrelated. They contain also the seeds of each other’s transformation as individuals seek to legitimise, to justify or just to explain their circumstances, and to change them. Political cultures exist at all times and among all peoples. They integrate material and structural sources of power and conflict into meaningful experiences, defining human motivation and consciousness. Political change occurs when disparities between imagined and material circumstances can no longer be reconciled within cultural paradigms, forcing humans to change.
either their perceptions or their circumstances.\textsuperscript{101}

Michael Mann’s identification of four types of power - political, economic, military and ideological provides a framework for integrating, or at least interrelating, the three different approaches to the analysis of southeast Asian politics. But it provides a framework, also, for political science methodologies to inform and expand our understanding of state systems in pre- and early-modern southeast Asia. By extending our gaze into southeast Asia’s remoter past, political scientists can profoundly enrich scholarly understandings of it.

Endnotes

1. In particular, structural functionalism and political culture, both of which are discussed below.
6. Ibid., p. 283.

Ibid., p. 54.

See Andrew Milner, Cultural Materialism, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1993, pp. 5-7.


J. H. Kautsky, op. cit., p. 17.

Michael Mann, op. cit., p. 173. I do not suggest that Kautsky’s generalisations across epochs derive from Marxist theory. In fact, they are incompatible with historical materialism.


David Easton, op. cit., p. 105.

David E. Apter, Introduction to Political Analysis, p. 381.


Sharon Joy Siddique, Relics of the Past? A Sociological Study of the Sultanates of Cirebon, West Java, Bielfeld: Doktors der Sozialwiss-


Ibid., p. 139.

Shelly Errington, “Recasting Sex, Gender, and Power: A Theoretical and Regional Overview”, in Jane Monnig Atkinson and Shelly Errington (eds.), Power and Difference: Gender in Island Southeast Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, pp. 1-58 at pp. 5-7. Errington noted that many of those westerners who have observed the relatively higher status of women in southeast Asia compared to north or south Asia based their views on the scope for economic and other activities enjoyed by southeast Asian women. She argued that these activities, which have been interpreted as empowering women, were, in fact, badges of lowly status within their own culture, but concluded correctly that this “is not to say that women in Southeast Asia would be better off in any sense without economic autonomy and control over the products of their labour”.

Patrick Sullivan, op.cit.

J. M. Gullick, op. cit.

A. C. Milner, Kerajaan.


Michael Mann, op. cit., p. 2.

Ibid., p. 24.
40. E. R. Leach, quoted by Ulla Wagner, Colonialism and Iban Warfare. Stockholm: OBE-Tryck; 1972. p. 3. But see, also, Rapaport, who argued, in a different context, that ‘man’ was a symbol maker before he was a tool maker, that “man put his energy into symbolic rather than utilitarian forms even when he was barely starting”, concluding that both “physical and socio-cultural aspects need to be considered, but the latter need primary stress”. ” Quoted by J. H. Walker, “Culture, Power and the Meaning of Built Forms in Sarawak, 1841-1868”, Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, 44:2, 2011. pp. 89-128 at p. 124, fn. 44.


44. Ibid.


48. Ibid., p. 7. See also Christopher Healey, op. cit., and James C. Scott, The Art of not being Governed.


50. Ibid., p. 106.

51. Lucien M. Hanks, op. cit., p. 197.

52. Ibid., p. 202
57. Shelly Errington, Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm, p. 106. See also p. 97.
58. J. H. Kautsky, op. cit., p. 249, Bendix also argued that the “general populace was excluded from the political arena”, Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p. 3.
65. According to a sixteenth century King of Man, who was also Earl of Derby in England, quoted by Encyclopaedia Britannica (9th edition), Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1883. vol XV. p. 454. The king, in consequence, relinquished his sovereignty to the English king.
67. O. W. Wolters, History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, p. 23.


70. Christopher Healey, op. cit., p.7.

71. Bendix perceived the same process in the development of the Russian Empire. He argued that the power of Russian aristocrats derived from their proximity to the Tsar and that “distinctions of birth derived from a family’s independent status declined in importance with the rise of Moscow”. Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People, p. 107.

72. O. W. Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, p. 16.


74. D. A. Low, op. cit., p. 379


77. Ibid. p. 71.


80. Michael Mann, op. cit., p. 25.


83. Thus Walter identified, within broader systems, zones of terror, such as slavery, which, when themselves the subjects of study, could be considered systems of terror, ibid., pp. 6-7.

84. Carl von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 403.

85. Michael Mann, op. cit., p. 22.


87. See footnotes 24, 25 and 26 above.

88. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of


95. Sharon Siddique, op. cit., p. 81.


98. Shelly Errington, Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm. p. 106. See also p. 97.


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