

The Evolution of Indonesia's Military Doctrines in Old Order, New Order and Reformation Era

Evolusi Doktrin Ketenteraan Indonesia Masa Orde Lama, Orde Baru dan Era Reformasi

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the evolution of the Indonesian military doctrines during the Old Order, the New Order, and the Reformation Era. Under Sukarno's leadership, the use of military force was outward looking and offensive, apart from constantly viewing neighbouring countries as potential enemies. Suharto prioritised homeland security and built synergies among nations within the region. The military doctrine during the Reformation Era has undergone four amendments as an effort to improve military professionalism. This study analyses factors that led to the evolution of the Indonesian military doctrine and explains the evolution that took place during the three periods. This study employed a qualitative method supported by Neoclassical Realism analysis through literature study, document analysis, and interviews as an attempt to analyse various factors for the military doctrine evolution. The study outcomes showed that domestic politics emerged as the most dominant factor that sparked the evolution of military doctrine. Finally, this study concludes that the evolutionary doctrine of the Indonesian military reflects a form of adjustment to political developments and strategic environment in maintaining the Indonesian national security.

Keywords: Evolution; military doctrine; New Order; Old Order; Reformation Era

ABSTRAK

Kajian ini membicarakan evolusi doktrin ketenteraan Indonesia dalam tempoh Orde Lama, Orde Baru dan Era Reformasi. Di bawah kepemimpinan Sukarno, penggunaan kekuatan ketenteraan tertuju keluar dan ofensif serta melihat negara-negara jiran berpotensi sebagai musuh. Suharto mengutamakan keselamatan dalam negeri dan membangun sinergi antara negara serantau. Doktrin ketenteraan di Era Reformasi telah mengalami empat perubahan sebagai upaya untuk mempertingkatkan profesionalisme tentera. Kajian ini menganalisis faktor-faktor yang menyebabkan evolusi doktrin ketenteraan Indonesia dan menjelaskan evolusi doktrin yang berlaku selama tiga period. Penyelidikan ini menggunakan kaedah kualitatif yang disokong dengan analisis Realisme Neoklasik ke atas data yang diperolehi melalui kajian kepustakaan, analisis dokumen dan temu bual sebagai usaha untuk menganalisis pelbagai faktor dalam evolusi doktrin ketenteraan. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahawa politik domestik adalah faktor yang paling dominan dalam evolusi doktrin ketenteraan. Akhirnya, dapat disimpulkan bahawa evolusi doktrin ketenteraan Indonesia adalah suatu bentuk penyesuaian dengan perkembangan politik dan lingkungan strategis dalam mengawal keselamatan nasional Indonesia.

Kata kunci: Evolusi; doktrin ketenteraan; Order Lama; Order Baru; Era Reformasi.

INTRODUCTION

Doctrine refers to a set of fundamental principles, based on the armed forces' guidelines in support of the outlined objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application (Andi 2010). A doctrine has a highly fundamental role for the military in guarding the sovereignty, the territorial integrity, and the safety of the Indonesian people. Indonesia has experienced three governmental eras, namely, Sukarno period which Suharto called the

Old Order (1945-1967), the New Order (1967-1998), and the Reformation (1998-present). Within these three governmental eras, Indonesia has faced highly dynamic domestic politics, regional geopolitics, and global development. Hence, the Indonesian military has varied interests in developing the doctrine during each period.

During the Old Order, the Indonesian military faced various physical conflicts to defend their independence from the Netherlands military aggression, various armed rebellions, and instability

of domestic politics. Amidst political instability and economic failure, Sukarno was able to transform the Indonesian military to become the strongest in Asia in the 1960s (Nasution 1988). It was during this period emerged a thought to develop a military doctrine. During the New Order, Suharto recovered the national security stability and its economic development became the main priority by applying inward and outward looking strategies. He changed the orientation of foreign policy and gave dual functions to the military, as described in its doctrine (Crouch 2010). During the Reformation Era, the military conducted internal reformation by discarding the dual-function. Dual-function led to biases in the national political system and affected military professionalism (Yani 2014). Five national leadership changes varied the impacts in constructing the military doctrines and the role of Indonesia within the Southeast Asia region. Indonesia faced hegemony from China and rebalanced politics from the United States in the Asia Pacific (Prashanth 2014; Hisham Kamal & Azizan 2017). In response to the progress of domestic politics, regional geopolitics, and global development during the Reformation Era, the military had transformed its doctrine four times.

Since independence, Indonesia has experienced three governmental periods with different sets of national issues. Similarly, the military, which serves as the guarding force of both the nation and state, must be capable of guiding possible changes and overcoming any kind of national security threats through the development of its military doctrine. Accordingly, this study analyses factors for the evolution of Indonesian military doctrine and describes the evolution of military doctrine that took place during the three administration periods.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A study that probed into Indonesia's military doctrine was conducted by Jenkins (1983) entitled *The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doktrin, Thinking: The Concept of Dwifungsi*. The study analysed the progress of military doctrine described in five periods - physical revolution (1945-1949), liberal democratic (1949-1957), (1957-1959), (1959-1965), and post-1965. Jenkins elaborated the conditions of domestic politics and national security at that time when the military was rebranded with a non-military role. The review, nonetheless, only discussed one of its many military doctrine aspects,

particularly those linked with the dual-function of the Indonesian military limited to post-1965 period.

This study appears to share some similarities with the paper published by Kier (1992), who discovered that the military doctrine constitutes a product of domestic politics and organisational factors. Civilian intervention and perspective on military influenced the progress of doctrine. In developing Indonesia's military doctrine, domestic politics gave varying effects from time-to-time. This is consistent with a study carried out by Desh (1999), who asserted that aspects embedded in the military doctrine serve as one of the many determinants in civilian control power on military. A rumour is viewed as a threat and this does not take into account the perception of the civilian leader.

An article published by Andi in Media Indonesia Newspaper dated April 28th, 2005 described the importance of formulating military doctrine for the government pertaining to the use of military power. The view of the state on war must be included in military doctrine of strategic nature and described in both operational and tactical doctrines. Andi added that it is a must to have a joint operation doctrine, apart from force-based doctrine. This thought displayed his capability in reading the condition of military doctrine and the need for the military to develop a viable doctrine that serves as guidance for duty implementation. Andi (2010) completed his writing upon reviewing the *Evolution of Indonesia Defence Doctrine*, in which he argued that the substance of doctrine associated to the military strategy applied in a war scenario.

Komang (2010) described the variations of the defence doctrines implemented during the Guided Democracy period (1959-1965) and New Order (1965-1998), which were influenced by the changes that took place in strategic culture and threat structure. This differed from the notion championed by Green (2011), who discussed military doctrine 2007 and its integral function in military modernisation. Military must be able to project technology advancement into its doctrine. Green added that the stipulation of military doctrine 2007 as the realisation of military internal reformation agenda implementation exhibited an implication to the building of military power for state defence in protecting its citizens, assisting in handling natural disasters, and facing external threat. The study also sought Indonesia's defence policy innovations gained through war experience by the armed forces, wherein the study findings are outlined in the form of state defence regulations.

Yani (2013), whose study differed from Green's, described the various changes in military doctrine 2007 that derived from military doctrine 1988. He claimed that the changes made to the doctrine constituted an indication of military re-functionality. In the doctrine content, the social political role was stripped from the military and was left only with the role as a state apparatus in the defence sector, in which its duty was based on the state political interests. As in Green's study, the discussion by Yani was still partial in nature, but limited to military doctrine 2007.

Hence, this article recognized the knowledge gap by discussing and analysing the evolution of the Indonesia's military doctrine from the Old Order, the New Order, until the Reformation Era in a comprehensive manner by incorporating domestic politics, regional geopolitics, and systemic factor in the light of the doctrine development.

METHODOLOGY

This study gathered qualitative data from primary and secondary sources by through interviews with selected key informants and document analysis. According to Lebar (2015), in-depth interviews are used as the primary method and are the most appropriate research method for data collection. He added that interview should be conducted to obtain primary data directly in the field from selected sources based on their qualification and experience. Selection of viable sources is essential as the data collected are accounted for a quality information in line with study objectives. This study selected key informants among those involved in the formulation of Indonesia's military doctrine based on their analytical capability and authority to answer the questions. The interviews conducted in this study were semi-structured.

Those key informants were: (i) Try Sutrisno, former vice president with military background; (ii) Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, and (iii) Rais Abin, veterans who served as ambassadors and experienced the three administration periods; (iv) Moeldoko, who once served as Indonesia's military commander and had been in command of the Army; (v) Herman Prayitno, former chief of staff of Air Force and Indonesia's ambassador to Malaysia; (vi) Marsetio, former chief of staff of Navy who developed the Indonesia's sea power concept and was involved personally in the formulation of military doctrine 2007; (vii) Junias Tobing, an expert of military

doctrine and strategy; (viii) Supiadin Aries, a member of Indonesia parliament; and (ix) Makmur Keliat, who has a strong academic background and has published many reviews on military reform, as well as the Indonesian national security. The interviews were conducted from November until December 2017.

In order to complement the data gathered from the interviews, a document analysis was performed on the military doctrine since its initiation in the year 1967 up to the present time, including force-based doctrines comprising of Army Navy, and Air Force doctrines. Literature review was also carried out on related publications, both in printed and electronic forms. Next, secondary data were gathered from books, journals, theses, and articles associated with the evolution of military doctrine, the condition of Indonesia's domestic politics, Southeast Asia geopolitics, and systemic factors.

The collected data were analysed by a qualitative descriptive technique from the perspectives of neoclassical realism theory, conceptualised by Rose (1998). This theory upholds that foreign policy of a country is influenced by the effort of the power holder in an international system. The decision maker would keep depending on the state's domestic structure and threat to the state, apart from weighing in political leader's view and elite. Schweller (2004) explained that although neoclassical realism theory was so far used for foreign policy theory, this theory can be applied to depict certain types of political results by analysing the national safety behaviour through the introduction of domestic politics and international system.

FACTORS THAT LED TO DOCTRINE TRANSFORMATION

As the main power of state defence system, the military must be able to retain the existence of Indonesia amidst the highly dynamic international system. Thus, the military must adhere to a doctrine that serves as guidance in performing its duty and being capable of adjusting to various changes (Agus 2015). In analysing the transformation of Indonesia's military doctrine, three aspects underlying the implementation of transformation to Indonesia's military doctrine in three periods, i.e. domestic politics, regional geopolitics, and systemic factor, are crucial. The conditions of those three aspects during these three periods are described in the table below.

TABLE 1. Conditions of domestic politics, regional geopolitics, and systemic factors

Aspect	Old Order	New Order	Reformation Era
Domestic politics	Unstable	Stable	Dynamic
Regional geopolitics	SEATO, ASA, Maphilindo	Building of Asean	Strengthening of Asean
Systemic factors	Cold war	Cold war	Hegemony of China Rebalancing of USA

Source: Adapted from various sources.

Domestic Politics

In the Old Order period, the condition of domestic politics was the most unstable in comparison of New Order and Reformation Era. Indonesia was still waging war against the Netherlands military aggression and other various domestic armed rebellions. The political elite struggled to achieve a mutual agreement in finding a viable governmental model that best fit Indonesia (Rais 2017). The

instability of domestic political condition was marked by the frequent changes in its governmental system, constitution, and cabinet as described in the table 2. Based on this domestic political situation, General Nasution developed a military role in the politics known as the “Jalan Tengah” (the Middle Way). The military’s role in politics had been significant since the enactment of martial law in 1957 (Crouch 2007).

TABLE 2. The Old Order governmental changes

Aspect	1945-1949	1949-1950	1950-1959	1959-1967
Form of state	Unity	Union/federation	Unity	Unity
Governmental system	Presidential	Parliamentary	Parliamentary	Presidential
Constitution	1945 constitution	RIS constitution	UUDS 1950	1945 constitution
Change of cabinet	8	3	7	9
Parliamentary	KNIP	DPR and RIS senate	DPRS	DPRGR

Source: Adapted from various sources.

In 1959, Sukarno initiated the Guided Democracy period. He dismissed the parliament and substituted it with a new parliament, in which most of the members were appointed personally by Sukarno. At the initial phase of this period, the military reorganized itself from organizational, educational, and doctrinal aspects into organizations with a stronger political role. Sukarno realised that the growing strength of the military is a threat to his position. The military, especially the Army, as an organization that has different stance from Sukarno’s attitude about communist ideology. According to Sukarno, the Army could use their weapons to realize their political desires. Hence, Sukarno sought support from the Indonesia’s communist party to counter military power. Both military and Indonesia’s communist party constituted part of Sukarno’s political conception that wished to unite the three most important ideologies in Indonesia: nationalism, religion, and communism (Salim 2001). Sukarno directed the military so that his political concept served as a reference for doctrine formulation.

The formulation of Territorial War Doctrine was the first military doctrine accepted by the

government in the year 1960. This doctrine was in the form of ideological war that defended the state ideology, which faced strong criticisms from the Indonesian communist party (PKI). PKI desired communism as the ideology of Indonesia. The military could not be controlled by the Indonesian communist party or even turned in into political opponents. Upon further doctrinal development, the military doctrines were composed of each force that highlighted its strengths and formed a narrow perspective. This resulted in a competition among the forces that threatened the integrity of military. In order to overcome this problem, the military, in the year 1966, compiled a doctrine guided by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police. Sayidiman (2017) stated that the faction in military was not only caused by doctrinal variances, but also the involvement of military figures in politics and the Indonesian communist party rebellion on September 30, 1965.

The military doctrine, which was formulated since 1966, had been validated in March 31, 1967 after Suharto replaced Sukarno as the President. In these doctrines, the military was assigned with a dual-function as defence and security force and as

a social power to maintain both domestic political stability and economic development. Moeldoko (2017) claimed that the military was assigned with the dual-function since the Old Order under Sukarno emphasised more security and politics that resulted in economic slump. Suharto placed economy as an important aspect for progress, whereby economic development halts upon poor political stability. Suharto viewed that the agent reliable to enforce political stability was the military especially the Army, thus the assignment of a bigger role to the military through its dual-function. In fact, this dual-function was further strengthened through the formulation of military doctrine in 1988, which was guided by the military until the advent of the Reformation Era.

During the Reformation Era, the military conducted internal reformation across structural, cultural, and doctrinal domains. However during the Reformation Era under the national leadership of Habibie (1998-1999), Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati (2001-2004) did not change military doctrine but instead, they made a number of policies in an effort to reform the military, especially the restructuring of military institutions and Indonesian police. In fact, Megawati did re-arrange the state defence system by issuing state defence law and Indonesian Armed Forces law. In the two periods of Yudhoyono (2004-2014), three transformations took place in the military doctrine; years 2007, 2010, and 2012. The formulation of this doctrine referred to a follow-up to military and police separation, as well as the elimination of dual-function from military professionalism (Suhaimi, Yaakub & Jayum 2012). This policy was resumed by the leadership of Joko Widodo by transforming the military doctrine in 2018 upon accentuating maritime security to support the global maritime fulcrum policy.

Domestic politics emerged as the main cause of the evolution of military doctrine in Indonesia, especially national leadership and military development. Political instability under Sukarno's leadership prompted Nasution to develop military involvement in politics. At the beginning of the New Order, Suharto as the President served concurrently as Commander of the Armed Forces by establishing the dual role of ABRI in military doctrine in 1967 and strengthening of the military doctrine in 1988. Suharto gave a broad role to the military to create national security stability to develop the economy (Salim 2006). Although in 1998 there was a reform movement which demanded the elimination of

the dual function, the military carried out internal reforms by formulating a new paradigm for the role of the TNI by becoming a professional, effective, efficient and modern military (Agus 2015). Obviously changes in military doctrine was formulated in 2007 by the TNI Commander General Djoko Suyanto under Yudhoyono's national leadership. All the respondents were of the same opinion on this. Sutrisno (2017) added that the other factors, which led to doctrinal transformation, were technological advancement and national security threats to development. Technological developments impact on the development of types and the escalation of threats. Military doctrine must be transformed to overcome the development of national security threats.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN GEOPOLITICS

Anti-neo-colonialism and imperialism were the foundation of Sukarno's political attitude in determining the relationship with foreign nations. This attitude was displayed by Sukarno after his diplomacy failed with the Netherlands concerning the return of Irian Barat and the seizing Irian Barat offensively through "Trihora Operation". A number of regional collaborations had been established, such as Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), and Malaysia Philippines Indonesia (Maphilindo), which failed to establish cooperation on mutual benefit, respecting equality, and sovereignty basis. In fact, the Indonesian government executed the politics of Konfrontasi in order to oppose a plan of Malaysian administration to extend The Federation concept, which embraced Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. In a move against this proposal, President Sukarno announced Dwikora Operation aimed at crushing the Malaysia federation. during the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation (Nasution 1988).

Sukarno's offensive decision reflected the Indonesians' response to their country's independence and sovereignty. This was written in the military doctrine 1967 in terms of the Indonesian people's interpretation on war and peace. Indonesians love peace. Therefore, Indonesians would like to adopt a peaceful approach in each settlement of problem both nationally and internationally. Though loving peace, Indonesian were determined to defend their sovereignty against any forms of security threats. If this determination must be realised through war, then it has to be that way because Indonesians loved independence more. For Indonesians, war was the

last resort forcefully taken to defend sovereignty and integrity. With the offensive nature carried out by Sukarno, Rais (2017) and Sayidiman (2017) asserted that Indonesia's military strength was considered a source of threat in the Southeast Asian region.

The New Order government changed its foreign policy by mending its relationship with the countries in Southeast Asian region through the formation of ASEAN. Suharto prioritised national stability as an absolute condition to conduct economic development. The New Order government wished to make Indonesia a country with a national resilience. Hence, Suharto invited the Southeast Asian nations to jointly realise the region's stability independently and to create the regional resilience through ASEAN. ASEAN is not a defence pact or military alliance, but through ASEAN; bilateral military cooperation was developed amongst its members. In the Suharto era, Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN was dominant (He 2007). Both national and regional resilience turned into a vital foundation in formulating the military doctrine, which was established in 1988, in view of geopolitical perspective and geostrategic of each nation.

At the beginning of Reformation Era, the Indonesian leadership in Asean suffered a decline. However, the member countries attempted to strengthen the role of ASEAN by developing various collaborations and mutually agreed to develop an integrated region by forming a community of Southeast Asia nations. In 2003, the ASEAN members agreed to form the ASEAN Community. ASEAN member states accelerated in ASEAN political and security cooperation by realising regional peacefulness through ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC), which was formed to be one of the Asean Community pillars (Benny, Sity & Moorthy 2018). They added that APSC encouraged the ASEAN members to get themselves free from a security dilemma situation and condition by shared peace values within the context of reaching regional stability and dispute settlement at the regional level. ASEAN should develop a cooperation amongst its members to face human security threats, which become a crucial issue in Archipelagic Southeast Asia (Sity, Zarina & Rashila 2015).

The strengthening of various ASEAN collaborations became the considerations in developing the military doctrine during the Reformation Era. The formulation of the doctrine was based on the escalation of terrorism, hijacking

and piracy at sea, human trafficking, as well as various natural disaster occurrences. The demand on military professionalism after the elimination of dual-function determined the distinction of operational duty performed, military operation to war (MOTW), and military operation other than war (MOOTW) method, capability development, and international cooperation.

THE DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL POWER

After the proclamation of Independence, Indonesia experienced a Cold War between western and eastern blocks. Countries worldwide formed groups based on their national interests. Indonesia who did not involve in the Cold War, practiced an active and a neutral foreign policy. Although the world power became bipolar, Indonesia under Sukarno had relations with the two blocs. Sukarno had quite close relations with the United States. The relationship became less dynamic after it was discovered that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in a regional uprising. Therefore, Sukarno developed a relationship with the Soviet Union and China, even established Jakarta-Moscow and Jakarta-Beijing axes. This policy reflects the strength of communist influence in Indonesia. This policy affected the development of military power, not only in the modernisation of military equipment aspect, but also in formulating the military doctrine.

This differed from the New Order regime, in which Suharto established a relationship with the United States of America and Europe. Suharto ended Indonesian-Chinese relations on October 30, 1967 because of its involvement in the spread of communist ideology in Indonesia and normalized relations in 1990 in the interests of developing economic and trade cooperation. The Cold War was basically a contest between liberal and communist ideological influences. The New Order remained consistent in running an active and neutral foreign policy. Indonesia maintained good relations with the eastern and western bloc countries based on equality and mutual respect.

During the Reformation Era, Indonesia's attention was diverted to China's hegemony issue and the United States' rebalancing policy in Asia Pacific. In international relations, all countries had different national interests and from time to time conflict of interest happens between nations (Papatheologou, Rizwan & Musarat 2014). The state leadership played an important role in perceiving relationship with other nations (Muein 2017). The

relationship between Indonesia, China, and United States of America during the Reformation Era were maintained well by putting forward mutual respect and appreciation principle as equal nations, including being responsible for the region's peace and stability. Supiadin (2017) claimed that in a system, either regional or global, stability can be maintained or recovered through careful management of politics, military, and economic interactions by the regional players. Hence, Yudhoyono gave directions to military officers in July 13, 2011 so that a review of the current doctrine could be adjusted to suit the needs of the national interests, particularly in maintaining the sovereignty of outer islands and maritime security.

Alterations made due to strategic environment is a crucial factor in formulating a military doctrine. This served as a guidance in determining the essential of present and future threats that must be addressed by the military. Hence, all doctrines stipulated since the Old Order, New Order, and Reformation Era were adjusted to suit the strategic environment i.e. the polarization of world power into bipolar, unipolar and multipolar. Indonesia, with its military strength and diplomacy, must be

able to guard national security based on a neutral and active foreign policy. This was consistent with the views asserted by Moeldoko (2017), Prayitno (2017), and Marsetio (2017), that any changes made to the military doctrine was due to the modifications that were made in the strategic environment. These statements were verified by Keliat (2017), who claimed that changes in the strategic environment were in the form of coercing the interests of nations towards Indonesia in multiple ways and in becoming a threat that encouraged changes in the military doctrine by adhering to the development of the threats.

EVOLUTION OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

Indonesia's military doctrine experienced adjustment and revision in terms of its duty needs. A doctrine was not of dogmatic nature, but has to be flexible in facing various changes (Marsetio 2017). Andi (2010) opined that a doctrine is revised to accommodate to the changing factors. The development of military doctrine during the three highlighted periods is given in the following table 3.

TABLE 3. The development of military doctrine

Type	Old Order	New Order	Reformation Era
Military doctrine	1966	1967, 1988	1967, 1988
Army doctrine	1960, 1965, 1966	1996	2001, 2007, 2013, 2017
Navy doctrine	1965	-	2001
Air force doctrine	1963, 1965	1980, 1985, 1992	2000, 2004, 2007, 2012

Source: Adapted from various sources.

MILITARY DOCTRINE IN THE OLD ORDER

In the physical Revolution Era, the Indonesian military was busy facing the Netherlands military aggression that attempted to colonise Indonesia again. The military also had to overcome various domestic rebellions. Hence, the military then did not develop a specific doctrine to serve as guidance in its operations. The formulation of the doctrine in the Old Order that was carried out by each force developed sectoral egos that led to military disintegration. Army produced a formulation of territorial war doctrine in 1960 as a guidance and reference in carrying out its operation for realising the national interest. Likewise, in 1963, the Air Force stipulated the outcomes of Cibulan Seminar as the principal doctrine of Air Force and was further improved in 1965. In the context of developing a doctrine, the

Navy held a seminar entitled "War and Working Doctrine of Maritime" in 1965, which produced the Indonesia's Navy Doctrine. Upon completion of the doctrine, the Navy secured a guideline to build a force that is capable of guarding the sovereignty of Indonesia. Eventually, the naval forces emerged as a respected force in Asia. The doctrine was developed after weighing in the interests of the Navy, which were omitted in the synergy between the forces (TNI History and Tradition Centre 2000).

Doctrine 1966 constituted the initial integrated doctrine for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) that comprised of the Army, the Navy, Air Force, and the Police. Based on the evolution of the military doctrine described in Table 4, the military doctrine also assigned the legality on military dual-function as the defence and security role, as well as social role. The Military Doctrine

of 1966 stated that military role other than national defense were driven by the desire to determine the direction and politics of the state. Even in the military doctrine of 1988 it was stated that ABRI as a pioneer, stabilizer and dynamist of national development. Although its implementation causes biases in the democratic system in Indonesia (Mietzner 2006). In facing both external and internal threats, as well as aspects related to national defence and security, the defence politics used was active defensive. The

essence of threat was divided into domestic and external threats. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia also developed technology capabilities and social systems. Threat was overcome by using defence operating pattern and domestic security operation. This doctrine was formulated based on Indonesia's view of war and peace. Indonesians love peace. War was the last resort to defend ideology, independence, and sovereignty.

TABLE 4. The Evolution of Indonesia's military doctrine

Aspect	1966/1967	1988	2007	2010	2012
Identity	3	3	4	4	4
Organisation 2001, 2007, 2013, 2017	ABRI	ABRI	TNI	TNI	TNI
Role	Dual function	Dual function	Defence	Defence	Defence
Defence politics	Active defensive	Active defensive Active preventive	Active defensive Active preventive	Active defensive	Active defensive
Threat	Internal External	Internal External	Military Non-military	Military Non-military	Traditional Non-traditional Non-military
Capability	Technological and social system	6 capabilities	5 capabilities	5 capabilities	4 capabilities
Operation pattern	Defence Domestic	Defence Domestic Social politics	MOTW MOOTW	MOTW MOOTW	MOTW MOOTW

Source: Adapted from various sources.

According to Sayidiman (2017), the formulation of military doctrine during the Old Order is partial by each force in the 1960s. The military still faced various physical wars in maintaining Indonesia's independence. The domestic political conditions were unstable, as it experienced nine cabinet reshuffles from 1959 until 1967; signifying the political dynamics at that time. In addition, Rais (2017) said that the formulation of the doctrine in each force led to the development of sectoral ego and lack of synergy among these forces. This jeopardised the forces of the army that should have high solidarity to safeguard the sovereignty of the state. Marsetio (2017) supported both statements and added that Sukarno was aware that in order to support his policy against imperialism and colonialism, it was a must to acquire a formidable military force, possessing militancy, and unyielding spirit expressed in its doctrine. Thus, at the end of Sukarno's leadership, a military doctrine was integrated amongst its forces.

MILITARY DOCTRINE IN THE NEW ORDER

Upon having been appointed as a President, Suharto took over the position of Minister of Defence and Security. With that, a special team was formed to revise the military doctrine 1966, in which the paperwork was submitted to the Minister of Defence and Security in March 31, 1967 (Ministry of Defence and Security 1967). By the stipulation of this doctrine, any variance in the interpretation among forces can be eliminated. Thus, the military adhered to the archipelagic concept, hence disregarded accentuating the interest of a single force and the interest of one of the struggling sectors.

Military doctrine 1988 constituted a revision to the military doctrine 1966 after a 20-year operation with the intention to harmonise it with both the current environmental condition and situation, as well as those in the future. The military maintained its identities. This doctrine further strengthened the dual-function. The state defence politics was both active defensive and active preventive directed to

guarantee domestic security, apart from participating in peace-keeping at both regional and global arena.

This doctrine described the essence of threat that comprised of war and domestic security threats. In order to realise the said condition, military professionalism was directed to six domains of defence and security, as well as socio-political capabilities, in covering its strategic intelligence capacity, defence, security, socio-political, territorial, and support. With such capabilities, the military was expected to be capable of implementing the defence operating pattern, domestic security operation, and socio-political operation. The defence operation consisted of conditions for controlling operation, conventional operation, territorial fighting operation, revenging attack operation, and security recovery operation. Meanwhile, domestic security operation was composed of conditions for controlling operation, repressive operation, security recovery operation executed in the form of strategic intelligence operation, territorial operation, combating operation, as well as community security and order operation. In addition, the military also carried out socio-political operation that was composed of condition for controlling operation, socio-political controlling operation, and socio-political condition establishing operation (ABRI Headquarters 1988).

The implication of the military doctrine implementation displayed that the military involvement in the national political system was getting stronger and more transparent, and the military was used as a tool to maintain Suharto's power. Therefore, the military was used to support and to strengthen the ruling government's party, apart from carrying out repressive actions against government political opponents. Next, the military was considered unprofessional in the field of national defence and its involvement in politics was considered to cause refraction of the national political system. The national reform movement demanded the military to abolish its dual functions and become the professional army instead (Agus 2015).

MILITARY DOCTRINE IN THE REFORMATION ERA

Upon having gone through an in-depth and comprehensive review, military doctrine 2007 was officially endorsed by the Chief Command of Armed Forces in January 12, 2007. This doctrine was the first doctrine stipulated in Reformation Era

with a substantial number of fundamental changes in identity, organisational, role, and operating pattern aspects. During this period, the military doctrine experienced four transformations in 2007, 2010, 2012, and 2018. The segregation of the police from military, the addition of military identity, and the demand on the elimination of dual-function had an influence on the formulation of the doctrine.

The 2007 doctrine was developed in the interest of the armed forces with the basic duties of enforcing the state sovereignty, maintaining the territory integrity, as well as protecting the whole nation and all of Indonesia's territories from any threat to the nation and state integrity. Professionalism is an integral military identity. The military functions as the state apparatus in the defence sector in performing its duties based on the state political decision taken by the government and parliament. The state defence politics, however, did not change from the previous doctrine i.e. active defensive and active preventive.

The doctrine determined both military and non-military threats. Military threat covered aggression, territorial violation, armed rebellion, sabotage, espionage, armed terrorist act, security threats on sea and air, as well as communal conflict. In facing military and non-military threats, the military conducted two operating patterns; MOTW and MOOTW. MOTW consisted of military joint operation, land operation, marine operation, aerial operation, military campaign, and support operation, while MOOTW operation covered fourteen actions according to law of the Indonesian Armed Forces.

During the Reformation Era, the military conducted internal reformation by eliminating its dual-function. The establishment of the national defence law in 2002 and the law on the Indonesian National Army in 2004 transformed the Indonesian military to turn into professional without involvement in politics, but upholding civilian supremacy and carrying out tasks based on the nation's political decisions (Mitzner 2006). Increased threats to national security at the beginning of the reform era and less demand for political role of the Indonesian military in maintaining the existence of the country and democratisation can affect the stability of a nation. According to Keliat (2017), if the Indonesian military, along with its doctrine, was able to realise national security during the New Order era, the military reform must also be able to realise national security in the reform era.

In the formulation of 2010 military doctrine, a revision to the previous doctrine was made,

especially in analysing the categories of threat and in determining the defence politics. This doctrine assessed that threats to the security of the sea and air, as well as communal conflict, constituted non-military threats. The doctrine also added three other non-military threats that must be considered: threat to the national vital object; threat to President and vice president, along with their families; as well as threat to the safety of state guests of the head of state and foreign representatives in Indonesia. An adjustment was also made to the defence politics, which was previously active defensive and active preventive, into active defensive. On July 13, 2011, Yudhoyono provided a direct guidance to military officers so that the military doctrine was transformed in accordance to global changes.

Indonesia faced China's hegemony and rebalancing with the United States, as debated by some scholars. Supiadin (2017) stated that the rise of China did not affect security stability in the Southeast Asian region, China was able to cooperate with Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN organizations to create a peaceful region. Tobing (2017) carried out studies that differed from prior researchers, which stated that Southeast Asia would become a disputed area between Chinese hegemony politics and US rebalancing politics. Thus, Indonesia must address these conditions by mobilising various resources, including adjusting several aspects of its military doctrine.

A transformation took place in military doctrine 2010 that generated military doctrine 2012. A change in this military doctrine 2012 refers to the formulation of the main duties shouldered by the military by adding its participation in the effort of keeping the world's order and peace as part of its operations. Development of threats to the national security were categorised into three, i.e. traditional military, non-traditional military, and non-military threats. The military developed four capabilities that consisted of defence, national security, empowerment of defence area, and supporting role. This doctrine clearly stated that in the attempt of facing traditional military, non-traditional military, and non-military threats; the military conducted two military operations; to war and other than war.

Moeldoko (2017) argued that in the reformation era, the military had a strong desire to become a professional force. The statement was reinforced by Prayitno (2017), Supiadin (2017), and Tobing (2017), whereby military reform was carried out in a gradual and systematic manner, including

doctrine formulation. The military transformed into a professional army. In fact, it became one of the most successful institutions in performing reformation. Organisational change and the primary military role as state defender had been restored in maintaining national security. The transformation of military doctrine should be carried out periodically for military guidelines to carry out its main mission. Military doctrine 2012 was guided by the military until the administration of President Joko Widodo.

Joko Widodo's government transformed the military doctrine in 2018. The transformation of this doctrine appears to be a priority for his administration after appointing General Hadi Tjahjanto as the Indonesian military commander. This military doctrine 2018 perfected the prior military doctrine to serve as a guideline for the military in supporting government policies, particularly the global maritime fulcrum. Enhancements made to the doctrine are carried out as military guidelines in dealing with cyber threats and non-military threats, particularly the security of people. This is in line with the work of Benny, Sity & Moorthy (2018), that the state as the guarantor of people's safety should be able to protect its people from any internal and external threats. Threats in the era of globalisation do not derive from warfare alone, as they include human trafficking as well, which seems to be a crucial issue to date. The study is in accordance with the findings by Sity, Zarina and Rashila (2015), which investigated peace and security of the Southeast Asian region pertaining to the threat of human security, which is escalating and demands for cooperation between nations to overcome this issue. In this regard, the policy of global maritime fulcrum in the maritime security aspect must be harmonised with the Indonesian military doctrine. Joko Widodo appears to be the first civilian President who has carried out the transformation of the military doctrine during his reign.

CONCLUSION

The Indonesian military doctrine experienced evolution throughout the Old Order, the New Order, and the Reformation Era mainly due to domestic politics. The evolution of the Indonesian military doctrine served as a form of adjustment to the development of domestic politics, geopolitical areas, and the dynamics of global major powers. The formulation of the Indonesian military doctrine

is not concurrent with the formation of the military in Indonesia. The military doctrine was passed after twenty years of military formation that struggled to defend Indonesia's independence. In the reform era, the military doctrine served as a guideline to restore military professionalism after its involvement in politics during the New Order. The military doctrine also encouraged international military cooperation to deal with various forms of global threats.

The evolution of military doctrine took place across organisational, professionalism, threat perspectives, and operating patterns aspects. The military doctrine functions as a guideline in carrying out the task of maintaining national security, which must be formulated in synergy and integrated between forces. The reformation era has restored military professionalism by removing its involvement in politics with the formulation of doctrines that prioritised military professionalism in safeguarding state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and protecting the safety of the Indonesian nation. To supplement reviews on military doctrine, it is recommended to conduct a study on the correlation between the evolution of military doctrine and Indonesia's national security condition.

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