

## THE SOCIAL CONFLICT IN AND OUT OF HADRAMAUT \*

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The role of the British in the political process in Hadramaut had far-reaching consequences and cannot be isolated from the social life in general. In a semi-primitive society in which political authority exercises a limited control over its antagonistic tribal life, the blurred line of demarcation dividing political jurisdiction and social authority barely discernible. Central political authority may be established, incorporating in itself, at least theoretically, some remote tribal areas, but the latter may not necessarily remain subordinate to the former. Such sem-independent or -autonomous tribes often collide, in terms of their local conflicting interests, even with central authority, giving rise to inter-tribe conflict and war.

In *Hadramaut* such conflict occurred within the framework of stratified social behaviour: the conflict usually occurred within the same strata, but sometimes between the different strata, until such a time when the lower stratum of the society underwent change resulting from the impact of new ideas such as the new concept of equality in Islam. The British, who were the prime mover behind, or the key actors of, the political process in *Hadramaut*, had deep perception of the relationship between the political entity which they intended to establish, and the social conditions and problems which they had to face thus the need for social stability had a direct impact upon the political objectives to be achieved.

The general picture of the *Hadramaut* society is not very complex. The *Hadramis* have traditionally seen their society as being composed of "civilized" people (hadr) of the towns and the "primitive" tribesmen (bedu). This categorization, however, is more than a mere contrast between the cultural townsmen living in tall buildings and the primitive, half-naked armed tribesmen roaming the plateaux and the valleys. Though the two sub —

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cultures, *bedu* and *hadr*, belong to the same Arabic dialect and adhere to the same Islamic religion, their main features are different. While the towns represent large communities that are highly stratified, with a complex economy based on cultivation, trading and division of labour and have centres of religious and educational activities, the small rural communities are made up of homogeneous groups of tribesmen living in hamlets and tents. Having no schools and mosques, the rural communities live on their simple economy, based on cultivation, animal husbandry, and sometimes on caravan transportation. They depend on towns for their supplies, such as tools, imported goods and food.<sup>1</sup>

The emergence of a comparatively new element, the class of Sayyid, had gradually transformed the social structure of the *Hadramaut* into a relatively complex one. Social mobility is regarded as impossible: those who are at the lower rung of hierarchy cannot move upward simply because of the hereditary principle. The Sayyids, who claim themselves as the children of the Prophet Muhammad, play an almost exclusive religious role in the society and the non-Sayyids cannot marry to their daughters. This new element crystallizes further into a new form of social division, in which the Sayyids were able, because of their claim and their religious qualities, to achieve social dominance. Sayyid power in *Hadramaut* is in some degree that of the growth of their influence through the founding of Sayyid *hautah* (sacred enclave) parallel with the decline of Mashaikh *hautah* which they eclipsed.<sup>2</sup> In this way the social dominance of the Mashaikh (singular: Shaikh) class gave way to the newcomers, the Sayyids. Finally the Sayyids developed into a new class occupying the highest rung of social hierarchy to be followed by Mashaikh and qabail (singular qabilah: tribe) while the word Sayyid (plural *Sadah*) means Master.

The Mashaikh (scholars and holy men) claimed descent from well-known and reputed Hadrami scholars and holy man of the past. Their religious and social status is second to that of the Sayyids. The qabail claimed descent from Qahtan, the Arab of the Southern Arabia. The lowest stratum is *masakin* (singular *misikin*: poor) and *du'afa'* (singular *daif*: weak). *Masakin* are petty shopmen and artisans while *du'afa'* are workers in clay — mainly builders and cultivators.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the fact that the Sayyids are a minority group<sup>4</sup> they play a social role out of proportion their numbers. Status of a Sayyid is one of the main reasons for his being respected by the people. Their dresses, such as long white robes with white hats, their *hautahs*, and their *mansab* (spiritual lords) indicate their

commanding religious authority, and, by its implication, social dominance. This is translated into several observable forms: the Sayyids are mediator in the conflicts mainly between the people of lower strata and are leaders in religious ceremonies. They are looked upon as saints whose hands are kissed by other classes of people and are addressed as Sayyid or *Habib* (Beloved)<sup>5</sup>. In addition they are generally wealthy. Sayyid Abu Bakr is known for spending large sums of money in buying slaves and freeing them<sup>6</sup> while al-Kaff family spent a great deal of money to build a road, the well-known al-Kaff road.<sup>7</sup> In general the Sayyids exerted a particular influence<sup>8</sup> in the *Kathiri* and Quaiti States. Their influence among the ruling circles was to the extent that their opponents (*al-Irshad men*) were not permitted to rear their heads in *Hadramaut* because the sultans wished to remain friendly with them.<sup>9</sup>

The history of *Hadramis* is partly the history of their overseas emigration. Between 20 and 30 per cent. of the estimated population of the *Hadramaut* lived in Indonesia (East Indies), East Africa and the countries bordering the Red Sea.<sup>10</sup> As one out of every three or four *Hadramis* lived and worked abroad, *Hadramaut* had drawn its cash from those living abroad,<sup>11</sup> particularly from South East Asia. It is not known precisely when they emigrated there,<sup>12</sup> but they later became the second largest Oriental minority in Indonesia after the Chinese, and since the middle of the nineteenth century, when more or less accurate census became available, they appeared to have steadily and sometime sharply increased in numbers. In 1930, when the complete census was held, there were 71,000 Arabs in Indonesia.<sup>13</sup>

Over the centuries they had managed to occupy a unique, and in many ways indispensable, place in Indonesian society, particularly in connection with religious and economic life.<sup>14</sup> Their social and religious background in *Hadramaut* had, therefore, marked influence upon the social and religious behaviour of the indigenous society in Indonesia, even though an estimated 80 per cent. of them were eventually of the *peranakan* (child of the local birth), and even though some of them were from the states other than *Hadramaut*. The majority of the *Hadramis* in Indonesia were usually from the *masakin* class, while the Sayyid class stood on a higher social level in relation to the Indonesian masses in general<sup>15</sup> and even to non-Sayyid *Hadramis*. Almost the same status was secured by them in Malaya.<sup>16</sup>

The Sayyids enjoyed this social and religious dominance in *Hadramaut* unhampered and strived to maintain it in the new lands, but they had gradually to face a new challenge in the new environment, particularly from the wealthy "tribesmen" who

made their fortunes there.<sup>17</sup> It is by their own labour, not by hereditary or by depending on Sayyids, that made them socially prominent in a comparatively "unstratified" social life. In addition, the Malay archipelago became the fertile lands for the flow and growth of modern ideas specifically of those disseminated by Egyptian journals like *al-Hilal* and *al-Manar*.<sup>18</sup> The latter was noted for its advocacy of reformist ideas: the concept of equality and brotherhood in Islam, and the return to the Quran and Hadith. This is directly detrimental to the social position which the Sayyids tried to maintain.

However, it was not until 1905 that the character of Social relations between Sayyids and non-Sayyids in the Malay archipelago was decided, subsequently spreading to *Hadramaut*. Two important events occurred in that year. The first is the formation of *Jamiyat Khair* in Jakarta<sup>19</sup> and the second is the case in which a Sayyid woman (usually called Sharifah) in Singapore was married to an Indian Muslim with the consent of her parents.<sup>20</sup> The latter event became a turning point that shattered the social immobility and created an outcry among the Sayyids. The *Hadramis* in Singapore seemed to be under the pressure of the "spiritual authority" (*sultat ar-ruhiyah*) of the Sayyids and to be aware of the religious reputation of the *al-Manar* editor, Muhammad Rashid Rida. One of these *Hadramins*, perhaps in an attempt to implicate him in the intellectual battle, wrote him a letter enquiring about the validity of the marriage. His religious ruling (*fatwa*) was clear: the marriage was valid. This raised so much anger among the Sayyids that Shaikh Umar bin Salim al-'Attas made not only a counter *fatwa* illegalizing the marriage,<sup>21</sup> but regarded non-Sayyids as "slaves" to Sayyids.<sup>22</sup> The idea of being slave to Sayyids was unexpected and Rashid Rida refuted it vehemently on religious grounds.<sup>24</sup>

The non-Sayyids had intellectual backing from a group of Arab teachers, recruited initially by the Sayyids to teach in their school. One of them was Shaikh Ahmad Surkati of Sudan who joined the staff of the school of *Jamiyat Khair* in 1911<sup>25</sup>. Initially he was very much respected by the Sayyids for his piety and knowledge; but was later bitterly opposed by them because he gave *fatwa* in Solo, Java, in 1913 about the permissibility of marriage between Alawi (Sayyid) female with non-Alawi male.<sup>26</sup> In addition, he also stressed that Islam championed equality among Muslims and did not recognize the existence of an elevated position of a certain group because of birth, wealth, and rank.<sup>27</sup>

From these two events, the social conflict between the Sayyids and non-Sayyids developed rapidly. The Sayyids were reluctant to

forgo their social dominance and to condescend to the general level of the non-Sayyids, but the latter were aware of their increased power and influence which considerably eroded the spiritual authority of the former. This new changing social attitude among the non-Sayyids has enhanced by the transmission of the reformist ideas of Muhammad Abduh and his disciples like Muhammad Rashid Rida. Enstrangement between Sayyids and non-Sayyids occurred within the *Jam'iyat Khair*. The non-Sayyids, after quitting the organization, formed *Jam'iyat al-Islam wal-Irshad al-Arabi* (Association of Islam and Arabian Guidance), abbreviated to *al-Irshad*, in 1913, and it was legally recognized by the Dutch Government in 1915.<sup>28</sup> Its constitution was non-political<sup>29</sup> but obviously anti-Sayyid. In the Fifth Article it was stipulated that those who were from Al Ba Alawi (Sayyids) were not permissible to become member of the leadership or a delegation to it.<sup>30</sup> The organization paid particular attention to the Arabs or to questions within the Arab communities, although non-Arab Muslims could also become its members. Its cooperation with other Muslim organizations in Indonesia, its educational institutions, and its reformist ideas made it popular to non-Sayyids. *Al-Irshad* branches were established in Cheribon, Bumiayu, Tegal, Pekalongan, Surabaya and Lawang.<sup>31</sup>

The Sayyids appeared to be nervous, and in order to stem the tide of the popularity of the *al-Irshad* they formed a new society entitled *ar-Rabitat al-'Alawiyah* in 1927<sup>32</sup>, which became an instrument for them in their social conflict against *al-Irshad*. Due to this, the Sayyid and non-Sayyid conflict also became known as the Alawi-Irshadi conflict. Both parties had their respective journals, newspapers and pamphlets. The outstanding Sayyid publications were the journals or periodicals like *al-Iqbal*, *Hadramaut* and *ar-Rabitat al-'Alawiyah*, while the *al-Irshad* published the well-known *al-Irshad*.<sup>33</sup> Their public debates — through their numerous publications — were concerned with arguments about the details of stratification, in personal attacks on leaders, and in religious law and ideas. *Al-Irshad* accused the Sayyids of using Islam to maintain inequality and their social dominance, of teaching people *bid'ah* (innovation) and *khurafat* (superstition), such as kissing the hands of the Sayyids, and "worshipping" their shrines, etc. They were regarded as reactionaries who had kept *Hadramaut* in "darkness and ignorance," and had exploited the love of the people for Islam in order to maintain their hegemony. In addition, *al-Irshad* insisted that all people were equal, irrespective of their descent, and they deliberately used the term Sayyid to address everyone, advocated intermarriage — between qabail,

*Mashaikh and masakin* and taught all these ideas in their schools. In response the Sayyids branded *al-Irshad* of being *kharijis* (seceders), of going against the Islamic teaching by attacking the "children of the Prophet" and of introducing "Bolshevik" ideas among the *Hadramis*.<sup>35</sup> They even accused the *al-Irshad* of being Christian to spread christianity, and a communist organization established by Russian to spread ideas against authority.<sup>36</sup> They insisted that the term Sayyid was exclusive to the children of the Prophet, and therefore they had inherent nobility and superior status.<sup>37</sup>

The Sayyids however were not satisfied with the polemic they engaged against the *al-Irshad*. They tried to broaden the conflict by implicating other parties, especially the colonial authority. The Dutch Government however was not very much concerned with the internal matters of the Arabs, because it was not relevant to colonial interests. The Sayyids presented their views to the Dutch against the *al-Irshad* but they received a cool response.<sup>38</sup> But unlike the Dutch, the British took a different view toward the conflict, which, if it was allowed to exist, might jeopardize their political interest in the *Hadramaut*. They considered the country as under their obligation to protect it, while the Sayyid propaganda against their enemies seemed to be influential among the British officers. No doubt the Sayyids were shrewd enough to raise sensitive issues which might help them in their struggle, while their social and political position in the *Hadramaut* provided an effective line of communication with the colonial power. When the *al-Irshad* were accused by the Sayyids as opposing the British in the east and assisting Germany against Great Britain it would be enough for the British to lose the balance of judgement, not because of the substantiality of the propaganda, but essentially because they wanted to maintain political control by securing good relation with the Sayyids and the sultans. In addition, the *al-Irshad's* ideological aggressiveness was not in tune with British colonial policy. It seemed that the two Sultans of *Hadramaut*, *Quaiti and Kathiri* had greater faith in the British and their Sayyid allies than any other powers or organizations. The British observed to behaviour of the *al-Irshad* and subsequently cautioned the two Sultans about it. This was sufficient to influence the *Kathiri* Sultan, *'Ali bin Mansur*, and the *Quaiti* Sultan, *Ghalib bin 'Awad*, to send their joint message in A.H. 1337 (ca. 1918) to the *Hadramis* and the "members of the house" in *Hadramaut* and *abroad*.<sup>39</sup> Both Sultans expressed shock of the news they received and of what were published in *al-Iqbal* concerning the conflict created by "foreigners, selfish people and sectarians."<sup>40</sup>

This was obviously an implicit reference to *al-Irshad* men.

The Sayyids even asked the Sharif of Mecca to prevent the *al-Irshad* men from making the pilgrimage to Mecca.<sup>41</sup> In their letter to the Sharif they accused that the *al-Irshad* expressed anger against the Prophet and his "members of the house", plotted against his (Sharif's) government and spread sedition. But this attempt backfired when the Sharif exposed the Sayyid intention by publishing the letter in the journal *al-Qiblah* in A.H. 1338 (ca. 1919).<sup>42</sup> Another attempt was made by a group of Sayyids who invented circular attributed to Sultan *Ghalib bin 'Awad*, in which he threatened to inflict punishment on *al-Irshad* men.<sup>43</sup>

The Sayyid propaganda created a strong reaction from the *al-Irshad*, but the latter was to movement of the former. The Quaiti Government was exposed to the Sayyid efforts about one year earlier, in ca.1918, but only in the following year did the *al-Irshad* branch of Surabaya write a petition to that Government, explaining the conflict between the two parties and clearing themselves all accusations.<sup>44</sup> Similarly they wrote a petition to the British Consulate in Batavia,<sup>45</sup> to be followed a few months later by a meeting between Shaikh Ahmad Surkati, one of the *al-Irshad* leaders, with the British Consular. They discussed the statement published several times in *al-Iqbal*, a Sayyid journal, that the British Government considered the *al-Irshad* men as enemies. According to the Shaikh Ahmad Surkati, the statement was not true.<sup>46</sup> Only after all these efforts proved fruitless had the organization written a lengthy petition to the British Foreign Ministry explaining the history of the Sayyids in *Hadramaut*, the origin and causes of the conflict and the *al-Irshad* grievances against them.<sup>47</sup>

No doubt the conflict shook the whole body politic of *Hadramaut* and drew in all who were in any way connected with that part of the world. It can be conclusively said that both contesting parties sought to mobilise the Cairo press, the *Qu'aiti and Kathiri* authorities, the turbulent semi-independent tribes, the British and Ottoman Governments, and the various rulers of Arabia. Each or all of these could in some way or another affect the course of the struggle. Furthermore, the ideas had to be transmitted to the people of *Hadramaut* and more importantly the home government had to be won over. The lines of communication between the homeland and the fields of fortunes or the original field of conflict overseas must be established and controlled.<sup>48</sup> Ideas brought to Mukalla from Singapore or Java had to be expressed in such a way that the Sultans were willing to listen. During the First World War, the Sayyids were more successful in this regard than their enemies, because the political conditions were favourable to them. Firstly,

the Wazir of the Government of Mukalla was from the Sayyid family. Through him the Sayyids could influence the Sultan of Quaiti State. Secondly, the British Government, by keeping in line with the town of Mukalla, was angered by the alleged *al-Irshad* support for the ottoman cause. This seemed to be the main reason for the discrimination carried out against the *al-Irshad* men who were baulked at Mukalla and Batavia.<sup>49</sup> But by 1922, the Sayyids had become dissatisfied with the performance of their friends in *Hadramaut*. The Quaiti Government began to waver and in 1924 swung over toward the other side. The British, relieved from the strain of war, were casting aside the categories of "enemy" and "loyal friend".<sup>50</sup>

This changing trend made the Sayyids become more restless, because they were well aware that the ideas advocated by the *al-Irshad* were more appealing to the tribes than the traditional ideas of the Sayyid class. As the *al-Irshad* were making headway among tribesmen beyond the reach of the government authorities which the Sayyids could influence the latter were seeking decisive outside support such as the Imam of Yemen. Some Sayyids had already appealed to him in 1923 and if he had any doubts about supporting them rather than the *al-Irshad* these would have been dispelled by the knowledge that the *al-Irshad* were cultivating Ibn Soud whose Wahabism, especially on the veneration of saints, accorded well with their own.<sup>51</sup>

The shift in policy by the British Government and by the Quaiti Sultan toward *al-Irshad* in 1920s had increased the vigour of the latter. However, the power base of the organization was not the ruling elite but the poverty stricken tribesmen, who might have nothing to suffer at that time by supporting it. Naturally the *al-Irshad* ideology might have greater impact upon the mind of those tribesmen, who had experienced living under the "arroyant" behaviour of the Sayyids. The ideology of change which aimed at uplifting the downtrodden class living in a stratified society might receive a favourable response from the class concerned and those who wanted to maintain the social *status quo*, must have realized what was expected to happen. They had to face the erosion of their power and popularity. This explains the fact that the Sayyids were unable, at least in the second half of 1920s, to match the movement of the *al-Irshad* in *Hadramaut*. The Sayyid authority waned particularly in Wadi 'Amd due to the spread of *al-Irshad* propaganda among the tribesmen.<sup>52</sup>

This was, however, not the whole picture of the social struggle in *Hadramaut*. The Sayyids were aware that the conditions in the country were different from those of Indonesia. They realized

that, unlike in Indonesia their economic, social, religious and political influences among the ruling elite were too great for the *al-Irshad* to gain decisive ascendancy over their rivals. Furthermore, the more progressive leaders among the Sayyids were anxious to spread their influence within and beyond the wadis and draw all within the circle of ordered and progressive government<sup>53</sup> which the British promised to establish. The British support for Qu'aiti Sultan was obvious and the latter in turn closely associated with the Sayyids. It was therefore, not surprising that the British became pro-Sayyids too. After refusing to take sides in 1932, the British Government gave way to Qu'aiti pressure and turned definitely against the *al-Irshad* in the following years. The British Consul-General in Java, much against his will, was instructed to obstruct the movement of the *al-Irshad* men to *Hadramaut*. In addition, worldwide British contacts were used to frustrate the shipping of *al-Irshad* arms through the Wahidi port of Bir Ali to the Wadi *Hadramaut*.<sup>54</sup>

The British policy was motivated by the desire to gain exclusive political control over the *Hadramaut*. Any social unrest which might jeopardize or hamper their plan was to be avoided. They were adroit enough to see which party was suitable for these colonial aims. Apparently their political link with the Sayyids was, in some cases, indirect. Sayyid Abu Bakr al-Kaff, of the wealthy al-Kaff family, "controlled" the *Kathiri*, and without the *Kathiri* the British had no stable position in the Wadi. So when Ingrams was on his mission in *Hadramaut* he was tied to al-Kaff and, although with some misgivings about interfering in what he thought was a religious dispute, he acted against the *al-Irshad* elements when they sought to gain control of the al-Kaff dominated peace board in 1937.<sup>55</sup>

The conflict had developed to such a magnitude that it drew the attention from some prominent persons, who saw it as a menace to their collective existence in the foreign land. As early as 1919 a Reconciliation Committee (*Lajnat al-Islah*) was formed in Batavia under the chairmanship of Sayyid Ismail al-Attas. One of its main objectives was to unite the Arabs, but the Sayyids rejected the *Lajnat* simply because Shaikh Ahmad Surkati was one of its members.<sup>56</sup> Another attempt was made in 1921 by Sayyid Husin bin Abidin of Singapore who sent a letter to *al-Irshad* in Java, but because his ideas was in line with the organization of the Sayyids, he was ignored<sup>57</sup> in 1933 al-Malik 'Abd al-'Aziz of Hijaz made an attempt to settle the dispute by sending a letter to each of the two parties through Sayyid Ibrahim as-Saqaf in Singapore, but this effort became a failure.<sup>58</sup>

It must be observed that not all Sayyids were against *al-Irshad*. The *Hadramis*' conference in 1928 in Singapore was organized by them, not on the basis of the conflict rather focusing on the theme of "national reconstruction".<sup>59</sup> Although the conference was a failure and the conflict was increasing, some Sayyids were indifferent or avoided involvement. Sayyid *Hasan bin Jadid al-Habshi* withdrew from *ar-Rabitat al-'Alawiyah* and urged his relatives to do so and not to involve themselves in the conflict.<sup>60</sup> Some others were sympathizer with the *al-Irshad*, like 'Abdullah bin 'Alawi al-Attas who contributed a lot of money to the organization.<sup>61</sup>

### Conclusion

The British have had the deeper understanding of the psychology of the people of *Hadramaut*. The social conflict, keenly contested by Sayyids and *al-Irshad*, was skillfully dealt with. The major role in the drama was apparently played by the contesting parties, while the British "directed" the events in such a manner that was fit with their effort of achieving political objectives. The outcome of the social struggle — the ultimate powerlessness of the *al-Irshad* — was attributed more to the British rather than to the other factors. Some other factors such as the dominance position of the Sayyids and their relations with the ruling elite contributed to the ultimate outcome. Bujra<sup>62</sup> had seemingly over-emphasized the situational arguments without linking them adequately with the external elements which were decisive for the fate and the ultimate outcome of the social conflict. In this case, the British "reasonableness" and fire power satisfied the mutual needs of the ruling elite, the Sayyids, and British policy. The Social *status quo* was protected by the British and the Sayyids were instrumental for the British political control of the Kathiri and Qu'aiti Government. For instance the tribesmen outside the main towns believed that the justice existing in the stratified society and corrupt Shari'a courts was no better than the justice of the rifle,<sup>63</sup> but only the British, not the ruling elite (like the sultans and their family or their administrators) or the Sayyids, had the capability to effectively stop the guns from flowing into *Hadramaut*, thereby deciding the fate of the political and social struggle in the country.

## Nota

<sup>1</sup> See A.S. Bujra, *Politics of Stratification*, London, 1971, pp. 5-6. To understand the features of the towns and some aspects of social life in Hadramaut, see R.B. Serjeant, "Social Stratification in Arabia," in R.B. Serjeant (Ed.), *The Islamic City*, UNESCO, Paris, 1980, pp. 126-147.

<sup>2</sup> R.B. Serjeant, *The Saiyid of Hadramaut*, London, 1957, p. 16. Even though the attacks had been made on their claim to descend from the Prophet (Ibid., p. 10), all authors agree that the origin of Sayyid of Hadramaut was the descendant of one man named Sayyid Ahmad bin Isa, known as al-Muhajir the Emigrant. See A.S. Bujra, *Politics of Stratification*, p. 22. Mahyudin Haji Yahya ("Latarbelakang Sejarah Keturunan Sayid di Malaysia," *Tamadun Islam*, Kuala Lumpur, 1980, pp. 60-73), has given a description of the origin of the Sayyids in Hadramaut and their contribution to Malaysia.

<sup>3</sup> A.S. Bujra, *Politics of Stratification*, London, 1971, pp. 13-14. Doreen Ingrams, *A Survey of Social and Economic Conditions in the Aden Protectorate* (n.p and n.d) pp. 48-53, divided the classes as follows:

- A. Tribal classes;
- B. Influential classes: 1. Sayyids, 2. Mashaikh, 3. Manaqib, 4. townsmen, and 5. government officials;
- C. Subject or depressed classes: 1. racy (sic) subjects, 2. duafa, 3. akhdam, hajur and subya, 4. doshan and shahidh, and 5. slaves; and
- D. Other classes: 1. Jews and 2. mercenaries or asakir. Cf. R.B. Serjeant, "Social Stratification in Arabia," in R.B. Serjeant (Ed.), *The Islamic City*, pp. 141-142.

<sup>4</sup> W.H. Ingrams, *A report on Social, Economic and Political Condition of Hadramaut*, (Colonial No. 123), (London: 1937), pp. 37-39, (Hereafter *A Report*), estimated that the total population of Hadramaut was 260,000. According to his list, the total number of those Sayyids was 19,415. However, in January 1945 he estimated that the Sayyids were about a fifth of the population. See Harold Ingrams, "South West Arabia: To-Day and To-Morrow," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, Vol. XXXII, Part II, May 1945, p. 150.

<sup>5</sup> A.S. Bujra, *Politics of Stratification*, pp. 15-18.

<sup>6</sup> Harold Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, London, 1966, p. 293.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 298. Ingrams estimated the road, from Tarim to Shihr, costed about 50,000. See Ibid., "Introduction", p. 39.

<sup>8</sup> Charles Hepburn Jonston, *The View from Steamer Point, being an Account of Three Years in Aden*, London, 1964, p. 86. An instance of this phenomenon was illustrated by A.S. Bujra (*The Politics of Stratification*, p. 155):

... Abu Bakar had emerged as the President of the Local Council and as *de facto* leader of the 'Attas ... has two important sets of connections within the total system, the first within the hierarchy of the Qu'aiti State, and the second within the British hierarchy which is above that of the Qu'aiti State. As part of his first set of contacts he has links with such important people as the Governor of his province, the Governor of another

province (an 'Attas), the Wazir (an 'Attas), the head of the Judiciary (a Sayyid), the head of the Al-Kaf family (a most influential and wealthy Sayyid family in Hadramaut), and the two Sultans of the Kathiri and Qu'aiti States . . ."

<sup>9</sup> R.B. Serjeant, "Historians and Historiography of Hadramaut," *Bulletine of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London*, Vol. XXV, 2, 1962, p. 249.

<sup>10</sup> W.H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 141.

<sup>11</sup> Harold Ingrams, "South-West Arabia: To-Day and To-Morrow," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, p. 142.

<sup>12</sup> Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh Hadramaut as-Siyasi*, Vol. II, Cairo, 1956, p. 240 (hereafter Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*).

<sup>13</sup> Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian Arabs," *Civilization*, Vol. V, No. I, 1955, p. 15. The number of the Arabs in Indonesia varies according to different authors as follows:

Years	Kroef*	Ingrams**	al-Bakri***
1860	9,000	8,909	n.a.
1870	13,000	n.a.	n.a.
1880	16,000	16,025	n.a.
1890	22,000	21,640	n.a.
1900	27,000	27,399	n.a.
1905	30,000	29,588	29,500
1920	45,000	44,902	44,921
1930	71,000	335	n.a.
1952	85,000	n.a.	n.a.

Sources: \* Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Arabs in Indonesia," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 1953, p. 300.

\*\* W.H. Ingrams, *A Report*, p. 146.

\*\*\* Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, p. 241.

<sup>14</sup> Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Arabs in Indonesia," *The Middle East Journal*, p. 300.

<sup>15</sup> Idem., "The Indonesian Arabs," *Civilizations*, p. 17.

<sup>16</sup> An interesting achievement of the Sayyids was an event occurred in a Malay State of Perlis, Malaysia, in 1841. In that year Sayyid Sharif Hussain bin Sayyid Sharif Harun was made Raja. His father, Sayyid Harun, just like some of the Sayyids in Siak, Kampar and Jambi in Sumatra and Kubu and Pontianak in Borneo, had acquired the status of local chief. See C.R. Howitt (The British Adviser, Perlis), *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the people of the State of Perlis*, Report for the Year A.H. 1354 (April 5, 1935 -- March 23, 1936), Colonial Report, No. 1795, London, 1937, p. 2; Idem., the Report of A.H. 1355 (April, 16, 1934 April 4, 1935), Appendix E, p. 69; J.A.E. Morley, "The Arabs and the Eastern Trade," *Journal of Malayan Branch of Royal Asiatic Society*, (JMBRAS), Vol. XXII, Part 1, March, 1949, p. 166. W.H. Ingrams (*A Report*, p. 37) mentioned that Jamal al-Lail, the family name for the Raja of Perlis, is of the Sayyid Al Ba Alawi family whose residence is at Taris, Hadramaut. Yusof A. Talib ("Les

Hadramis et le Monde Malais, Essai de Bibliographie Critique des Ouvrages Europeens sur l' Emigration Hadramite aux XIXe et XXe Siecle," *Archipel*, 7, 1974, p. 54, ns. I and 3.) mentioned that Sayyid Ja'far al-Bar, the late General Secretary of the United Malays National Organization, originated from Wadi Duan, Hadramaut and the late Mufti of Johore, Malaysia, Sayyid Alawi bin Tahir al-Haddad, originated from the town of Qauda, in Wadi Duan.

<sup>17</sup> R.J. Gavin, *Aden under British Rule 1839-1967*, London, 1975, p. 266.

<sup>18</sup> Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, p. 242.

<sup>19</sup> Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*, Singapore, 1973, p. 58. According to Salah al-Bakri (*Tarikh*), a group of Al Ba Alawi and others formed *Jam'iyat Khair* in Batavia in 1903.

<sup>21</sup> Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, p. 243; A.S. Bujra, *Politics of Stratification*, p. 94.

<sup>22</sup> Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, p. 243.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 246. Shaikh Umar said: "And it was established that they are masters of all other people ... and is it permissible to marry the slave to his mistress?"

(وقد ثبت أنهم موال على ما سواهم من كافة الخلق ... وهل يجوز تزويج العبد مولاته).

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 247-253.

<sup>25</sup> Deliar Noer, pp. 59ff.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62; Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, p. 256.

<sup>27</sup> Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, pp. 262-272.

<sup>28</sup> Deliar Noer, pp. 60-63. Salah al-Bakri (*Tarikh*, p. 257) mentioned that *Jam'iyat al-Islam wal-Irshad* was formed in Batavia in 1914.

<sup>29</sup> *Al-Irshad* aim was to "build up and maintain a fund ... to carry out the tradition and customs of the Arabs according to the teachings of the Islamic religion, and to spread among the Arabs the wisdom of holy books, knowledge of Arabic language, Dutch and other languages ... to build and maintain buildings for meeting ... schools and other necessary useful purposes ... to set up a printing press ..." See Deliar Noer, p. 64, n. 25.

<sup>30</sup> Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, p. 260.

<sup>31</sup> Deliar Noer, pp. 64-65.

<sup>32</sup> A.S. Bujra, "Political Conflict and Stratification in Hadramaut-I," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. III, No. 4, July, 1967, p. 360; Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, pp. 327-328.

<sup>33</sup> Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, pp. 273 and 237; cf. R.B. Serjeant, "Historians and Historiography of Hadramaut," *Bulletine of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London*, p. 249.

<sup>34</sup> A.S. Bujra, "Political Conflict and Stratification in Hadramaut-I," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. III, No. 4, July, 1967, pp. 360-361.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 361.

<sup>36</sup> Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, p. 284.

- 37 A.S. Bujra, 'Political Conflict and Stratification in Hadramaut-I,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. III, No. 4, July, 1967, p. 361.
- 38 Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, p. 284.
- 39 Ibid., p. 286. The 'members of the house' (*ahl al-bait*) technically means the family of the Prophet but here it seems to be referred to the Sayyids.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 A.S. Bujra, 'Political Conflict and Stratification in Hadramaut-I,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. III, No. 4, July, 1967, p. 361; Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, p. 287.
- 42 Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, p. 287.
- 43 Ibid., p. 304.
- 44 Ibid., pp. 289-299.
- 45 Ibid., pp. 300 - 302.
- 46 Ibid., p. 303.
- 47 Ibid., pp. 307-319.
- 48 See R.J. Gavin, p. 267.
- 49 R.J. Gavin, p. 267; cf. Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, pp. 288-289.
- 50 R.J. Gavin, pp. 267-268.
- 51 Ibid., p. 268.
- 52 Freya Stark. *The Southern Gates of Arabia*, E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1936, p. 243.
- 53 R.J. Gavin, pp. 301-302.
- 54 Ibid., p. 302.
- 55 Ibid., p. 306. Al-Kaff and Bin 'Abdat were typically two prominent leaders in the Sayyid and *al-Irshad* camps (see Ibid., p. 307). British role in the conflict can be observed in Ingrams's political manoeuvre which he worked out through the ruling elite and the influential Sayyids in the Kathiri domain. It was the wealthy Sayyid Abu Bakr al-Kaff who assured Ingrams: "With my health and my wealth (*hali wa mali*) I will help you ... and together we will bring peace and order." British intention to put down *al-Irshad* under the name of peace was understandable. It was decided in Aden that the question to be settled in al-Ghurfa was Bin Abdat who possessed the town and kept perpetual feud (see Harold Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, pp. 240-241).
- Previously Bin 'Abdat's proposal to make peace was not supported and therefore he established control in the town (al-Ghurfa). Subsequently, Sayyid Husin al-Mihdar, the Qu'aiti Wazir persuaded the Kathiri Sultan and Salim bin Ja'far to join him in trying to force Bin 'Abdat to vacate al-Ghurfa. 'Ali bin Mansur, the Kathiri Sultan marched against him with one gun Sayyid Husin brought another together with troops from Shibam and Salim bin Ja'far brought his men. They bombarded Bin 'Abdat and had a good battle but without success. Sayyid Husin then retired and Sultan 'Ali came to terms with Bin 'Abdat. Thus Salim bin Ja'far and Bin 'Abdat agreed to fight it out together (Ibid., pp. 178-179).

56 Salah al-Bakri, pp. 273-281.

57 Ibid., pp. 281-283.

58 Ibid., pp. 339-342.

59 A.S. Bujra, "Political Conflict and Stratification-I, Nationalism and the Yemeni Revolution: Their Effects on Hadramaut," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, October, 1967, p. 2.

60 Salah al-Bakri, *Tarikh*, p. 328.

61 Deliar Noer, p. 64, n. 97.

62 The situational arguments are to consider the local situation without taking adequate account of forcing element, like British role, which involved in the process of events. So the ideas and actions of both Sayyids and *al-Irshad* in a strongly traditional, stratified and closed society of Hadramaut were regarded to be the main reasons for the victory of the traditional group, the Sayyids. Cf. A.S. Bujra, "Political Conflict and Stratification in Hadramaut-I," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. III, No. 4, July, 1967, pp. 369-372.

63 Cf. R.J. Gavin, p. 306.

